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To Juanita for not blinking when I started exhuming these bodies.
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ABSTRACT

Author: Denninghoff, Mark, E. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Political Order in the Modernizing Mormon Kingdom, 1887-1896
Major Professor: Mark Tilton
What was the function of political parties in colonizing the American West? How did the arrival
of national party politics impact the public lives and lived religious experience of everyday
Mormons? How did the Latter-day Saints disaggregate their hierarchal religious communities and
re-aggregate them into party affiliations that pitted co-religionists against one another? Mormons
had endured coerced adoption of secular public education, industrialization, a hostile military
presence and legal battles threatening the existence of the church. The introduction of national
political parties served as tipping point that precipitated the integration of this religiously
constituted community into the American polity at an astonishing pace. Interpreting Utah Territory
as subnational illiberal regime, this dissertation provides a new way of apprehending the Mormon
West. This dissertation highlights a period when religious identity was highly politicized in
subnational American politics. Latter-day Saint church hierarchs actively attempted to reverse this
trend in their region. Church hierarchs strategically divided the Mormon voting bloc equally to
simultaneously ensure access to political patronage from either party and to de-escalate the
salience of religion as a political identity. This strategic division of Mormons into the parties
allowed religious insiders to interact with religious outsiders and to begin working together toward
common political goals based on party identity and not religion. Since the impact of the party
divide was not felt the same in every region, I trace the impact of party divisions on Mormon
communities in northern, central and southern Utah. Finally, I flesh out how the church sought to
mediate between the political parties to mitigate the contentious nature of party politics in the
region. Using archival materials from politicians on the national stage, the subnational Mormon
elite and local church officers as well as the political experiences of local Mormon women and
men, this dissertation provides further evidence that state intervention into subnational regimes
can be understood as potentially reinforcing subnational regimes.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

“A Hard Pill to Swallow:” Federal Intervention and the Peculiarities of Nineteenth
Century Mormon Political Pluralism

John Barnes worked his way to the front of the meeting house with an urgent warning for
the visiting Latter-day Saint apostle Abraham H. Cannon. It was bitingly cold December
morning 1895 and the woodstove that warmed the meetinghouse left the front of the Mormon
meetinghouse chilly. Cannon, a nominal Republican, was about to call to the Sunday church
service to order when Barnes pulled Cannon aside with the warning. Democratic protesters
planned to disrupt the church services. John Barnes was a young Mormon and a Democrat. In
that order. His fellow Democratic Party members had asked Barnes to show solidarity with them
by publicly opposing the Latter-day Saint First Presidency members, George Q. Cannon and
Joseph F. Smith, and “perhaps other brethren who had taken active part in [Republican] politics.”
Joseph F. Smith had just recently used his concluding remarks at a general conference to present
a political charged rebuke of Mormon Democrats who refused to operate within the Churches
corporatist political framework. Mormon Democrats across the territory were appalled at his
partisan swipes. Thus, on this chilly Sunday meeting some planned to disrupt a specific part of
formal church liturgy when, in special church meetings, visiting church officials asked the
congregation to publically acknowledge their support for the highest councils of the Church. This
Mormon liturgical practice was meant to be a solemn occasion of communally witnessing their
consent to be governed by “prophets seers and revelators.” Mormons would have signified this
by raising their hands at a designated time. Barnes warned Cannon that when this moment came
in the service, these young Democrats were planning on refusing to raise their hand to sustain all
Republicans church leaders. Instead they were going to vocally oppose them.1 Because of John
Barnes warning the protest never occurred because the visiting leaders did not call for a the
sustaining of leaders. Instead, they spent their sermons excoriating those in the congregation for
the putting politics before God. For forty minutes Cannon urged the congregation to take care

1

Mormon Apostles were members of the second-highest governing body in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints (the First Presidency being the highest).
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that politics did not lead them away from the Church. In the same meeting Cannon’s fellow
Apostle, John W. Taylor, went even further to suggest that not approving the political behavior
of some of the more partisan Apostles was akin to rejecting the rule of all prophetic leadership in
the LDS church.2 Thus, both Apostles warned that Mormon Democrats were in threat of
excommunication and estrangement from their people if they continued to question the political
maneuverings of the highest ranking Republicans in the Mormon Church hierarchy.
From an outsider’s perspective, one might question: “why would John Barnes warn a
political rival in the Republican Party about this Democratic protest?” But, Barnes was exactly
the type of young politician the nineteenth century Mormon hierarchs hoped to cultivate:
Mormons with fluid party affiliations who were deferential to religious authority; Mormons who
would swing elections which ever direction the church leadership requested so the leaders could
maintain control of local politics. The last decade of the nineteenth century John Barnes was the
Democratic Chairman in Davis County in Utah. In spite of this fact, Barnes still worked “very
hard” to see that Republicans were elected during at least three campaigns. Why did this
Democratic Party official, go on the campaign stump for Republicans? Barnes felt that the
churchmen running on the Republican ticket “were better men than the Democrats.”3 Barnes
helped get Republicans Mormon leaders elected, even though he was a Democrat. This despite
the fact that multiple national Republican platforms for decades had called for the eradication of
the twin relics of barbarism: Slavery and Polygamy. Also despite the fact that most antipolygamy legislation targeting the Mormon people, was crafted and enforced by Republicans.4
One thing is clear from Barnes’ political behavior in the 1890s: religious identity meant more
than party loyalty to John Barnes.
As this example demonstrates, party politics in religiously constituted communities are a
bedeviling Gordian knot to untangle. The religious groups can be simultaneously a persecuted
group and an illiberal community that perpetuates behaviors inconsistent with a liberal
democracy. Which begs the question: How does federal intervention impact subnational social

He further warned his listeners “against corruption in politics as well as every other kind of evil.” Dec 8 1895.
Lyman, Edward Leo. "Candid Insights of a Mormon Apostle: The Diaries of Abraham H. Cannon, 1889-1895."
(2010)
3
Life Story of John George Moroni Barnes by Five Descendants compiled by G. Berenice Barnes Jones accessed on
FamilySearch Jan 17 2018
4
Gordon, Sarah Barringer. "The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth‐ Century
America." Journal of Supreme Court History 28, no. 1 (2003): 14-29.
2
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and religious institutions? Or similarly, how do religious groups navigate demands for
accommodation to the central government?5 My research uses a historical case to explore, how
the U.S. Federal government attempted to incorporate the nineteenth century Mormon people
into a patronage based national party system and how the Mormon people reacted to this
integration. Recent examples of how Muslim communities and other groups politicized religious
identities navigate party politics speak to the relevance of this topic.6
This dissertation provides an important theoretical backdrop for the above confrontation
between co-religionists of opposing political affiliations. While these tense disputes over church
influence in local politics were being played out in Utah, Congress had been weaponizing the
federal state to enforce laws in such a way that would be politically advantageous to the party in
control of Congress. Federal law enforcement officials enforced the anti-polygamy laws and then
the party in control for the federal law enforcement officials essentially extort a religiously
motivated subnational regime in Utah Territory. These local story if church control of politics
and the national story of politically motivated law enforcement are happening simultaneously
and are interconnected although they have often been told separately. Some scholars of
American political development have made efforts to situate state or territorial politics in a
comparative context, such as Robert Mickey and Edward Gibson. Mickey provides a
theoretically framed historical analysis of transitions from single-party rule in three states of the
U.S. South.7

5

Jaher, Frederic Cople. The Jews and the Nation: Revolution, Emancipation, State Formation, and the Liberal
Paradigm in America and France. Princeton University Press, 2009.
6
Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos. "Illiberal means to liberal ends? Understanding recent immigrant integration policies
in Europe." Journal of Ethnic and migration Studies 37, no. 6 (2011): 861-880. There are exact no parallels to the
large, isolated Mormon communities of the mid and late 19th century. However, there are some striking parallels
with some Muslim communities in a variety of contexts. Like nineteenth century Mormon communities, Muslims
are branded as having a strong illiberal character. Muslim communities today, like nineteenth century Mormons are
viewed with suspicion and hostility. Antebellum federalism permitted illiberal white supremacist ideology to coexist
alongside more liberal democratic systems for generations. For about 150 years, the system of federalism in the
United States was extremely decentralized. It allowed local regimes at the state and territorial level the freedom to
institute illiberal practices, if they so desired. An “illiberal practice” is an admittedly under-conceptualized and
nebulous term. However, some examples of illiberal practices could be oligarchic families, controlled media,
captured courts, political machines, or uneven enforcement procedures. For the purpose of this dissertation, I follow
Behrend and Whiteheads approach to the concept of “illiberal.” I interpret the term broadly to capture the many
sociocultural conditions that stand in the way of liberal democratic institutions, but may have fallen out of the
analysis if the focus were only on free and fair elections. See Behrend, Jacqueline, and Laurence Whitehead,
eds. Illiberal Practices: Territorial Variance Within Large Federal Democracies. JHU Press, 2016. See also
Amoretti, Ugo M., and Nancy Gina Bermeo, eds. Federalism and territorial cleavages. JHU Press, 2004.
7
Mickey, Robert. Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South,
1944-1972. Princeton University Press, 2015.
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An approach similar to Mickey’s, has never been applied to regime change in the
Mormon West.8 This dissertation- a case study of a critical juncture of party formation in a
subnational illiberal regime- seeks to explain one important element of process of national party
adoption: how was the equal party divide policy implemented and what was the fallout of this
policy? After Mormons sought patronage from their oppressors to stop the mass incarceration of
Mormon polygamists and the seizure of property, the LDS Church hierarchs attempted to
maintain local control by coordinating an equal political division in the face of external
liberalizing forces.
The subnational regime attempted to maintain control even though elite cohesion was
weak in Utah in the face of relaxing external threats.. External threats were no longer strong
enough to preserve a uniform message from disparate church hierarchs that were divided over
how much political pluralism was permissible. One faction within the Mormon elite encouraged
the adoption of party affiliations in the 1890s, under the assumption that “politics must be made
subordinate to the Gospel [so that] the Priesthood will [still] govern in all things.”9 As with most
other Christian denominations during this era, Latter-day Saint men alone held priesthood
offices.10 But the founding prophet of Mormonism, Joseph Smith, spoke of establishing a
“kingdom of priests.”11
Meanwhile, a rival faction in the church hierarchs elite was in favor of more political
pluralism and less church coordination of the Mormon people’s political affiliations. After
months of internal debates, the faction of church leaders that advocated more church
involvement in politics began touring Utah territory and stressing the message that the personal

8

Regimes are understood to be the set of norms, rules and practices that govern the selection and the behavior of
subnational leaders. Subnational regime continuity would only be possible if the national party leaders sought to
establish linkages with the incumbent regime instead of local opposition to the subnational regime.
9
John W. Taylor as quoted on October 20, 1895. Lyman, Edward Leo. "Candid Insights of a Mormon Apostle: The
Diaries of Abraham H. Cannon, 1889-1895." (2010)
10
Hatch, Nathan O. The democratization of American Christianity. Yale University Press, 1989. Many Latter-day
Saints considered the concept of priesthood mostly in terms common for Protestants of the day. In nineteenth
century America, the usage of the word priesthood denoted “the office or character of a priest.” Furthermore,
priesthood was “the order of men set apart for sacred offices.” Americans identified priesthood with religious office
and the men who held it. Mostly men served formal proselytizing missions, and performed rituals like baptism and
blessing the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. However, unlike those in various other religions, Latter-day Saints
extended priesthood ordination broadly to laymen. Over time, an extensive structure of priesthood offices and
quorums was established in Utah Territory where all male men were made into priests with varying degrees of
authority and stewardship.
11
Nauvoo Relief Society Minutes, Mar. 31, 1842, spelling and punctuation regularized, available at
churchhistorianspress.org; see also Exodus 19:6; and Revelation 1:6.
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vote with its associated character-based election cycles, was preferred to a dogmatic party
loyalty. The church hierarchs were invested in the local election outcomes and helped engineer
elections to reflect their strategy of balancing the parties to access national patronage. Political
losers in this church mediated arrangement protested against church leader’s involvement in
influencing election outcomes. Church leaders interpreted these protests of their role in politics
as apostasy. The church hierarchs subsequently cracked down on political pluralism in overtly
religious ways, such as using church discipline and limiting access to the churches highest
sacraments. Ultimately, the impact of the adoption of the national parties varied in intensity in
different regions in Utah Territory because of the religious elite’s failure to effectively
implement a cohesive collective strategy to control subnational politics.
The adoption of the national party system in the Mormon West was one of the most
important developments in the politics of the West and in the rise of modern Mormonism. It has
contributed to the ideological alignment of millions of Mormon Americans today. Yet, millions
of Mormons in the U.S. today practice a different mode of politics. For many Mormons in the
modern era, voting for the person instead of blindly following partisan loyalty is seen as a badge
of honor and approaches an article of their faith. This was most recently evidenced when more
than half of Mormons in Utah refused to swallow the bitter pill of a Trump candidacy and opted
for a third party Mormon candidate instead remaining loyal to the Republican party. The 2016
election made Utah seriously close to again becoming a swing state. Thus, understanding
modern Utah politics, requires illuminating the political development of the Mormon West.
This dissertation offers an optic for focusing on the Mormon West and the United States
in cross-national perspective. The remainder of this introductory chapter describes some
principle approaches to studying regime change and continuity in the Mormon West. I outline
the one used here. I describe the study’s research design, and I summarize the findings to come.
This dissertation is not a political history of the Mormon people. However, it illuminates how the
Mormon political participation has evolved. It studies U.S. party politics during a critical
juncture when the Latter-day Saint position vis-à-vis the United States was in state of strategic
flux.

15

Literature Review: Alternative Perspectives on Nineteenth Century Utah Politics
There are many interpretive frames that authors have used to make sense of the facts
surrounding the case of nineteenth century Mormon political integration in the United States.12 A
common historical argument is that the Mormon leaders capitulated to U.S. federal pressure and
the Mormon people simply conscientiously adopted American ideals in the late nineteenth
century.13 Another interpretation is that the Mormon people disingenuously promised to
assimilate, so they could perpetuate their insular religious community.14 Furthermore, many
accounts of this period depict the victory of U.S. assimilationist forces as inevitable, because of
the greater policing power and industrial might of the central U.S. government.
In addition to the variation in how the primary sources are interpreted, scholars have also
tackled different facets of the Mormonism’s political transformations. Most social scientists and
historians study the changes and transformations of Mormonism to answer the question, “When
did Mormons become modern?”15 Other social scientists question, “How does Mormonism
search for acceptance in the American body politic without losing its religious distinctiveness?”16
Whereas, the broader literature of regime change centers on the causes and conditions of regime
change that explain outcomes. One school of thought within regime change literature draws on
the literature of post-colonialism; other scholars use various forms of modernization theory.
Finally, one strain of the literature points to the increase of state power having an inverse
relationship with religious legitimacy. While most scholars have not studied the late nineteenth

12

Rogers, Brent M. Unpopular Sovereignty: Mormons and the Federal Management of Early Utah Territory. U of
Nebraska Press, 2017. Shipps, Jan. Mormonism: The story of a new religious tradition. University of Illinois Press,
1987.
13
Mauss, Armand L. The angel and the beehive: The Mormon struggle with assimilation. University of Illinois
Press, 1994; Alexander, Thomas G. Mormonism in transition: A history of the Latter-day Saints, 1890-1930.
University of Illinois Press, 1996; Lyman, Edward L. Political Deliverance: The Mormon Quest for Utah Statehood.
University of Illinois Press, 1986.
14
Bigler, David L. "Forgotten kingdom: the Mormon theocracy in the American West, 1847–1896." (2000);
Maxwell, John Gary. Robert Newton Baskin and the Making of Modern Utah. Vol. 37. University of Oklahoma
Press, 2013.
15
Simpson, Thomas W. American Universities and the Birth of Modern Mormonism, 1867–1940. UNC Press
Books, 2016; Flake, Kathleen. The politics of American religious identity: The seating of Senator Reed Smoot,
Mormon apostle. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2005; Alexander, Thomas G. Mormonism in transition: A history of
the Latter-day Saints, 1890-1930. University of Illinois Press, 1996. Reeve, W. Paul. Religion of a Different Color:
Race and the Mormon Struggle for Whiteness. Oxford University Press, 2015.
16
Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and J. Quin Monson. Seeking the Promised Land: Mormons and American
Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
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century Mormon West in terms of regime change/continuity, below I review these families of
explanations to explore what light they might shed on the Mormon case.
Many variables contribute to the democratization, including social divisions, colonial
legacies, religious traditions, modernization, international conflicts, elite pacts, institutional
arrangements, modernization, and culture.17 I now turn to reviewing modernization theory,
followed by social capital as lenses for understanding political change in Utah territory.
Modernization theory argues that democracy will a naturally grow in societies that experience
economic development because societal values are transformed by industrialization urbanization
and an expanding middle class. Thus, so the argument goes, once socio-economic conditions
meet a certain threshold, democracy will follow.18 Modernization theory if applied to the case of
Utah presents a benign argument that industrialization and economic growth in the Western
United States contributed to a change in values and the expansion of secularism and access to
education and a transformation of civic culture that is more conducive to self-governing
institutions. The transformed civic culture contributed to a greater acceptance of political
pluralism. There appears to be evidence to support that this occurred in Utah. But, there was not
widespread economic growth experienced by all levels of Utah society. The railroads connected
some settlements and not others. However both urban and rural Mormons in Utah were too busy
trying to survive the federal raids and the growing season to push for greater religious pluralism
and more social liberties. The arrival of the railroad and technological advances that increased
the mining communities in Utah, played a role in highlighting the conflicts between Mormons
(who were on the cultural margins) and with the comparatively modernized eastern United

17

Colonialism may seem like a conceptual stretch with little value added to the analysis of state intervention in a
federal state. The real draw is that colonialism addresses racially motivated influence. Colonialism could also be a
helpful framework because the inhabitants citizens of Utah Territory described themselves as being colonized and
infantilized by the “parent government.” A fairly orthodox operationalized definition of colonialism touches on
three elements: a colonizer makes a successful claim of sovereignty over a territory.Then, the colonizer exerts
influence over the occupied territory through the creation of an administrative structure that extracts resources and
enforces regulations; finally, the colonizer perceives the colonized population as different and usually inferior in
culture (as defined by race, ethnicity, religion, customs, and/or language) and denies this population full citizenship
rights. See Gerring, John, James Mahoney, Paul Barclay, Neil Englehart, Charles Kurzman, James Robinson, and
Nicolas van de Walle. "Colonialism and Its Legacies: A Comprehensive Historical Dataset.” Inglehart, Ronald, and
Christian Welzel. Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence. Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
18
Barro, Robert J. "Determinants of democracy." Journal of Political economy 107, no. S6 (1999): S158-S183.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political
legitimacy." American political science review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105; Klinghard, Daniel. The nationalization of
American political parties, 1880–1896. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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States.19 Yet, modernization theory would anticipate a slow emergence of democracy from the
bottom up and not an elite-led assigning of partisan identities to religious congregants.20
Often used in tandem with modernization theory, many scholars have studied the
relationship between social capital, economic growth and democracy.21 Using the social capital
framework, the Latter-day Saint economic cooperative movement could be seen as being an
accelerated generator of social capital. This increase in social capital in the region would have
contributed to the civic culture and the consolidation and effectiveness of democratic institutions
such as competitive parties.22 But social capital is not always conducive to healthy civic culture.
It only contributes to civic culture if the civic organizations create and maintain connections with
other groups and find common cause with different organizations that they may overlap in some
goals and not others.23 The conditions for deliberative democracy were engineered into the
physical spaces that Mormons carved out of their desert backdrops. Mormon villages in Utah
were modeled on the New England Township by both design and purpose. The nineteenth
century writer Alexis De Tocqueville highlighted the New England Township as creating
political institutions which inculcated “habits of the heart” where deliberation and discussion
awakened within villagers a desire for political involvement. Perhaps this was the case for
Mormons in their small villages along the frontier as well. Translating civic involvement in
building cooperative projects in a Mormon village in mobilizing voters was not a large stretch
when the national parties came to the villages. The habit of participation in deliberative decision
making in village and religious councils helped to generate a robust tradition of discussion well
before Mormons adopted national political parties or competitive elections. Thus, the social and
19

Rokkan, Stein, and Derek W. Urwin. Economy, territory, identity: Politics of West European peripheries. Sage
Publications, 1983.
20
Huntington, Samuel P. Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press, 2006. Huntington’s ideas
permeate my research in ways that are ubiquitous. My title is revised from Huntington’s work. Mormon society is
changing in some ways that reinforce Huntington’s arguments such as the railroad and the Sagebrush Democrats as
well as the organized opposition to the Mormon political establishment. But Mormon society changes much more
rapidly after the church hierarchs orchestrate the political divisions among congregations.
21
Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in
modern Italy. Princeton university press, 1994; Warren, Mark E., ed. Democracy and trust. Cambridge University
Press, 1999; Diamond, Larry. Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. JHU Press, 1999.
22
Social capital does not even necessarily lead to democracy. See Levi, Margaret. "Social and unsocial capital: A
review essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work." Politics & Society 24, no. 1 (1996): 45-55. Hirst,
Paul. Associative democracy: New forms of economic and social governance. John Wiley & Sons, 2013; Mooney,
Christopher Z. "Measuring state house speakers’ formal powers, 1981–2010." State Politics & Policy Quarterly13,
no. 2 (2013): 262-273.
23
Woolcock, Michael. "Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical synthesis and policy
framework." Theory and society 27, no. 2 (1998): 151-208.
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institutional conditions in Mormon society influenced political culture and constrained the
political decisions of the church elite when assigning parties.24 But this argument would expect
stronger democratic institutions in areas with stronger cooperative histories, a position that has
not been tested empirically.25
Furthermore, political science literature views economic modernization, with its attendant
secularization, often in a blunt and oversimplified way. With a few notable exceptions, the
majority of scholarly works on secularism, is sharply divided into two largely independent
categories: modernization case studies and secularization case studies (the retreat of tradition).26
The divide between these two types of case studies implies that modernization coincides with the
rise of the modern state and that secularization studies deal with the dismantling of pre-modern
traditional governing structures. For political scientists and sociologists, secularization is merely
incremental waning in the public significance placed on religion. Inglehart and Norris describe
this when they write that “factory workers did not pray for good crops – manufacturing
production depended on machines created by human ingenuity. With the discovery of germs and
antibiotics, even disease is ceased to be seen as a divine visitation; it became a problem within
human control.”27 This description by Norris is an example of what Charles Taylor calls a
subtraction story. A subtraction story is describes that modern Enlightenment rationality is what
is left over when you subtract the superstition of religious belief.
According to Taylor, the pre-modern worldview is one where the natural world was an
organized cosmos that functioned to point to greater signs and meaning beyond itself. This was
the world in which the Mormon people entered when they separated themselves from the United
States in 1847 and began settling the Utah frontier. The Mormon people lived in an enchanted
world, a world charged with spiritual significance.28 It is a pillar of secularization theory, as
mentioned above, that modernity “disenchants” the world. Secularization and modernization
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clears out the world of all its spirits; it disenchants the world. For example, in a disenchanted
world, diseases would no longer be considered demonic possession; mental illnesses were no
longer benign mystical possessions. The body was no longer considered “ensouled.” For Taylor,
disenchantment refers to simply the naturalization of the world. The magical world is dissolved
and we are left with the mere workings of matter that can be empirically measured by science.
Taylor argues that when secularization occurs that not only does the world become disenchanted,
but this disenchantment moves from the world and into “the mind” of most humans as well.
However Taylor explains that this process of disenchantment is not a nice tidy linear process. As
is evidenced at the turn of the century in Utah Territory, ritual healing and folk medicine,
demonic possession and belief in the imminent return of the Messiah operated (albeit with
tensions) alongside modernizing impulses. Priesthood authority and political authority competed
and the worldview, as presented in many of the journals in my research, demonstrate clearly
secular influences; yet, these journals still report a world that is also charged with holy
significance and presences. Nineteenth century Mormons adopted much of the language and
constructs of empirical rationality with some vestiges of the pre-modern tenaciously enduring.
Self-expression values, like partisan affiliation, became more important but the “survival values”
that emphasized loyalty to church leaders persisted and sometimes coexisted.29 Since this
dissertation draws source material from the rural villages of 1890s Utah and brings stories of
political tension from the Mormon frontier, we see examples of vote buying and character-based
political campaigns occurring often within the same town and within days of meetings where
Mormons are speaking in tongues and are worried about witches. In sum, this dissertation will
highlight the fact that constructs of tradition and modernity are not static and the process of
secularization is messier and more tenuous than facile models allow.30
As was briefly mentioned above, Taylor complicates this simple secularization thesis in
ways that reflect the messiness of the case I study below. For example, Taylor identifies three
different ways that a state can be secular. A secular state could describe a state one that is
religiously neutral, impartial, dispassionate, as in a usage of the phrase the “secular public
square.” A secular state could also mean when a state separates church and state. A final
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definition of secular could refer to more societal acceptance that humankind lives in an age of
contested belief where belief is no longer axiomatic. In other words, it is possible to imagine not
believing in God. Belief in God has become one option among many. Secularization is a slow
moving process and cannot be the most significant variable in explaining the rapidly emergence
partisanship in Utah Territory. Utah institutions in the 1890s did not become religiously neutral.
As will be shown below, political campaigns were often charged with explicitly Mormon tropes
and dualistic religious rhetoric. The second definition of secular does not fit Utah in this period
either. The Mormon elite still coordinated political competitions and handpicked candidates.
However, the third definition of secular was introduced inadvertently by the Mormon elite to
signal to the federal government that there was freedom of conscience. The church party was no
longer the only game in town belief in the church position was no longer axiomatic. Religious
warfare had lost its salience. The old antagonists buried there weapons and sought to create new
and different political alliances with former enemies. It became necessary to operate in a world
where coalitions had to be forged between people of different faiths to win political wars. In
sum, Mormons came to a societal acceptance that humankind lives in an age of contested belief.
Coerced Political Integration as factor of the rapid emergence of partisan conflict in late
nineteenth century Utah
Many different schools of thought tackle questions of how and why federal states
integrate minorities into a liberal democratic political systems and how this process impacts the
identity of the minority group. In a general way the question of how federal states negotiate the
existence of illiberal communities within their geographic borders have been addressed by
previous researchers.31 Previous authors have used theories of colonialism to analyze minority
groups within the United States in what has been called internal colonialism.32 This approach
helps explain the diversity of regional experience with state intervention and why enforcement of
federal law differs in different federal contexts. For example, Lisa McGirr’s book War on
Alcohol shows that before the implementation of prohibition law enforcement occurred, the real
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target of the future enforcement of prohibition was the working class, minorities and immigrants.
Interest group mobilization and debates surrounding temperance betrayed the fact that white
well-connected Americans and their clergy were intent on policing the leisure of urban
immigrants, and other ethnic minorities. Post-colonial literature argues that minority groups
within a federal context may, more often than not, be the subject of domination from the majority
and any state intervention is exploitative in nature and often racially or ethnically motivated.33
A different but not necessarily contradictory approach to explaining the variation in the
expansion of state capacity has been approached by other scholars. For example, Skowronek
submits that a systemic shift towards a corporatist state development began in the 1880s and
1890s and marked the beginnings of the modern American state. This occurred when vast
numbers of stake holders helped forge a more complex state apparatus in the early twentieth
century as the economy became more complex and industrialization expanded.34 The U.S.
modern state developed to in response to with the strains on society generated by
industrialization. The pressures of the expanding national economy and the breakdown of the
congressional bid for superiority in the federal government allowed the federal government a to
be more centralized, less politicized, and more rational and bureaucratic. But this process of the
emergence of the modern state was not one without historical contingency. It lacked a clear
smooth path dependent trajectory. Because for decades America was a strong nation with a weak
state, and state capacity increased based upon interventions into immigrant and racially
constituted communities. While a modern regulatory state began to emerge to deal with the
intensified industrialization of the United States, Congressional patron-client relationships did
not fade overnight.
Most of the literature about the rise of the modern state largely misses the fact that the
rise of the predatory penal state and intervention into the lives of immigrants had begun decades
earlier than often thought, with the mass incarceration of Mormons in Utah for sexual their
nonconformity.35 What often explains the variation of why a federal state attempts to politically
integrate illiberal communities is the argument of the predatory state. National political parties in
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the nineteenth century were organized like conquering political forces.36 They sought to
overwhelm an unincorporated group in society and subsequently force them to the bargaining
table. As Tilly’s metaphor of about politics as organized crime suggested, party leaders made
potential voting blocs politically vulnerable, then they offered them political protection in
exchange for their votes. Thus, any positive services or democratic outcomes that ever resulted
from party action was a largely an unintended byproduct of the party’s desire to extract resources
and expand its influence. The need for parties to compete with opposiing parties created the
pressure for party elite to raise revenues and acquire clients to help win elections. The need to
extract a lot of revenues to fund campaigns and distribute patronage and also the need to gain
large blocs of loyal supporters posed a problem for party leaders.37 One solution to this problem
was to coerce potential voters into a patron-client relationship. This would eliminate potential
voters for the opposition party and provide a source of revenue to support campaigns. If we view
the role of party elite as political entrepreneurs neutralizing competitors and extending patronage
networks, then any party policy, whether it is the reinforcing traditional gender roles or targeting
sexual nonconformity among Mormons in Utah, could be interpreted as an attempt to coerce or
neutralize political rivals so a party’s capacity to neutralize their competing opposition party is
increased. In sum, if we view parties as combative predatory neutralizers of competition, then
this bears a striking resemblance to the patronage linkages aggressively formed in the nineteenth
century party politics.
Argument of the Dissertation
While these explanations explain in part why there was a rapid emergence of partisan
conflict and a reactionary delay of subnational democratization in Utah Territory, none of these
explanations adequately capture the reasons behind the swift arrival of party fights in late
nineteenth century Utah and subsequent protracted democratization. The LDS assigning of party
identities combines causal mechanisms along with the relevant contextual layers to explain why
there was such a rapid emergence.38 Edward Gibson takes Schattschneider’s idea of the
nationalizing of a subnational conflict and argues that subnational democratization is achieved
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when the nationalization of a subnational conflict occurs.39 But Gibson argues that subnational
authoritarian regimes remain intact when incumbents successfully maximize influence over local
politics and prevent local opposition forces from accessing national allies and resources. Falleti
calls Gibson’s boundary control concept a portable causal mechanism; a mechanism that is
“portable across different contexts but may produce different results in analytically
nonequivalent contexts.”40
Boundary control mechanisms are more likely to operate in patrimonial subnational
authoritarian regimes. Patrimonial regimes operate where the state and its resources belong to the
individuals who lead it. Patrimonial regimes tend to favor the rulers’ or the selectorate’s own
family and friends in the governance and rule of the regime.41 Patrimonial regimes like in Utah,
have incumbents that can monopolize state resources, influence the local population, and control
or co-opt local opposition forces, thereby hindering coalition-making between opposition
politicians at the national and local levels.42
The above literature review should make clear two things: first, not all factors of the
subnational democratization are equally important and second, explanations of the context,
timing and sequence of state interventions do not account for important variables such as
religious traditions. The so-called colonial relationship between the United States and its
territories provides an explanation for why state intervention occurred, but it does not provide the
proper theoretical framework to understand the partisan state building involved in the
nationalizing of parties. The modernization argument appears important in theory but being able
to decipher when the Mormons became modern is incredibly difficult to study.
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In this dissertation, I propose to analyze Mormon political integration within a theoretical
framework that allows me to analyze the case of Utah as an illiberal society undergoing a
protracted subnational democratization. My work is an application of the state formation
literature and the subnational democratization literature with the addition of the variable of
religious identity. I use the case of nineteenth century Utah as a way to provide evidence for a
causal mechanism. Scholars have identified some general conditions where this problem is
found. Subnational illiberal practices seem especially common in federal systems with weak
central states.43 I use Edward Gibson’s mechanism of boundary control theory to understand elite
reactions to state intervention and their failure to control their boundaries to elite divisions. I use
Agustina Giraudy’s assumptions about vulnerable regimes being coopted by national regimes to
partially explain the regime continuity in Utah.44 Adopting a subnational democratization
framework is undoubtedly full of normative biases that must be interrogated and complicated in
the rehearsing of the facts below, but even still, this framework allows for useful comparisons
between other cases of subnational democratization within and without of the U.S.45
This dissertation interprets the following process: national partisan regimes such as the Radical
Republicans advocated for the dismantling of the vestiges in slavery in the South and of
polygamy in the Mormon West in the postbellum U.S. The Republican Party expanded their
partisan regime and patronage system successfully in the Mormon West, and unsuccessfully in
the South. The Republican-led federal raids in Utah Territory created a credible threat to
Mormon society. The Republicans offered the Mormon elite protection from their threat in
exchange for Republican electoral victories in Utah. The Mormon elite began encouraging their
people to adopt national political parties. The Mormon religious society was transformed into
divided factions of personality driven campaigns. Politics was subsequently suppressed by
church leaders in the name of community peace and harmony.
Presented more parsimoniously, I will trace the following process:
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Figure 1 Argument

Research Design
This dissertation has a few aims. First, it attempts to demonstrate that political institutions and
elite behavior, best account for variation in the modes of subnational regime continuity in the
settlements of Utah Territory, not merely preexisting conditions such as political culture or
economic modernization. Second, it seeks to investigate the possibility of the historical,
interpretation I advance in the third chapter- that by extorting subnational elites in the Mormon
West for votes, national party organizations aided and abetted the perpetuation of a subnational
theocratic regime much longer than would have been feasible given the regimes weakness. To
make this case, requires evidence tethered to theories and concepts from comparative politics. As
many scholars have pointed out, American Political Development has suffered from a lack of
research that situates the American case within the comparative perspective.46
Traditional treatments of this time period in historical works often suffer from a dearth
interpretive lenses to frame their analysis. My dissertation seeks to remedy the poverty of theory
in dealing with this case. I provide a theoretical framework synthesized from comparative
politics theories to interpret this period in hopes of putting this case into conversation with other
cases of subnational illiberal regimes.
In my analysis of this specific historical episode, I bring to bear a number of additional
theoretical assumptions that are not tested at any length. This dissertation fits within American
Political Development (APD) because it focuses on “the causes, nature, and consequences of key
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transformative periods and central patterns in American political history.” The case I study
below demonstrates a critical juncture in the selective expansion of state power.47 I adopt the
cleavage-critical juncture framework from Collier and Collier. Collier and Collier would call
this period which I study, a critical juncture.48 Critical junctures have been described as short
periods of time during which there is the choices of political elites will more greatly affect the
outcomes. The windows of opportunity when choices of political actors are more substantial, are
slowly closed after the critical juncture. After these initial choices during the critical juncture are
made, they become more likely to be reinforced and institutionalized. This institutionalization
provides parameters for the choices of subsequent leaders. Subsequent leaders’ agency is more
constrained than the leaders that operated during the critical juncture. In short, a critical juncture
affords an opening for strategic action of elites, which then constructs a “new normal” that
endures for some time until the status quo changes and again breaks down. I find this a useful
framework because I am interested in the questions it allows me to ask about how and why
things happened. As Falleti and Lynch explain, mechanisms, or the choices on the leaders’ menu
during a critical juncture, tell us what and how things happen.49 For example, how do local
religious actors interact? In periods of transition, how do elite actors and street level Mormons
come to believe what they do? What did religious actors draw on from past experiences? How do
policies of communitarianism and institutions that supported endure or change in the presence of
national party politics? 50 The mechanisms I am most interested in are the strategies used by the
Mormon leaders to maintain local control and secure protection in the face of intense state
intervention that initiated the transformation of the political system in nineteenth century Utah.
The comparison of the richly detailed narratives in this dissertation has some significant
drawbacks. It would be unreasonable to assume that I could test the theories that I use. The
theoretical approach I have laid out in this chapter is in part informed by the narratives; the
narratives I present below, therefore cannot test the theories I synthesize. Another drawback to
this research is the fact that this case study is of a highly specific and perhaps unique historical
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episode that resists facile comparison. I did not gather my data systematically. Instead, I relied
on process tracing to describe and explain democratization challenges and authoritarian regime
continuity. Process tracing often draws on “multiple types of evidence for the verification of a
single inference.” Through the creative and often chaotic bricolage of “causal process
observations,” that I uncovered and through a wide range sources, I pieced together evidence of
the existence of a causal chain. The inclusion and comparison of evidence of party adoption in
multiple varying settlements in Utah Territory increased the internal validity of the project, at the
expense of external validity. Despite these research complications, the extensive case study
research is appropriate because this case is under-researched and thus much of material is being
used for the first time in an academic work. Also, the subnational authoritarianism field is still in
its fledgling stages as a research discipline.
Cases
My research question was derived from an empirical puzzle. The question that initially
prompted my research was this: why would a persecuted religious minority join the political
party that was the instigator of much of the harassment? In my case the puzzle derived from what
little I knew about early Mormon political participation and thus my selection of cases was
constrained. I use the case study approach to do an in-depth analysis of one aspect of a historical
episode by applying existing theoretical frameworks to the case to allow the case to be included
in the conversation about subnational democratization.51 While this case appears hopelessly
historically contingent with the case of the political integration of the Mormon people being so
unique, there are avenues for comparison that subsequent researchers will find fruitful. Economic
historians have argued that the nineteenth century United States shares some similarities with the
newly industrializing developing nations around the globe.52 Thus, researchers will benefit from
the analysis since I situate it in comparative theories they will be able to infer how this case
speaks to the broader concepts and other cases.
The number of cases I study was also constrained. I spent two months in the archives of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter day saints, Utah State University, University of Utah
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Brigham Young University, Daughters of the Utah Pioneers archives and regional archival
repositories. I gathered extensive data on essentially one case that I now compare over a decade.
I can also compare it regionally in snapshots. The constraints on time and resources have made it
difficult to add further cases. Instead my research has exposed massive amounts of variation
along a number of potential comparisons. I limited my research to 1887 to 1896 in mostly Utah
Territory. This is the period of the most intense federal intervention and nationally scrutiny into
Utah Territory. The limiting of my scope to only Utah Territory is somewhat arbitrary. Mormon
majority towns in Arizona Idaho and California and Colorado could also be helpful, but the
territorial politics of each state are different but somewhat related. Other than brief historical
introductions and context, the majority of my original research falls under the period when the
federal government, empowered by the passage of the Edmunds Tucker Act in 1887, began a
much stronger intervention into the families, marriages and congregations of Mormons in Utah. I
compare the case of Reconstruction in the South with federal intervention in Utah. I compare the
transformation of Mormon social and religious institutions over this decade long critical
juncture.
Types of Evidence
I avoid the traditional surveys, military histories and biographies of central political
leaders. Most of these historical works focus only on political behavior of a handful of elite
actors in Salt Lake City and ignore the possibility of regional variance in other communities
within Utah Territory. I figuratively employ both a wide angle and zoom lens, interspersing
individual stories with political context. In addition to elite debates, I invite readers into the
private lives along the Utah frontier and tell stories in real time through diaries, letters,
photographs, military records and newspapers.
I use mostly journals for evidence. Diaries/journals and letters often recount processes of
marital and family interactions. Since state and societal actors were directly intervening into the
marital and family relations in Utah Territory, diaries are exceptional sources for reactions to
state intervention and the introduction of political pluralism. Said another way, within the pages
of journals and diaries I found the impact of a predatory surveillance-prone police state.53
Through the individuals and families described in the journals I was able to make some
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observations about the Mormon community in the nineteenth century. More specifically, I
gleaned insights from these journals to help understand how religious rituals played an important
role in creating a cohesive community and how party politics impacted community cohesion. I
have transcribed letters diary entries from over one hundred journals of women and men living in
nineteenth century Utah. These diaries are mostly from Mormons, but also some non–Mormon
journals and letters.
In addition to more than one hundred journals of which I have transcribed copies, I also
used a handful of incredibly important elite Mormon journals to shed light onto the attempts to
maintain local control and respond to the federal pressures to abandon important religious
practices such as economic communitarianism, polygamy, and priesthood involvement in local
government. The following eight journals of elite leaders lay bare much of the internal church
debates that helped formulate my argument about how the LDS elite tried to police up and
control the boundaries of their religious community amidst the increased federal interventions
and pressures to integrate into the national political system. The following individuals were
members of the “First Presidency” (the highest presiding quorum of the church) or in the
Quorum of the Twelve Apostles (the next highest governing bodies of the church). I had access
to the journals in full or in part of the following Mormon religious leaders: Wilford Woodruff,
Abraham H. Cannon, John Henry Smith, Heber J. Grant, Anthon L. Lund and Erastus Snow. The
following were other high ranking General authorities that were involved in dividing the LDS
church into political parties: Brigham H. Roberts, John H. Morgan, Andrew Jensen and Anthony
W. Ivins. I have access to their journals also. Other elite journals of import are restricted to
public access by the LDS church. However, some of the letters and most sermons from high
ranking leaders such as John Winder, Charles Penrose, letters of Joseph F Smith, and sermons of
George Q. Cannon are also available. A composite picture of all these elite accounts helped
flesh out the different factions and debates over how political pluralism was introduced into
Mormon communities and how they maintained de facto religious control while still gaining de
jure political integration with the national government.
Another source of evidence to understand the institutional reaction of the LDS church to
state intervention and coerced adoption of national political parties is the local minutes of church
meetings. I found and transcribed minutes of meetings from Mormon villages all over Utah
Territory, Northern Utah settlements, and Southern Utah settlements. I gathered minutes from
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various types of meetings: business meetings, sacrament meetings, Women’s Relief Society
Meetings, Youth church meetings, Ward Teachers meetings and testimony meetings. Testimony
meetings were especially helpful because these meetings offer any member of a congregation to
stand up in the meeting and share their convictions about Mormonism. They also served as
pressure valves in the community where Mormons could let off steam about things that were on
their mind and thus the minutes of testimony meetings across Utah Territory captured the
extemporaneous musings of Mormons and tongue lashing rebukes about political tensions that
were introduced in the community. Stake conferences as well as regional conference minutes and
priesthood meetings minutes were also helpful sources to view the hierarchical messages that
priesthood leaders transmitted to their wards and stakes. For Mormons, a local congregation is
called a ward. In the 1890s, most towns in Utah and Idaho had one ward which was presided
over by the presiding authority in the village called a bishop. The bishop along with his two
counselors, often called a bishopric, would function in both spiritual and civic duties in villages
and towns across the West. A stake is an organization structure used in the LDS church to
denote a cluster of wards which is run by a three person presiding council called a stake
presidency. This stake presidency usually presided over five or six congregations that were
designated to fall under their responsibility. When available, I also collected the minutes from
bishopric meetings and disciplinary councils. The institutional structure of the LDS Church
divides congregations geographically. Leaders indefinitely gave different messages to different
audiences. By gather minutes from all over the region this allowed me to put together a much
fuller picture of the how state intervention and the introduction of national political parties in
congregations impacted the church membership as a whole in Utah Territory.
I also use regional newspapers that cover Utah politics during the decade period from
1887-1896. These provide invaluable resources for the vitriolic interreligious political
competition during election cycles and often quote excerpts from political speeches of LDS
church leaders and other LDS political leaders. These sources are helpful, however many
newspapers did not employ stenographers or someone who knew short hand and the statements
reported do not always reflect the opinions of their sources. Many previous monographs relied
heavily on newspapers as a primary source of evidence and are largely concentrated in Salt Lake
City. While newspapers are incredibly important primary sources, the overreliance on newspaper
accounts by many scholars addressing this period has created a more sanitized and formal story.
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Their emphasis very different than the one I describe. In contrast, the newspapers do I use are
recently digitized regional newspapers that are not cited in most other monographs and provide a
new avenue of analysis and a reevaluation of previously held assumptions of regional differences
in political participation in the Mormon West.
I also employ a number of secondary sources such as monographic histories on Utah
statehood and the polygamy raids. Past researchers had access to more church owned materials
than I did. Recent policy changes in the LDS archives have restricted public access to many
sources that researchers in the earlier decades could use. Thus many secondary historical texts
are invaluable sources for opinions and journal entries or quotes of elite leaders that are
heretofore restricted archival data. To a lesser extent I use memoirs. James Henry Moyle’s
memoir is the most descriptive of the meeting when he was told by George Q. Cannon to
dissolve the church political party and adopt the national parties. The justifications that Moyle
records Cannon mentioning for abandoning the church party corroborates with other extant
sermons given in public by George Q. Cannon and his associates. However, as the language is
clearer and the reasons more detailed in the memoir, I quote from it. Another source I use are
oral histories. During the Great Depression, federally funded oral historians gathered oral
histories of Utah Pioneers and asked questions about Utah politics, polygamy and Mormon
lifestyles during the period. There was a set questionnaire and only a handful of respondents
gave information about the details of their reactions to the early political divisions. These are less
helpful because of their distance from the period, but prove useful in capturing how Mormons
remember this turbulent time in regional politics.
Summary of Findings
Different chapters of my dissertation answer different but related questions. In the first
chapter, I review the literature of competing explanations and explain my theoretical framework.
I outline its application to a historical episode in the democratization of the Western United
States: specifically, the decision of Latter-day Saint leaders to divide their members along party
lines, (sometimes arbitrarily assigning them parties). I frame my case within the context of
cleavages, critical Junctures and party evolution and create a map for what is going to be
analyzed in subsequent chapters to demonstrate that a use of a boundary control mechanism
inadvertently resulted in a diminishing of overt ecclesiastical local political control
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The second chapter interprets the actions of national actors. It is common to hear that the
United States was slower to develop a modern administrative state than the countries of Western
Europe.54 But the analysis in the second chapter shows that the United States actually began
intervening in the private affairs of many of its citizens a generation earlier than most scholars
have noted. During the late nineteenth century, competitive party politics in the United States
contributed to a rapid increase of the federal government’s capacity to be regulate the private
lives of citizens.55 Because of the U.S. federal system, this state intervention was incredibly
uneven and often racially and ethnically motivated. By comparing two similar cases with
differing outcomes, this chapter helps to explain why the Supreme Court permitted the expansion
of state intervention in the postbellum West and not in the postbellum South. This discussion
provides further evidence supporting the attitudinal model of Supreme Court decision making. I
demonstrate that the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned state intervention in Utah Territory, even
with its accompanying undeniable expansion of federal capacity because the federal government
accepted the narrative that Mormons in Utah were non-whites oppressing the white non-Mormon
minority in Utah Territory. Viewing Mormons through the lens of a racial construct, as a
barbaric “other,” permitted “civilized” peoples to delegitimize regional religious identities such
as those held by Mormons in Utah Territory. This chapter compares two similar regions of the
United States that both resented federal intervention in the postbellum period but nonetheless had
very different outcomes. The resented federal intervention of the both the South and the Mormon
West provide an opportunity to analyze how racist ideologies evidenced in Supreme Court
decisions contributed to uneven expansion of federal state capacity. Following many scholars I
define state capacity as a state's ability to achieve its specified goals.56 Below, I use the term state
capacity to describe the policing reorganizing of both the Southern states and the West, because
federal de jure authority to operate in the interventionist manner that the federal government
employed is not enumerated in the Constitution.57
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The third chapter discusses the federal intervention into Utah Territory in the post
Reconstruction era. Congress wielded effective power over the subnational regime of the
Mormon people in Utah. Congress in the hands of the majority Republican had enough leverage
to force the Mormons to cooperate with their requests. Mormons were vulnerable to federal
intervention because first, non-Mormons in Utah had successfully articulated their disadvantaged
position within the majority Mormon society of Utah Territory to an energized anti-Mormon
movement outside of Utah. Second, Congress had the political capital and the strategic will to
intervene into Mormon affairs. These two reasons made the Mormon people vulnerable to
federal intervention. When the ruling Republican Party in Congress sufficiently weakened the
Mormon institutions, the Mormons were forced to the bargaining table. Mormons wanted to be
released from the federal encroachments that came with territorial status; the federal government
appointed their governors; the federal government appointed federal judges that were openly
hostile to Mormon social norms; federal marshals tenaciously arrested polygamous Mormon
men. In exchange for relief from enforcement of laws, the Mormon elite would cultivate an
electorate that was no longer “hopelessly Democrat.” The federal government wanted the
assurance there was predictable chance that the Mormons would elect Republicans to
Congress.58 The federal government had the capacity to completely bring the Mormon people
into subjection through martial law. But, Republicans had incentives to reverse this course and
instead strengthen and sustain the Mormon subnational regime, since subnational regimes were
useful allies in elections.59 This chapter makes a major contribution because it reframes the
national Republican overtures to “help” the Mormons coerced patronage to secure votes instead
of an attempt to facilitate subnational democratization. Republicans crafted the anti-Mormon
legislation in Congress and then Republican operatives offered to sell Mormon leaders protection
from U.S. Marshals that were enforcing the Republican authored anti-Mormon legislation.
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The fourth chapter dives into the major elite divisions among the subnational Mormon
leaders within Utah Territory. This chapter previews the impact of the emergence of pluralism in
Utah. The Mormon elite became divided about how much the church leaders should explicitly
orchestrate the composition of the parties. All of the Mormon elite agreed that the boundaries of
their religious community needed to be protected and their autonomy and self-determination was
paramount. They differed on which strategies would be most effective in achieving regional
autonomy. The question that most deeply divided them was, how much pluralism should be
introduced into Territorial politics? Within the church elite, there were three camps: the partisan
Republicans, the partisan Democrats and a sizable portion of hard-liner leaders that were
ambivalent towards either party. The Democratic camp thought sincere partisan division would
discourage animosity between Mormons and non-Mormons in Utah thus limiting the likelihood
of the sectarian conflict and the adoption of anti-Mormon political parties. They worried that if
the church were involved in politics, the federal interventions to dismantle the church would
become more intense and severe. Another elite faction, the Republicans in church leadership,
believed that an equal partisan divide had to be manufactured so the Mormon people could seek
patronage from either ruling national party. For them protection required the church’s active
involvement in local partisan politics in a corporatist fashion. These leaders worried that sincere
party alignment would result in Mormons joining one national party and non-Mormons joining
the opposition and that bitter sectarian conflict would persist. The Twelve Apostles and the First
Presidency contested this topic for months until the debates spilled out into the public.60 For
example, Democrat Moses Thatcher “hoped [that the church] might never in the future sacrifice
principle to get down into the slums of politics.”61 These toxic partisan feuds among members of
the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles had an unintended byproduct for Utah’s transition from
theocracy to democracy. Political scientists studying democratization have emphasized the
importance of division among ruling elites as an important cause of democratization.62
Republican soft-liners formed a coalition with corporatist leaning hard-liners and adopted a
policy of manufacturing an equal party divide. Meanwhile, soft-liners that favored more
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separation of church and state began to defect publicly from the prevailing pragmatist position of
the other Mormon leaders.
In chapter five, using newly available data, I trace the process of the ecclesiastical
implementation of an equal national party divide in a religiously homogenous region. This
chapter explains how church leaders pitched the divide to Mormons and explained the policy’s
two functions: First, it established patron-client linkages with a powerful political parties that
would deliver relief from federal intervention into local affairs. Equal partisan divisions ensured
local autonomy for the regional Mormon majority because the regional group became a vital
constituency for national politics. The Mormon elite required non-interference policies in
exchange for electoral victories. The regionally dominant Mormon people, when equally divided
along national party lines, became a swing vote and the Mormon elite could shift the party
support to benefit which ever external power broker offered the most protection and relief from
federal intervention in local affairs. Second, equal partisan division de-emphasized the
politicized nature of the religious identities in the region. The salience of religious identity in
politics had contributed regional tensions and violence and had precipitated federal intervention
into local affairs.
In chapter six, I trace the reaction to the orchestrated division between political parties
from a variety of previously untapped sources. The church policy of coordinating equal party
divisions had several important consequences for the lived religion in Utah. Arbitrary equal
adoption of parties was only possible in Utah Territory with the active involvement of Mormon
leaders. The Mormon elite downplayed party differences and actively cultivated the personal
vote. This emphasis on the personal vote delayed the adoption of a party system organized
around policy programs. It increased the tendency towards personalistic politics where elections
turned into tests of the candidate’s personal piety. It increased verbal attacks of Mormons against
their church leaders and fellow Mormons.63 Negative campaigning tactics were common in
elections dominated by the personal vote. The intragroup tensions provoked an elite backlash
against party politics. Campaigns were “war-like” affairs.64 The increase in verbal attacks of
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Mormons against church leaders and fellow Mormons precipitated a reversal of the liberalizing
trend and the retrenchment of Mormon corporatist control of Utah Territory.
In sum, the purpose of my dissertation is not to generate some new grand theory. Instead
I use existing theories to analyze and explain a case to put this case in conversation with other
cases. This will help clarify and challenge our understanding of concepts such as state formation,
party nationalization and modernization. By so doing we might infer how this particular case
speaks to other cases. This dissertation studies a crucial period in the history of the American
West. It was the time when the battles that Americans are still fighting were set: battles over the
contours of the relationship between religion, immigration and citizenship, diversity and
inclusion.
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CHAPTER 2

“Zion needs Republicans:” Boundary Control and Subnational Democratization in Utah
Territory, 1887-1896

In this chapter, I provide an overview of them case; the case of a subnational illiberal
regime undergoing a rapid emergence of partisanship within a nationally democratic country. I
first provide a review of relevant literature to place this specific case in a broader context of
comparative democratization, followed by a description of my analytical approach. Specifically,
I review my adoption of the critical juncture framework for analyzing party formation in
nineteenth century Utah. I then analyze the three mechanisms implemented by the Latter-day
Saint church hierarchy to hold onto their regional power while simultaneously becoming more
integrated into a nationally democratic context.
I explain a theoretical framework and apply it to a historical episode in the
democratization of the Western United States. Specifically, the decision of Latter-day Saint
leaders to divide their members along party lines, (sometimes arbitrarily assigning them parties)
inadvertently resulted in a diminishing of overt ecclesiastical local political control. I argue that
assigning members to political parties was an example of what Edward Gibson calls a boundary
control strategy. Boundary control strategies according to Gibson can involve a range of
institutional strategies in both local and national arenas which are employed not to accommodate
and assimilate to the national government but instead to maintain the regional political control.
Subnational Democratization and the Loss Boundary Control
In Edward Gibson’s book Boundary Control he argues that democratization of national
politics does not automatically remove authoritarianism at the subnational level. In Gibson’s
cases studies, he highlights how subnational autocrats methodically and regularly intrude on
citizens’ rights by the use of both legal and illegal control of representative institutions.65 Gibson
further explains that authoritarian incumbents rely on three strategies to keep the boundaries to
their jurisdiction closed to democratic encroachments. First, autocrats try to keep a conflict local.
65
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Gibson says that this authoritarian intuitive to keep conflict local will allow them to
“parochialize power.”66 Gibson adopts Schattschneider’s idea of nationalizing a subnational
conflict. As Schattschneider argues, all conflicts consists of two parts. First, the few individuals
who are actively engaged at the localized center. The second part of conflict is the audience that
is attracted to the scene (either local or national). The audience determines the outcome of the
conflict. Schattschneider makes clear that as the scope of the conflict expands, the more intense
the conflict becomes. Intense outcomes invite an even larger audience and an even larger scope
of the conflict. Outcomes of conflict depend on the extent to which the audience becomes
involved in the conflict. For example, when a political institution controlled by a regionally
powerful religious majority disregarded the legitimate preferences of a non-Mormon minorities
living within their borders, and instituted policies favoring the ethnic majority, the groups which
were marginalized would lose confidence in the regional government’s institutions.67 Legitimacy
depends on the belief that the political process is fair and impartial.68 If minorities in a region
saw the political process as biased, then the presence of this overt bias could easily lead to the
minority in Utah Territory to appeal to national actors that were sympathetic to their plight.69
Gibson, building on Schattschneider, argues that subnational democratization is achieved
when the nationalization of a subnational conflict occurs.70 Thus, parochializing power is an
attempt by subnational incumbents to prevent the intrusion of national democratic actors seeking
to ally with local democratic oppositions so the local democratic opposition will not successfully
externalize the conflict. The second strategy subnational autocrats use to keep their power, is to
secure national power so these local autocrats can influence decisions about their jurisdiction
made by figures higher up in the administrative latter. Finally, authoritarian subnational autocrats
make an effort to monopolize the linkages between national and local politics. Gibson argues
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that subnational authoritarian regimes remain in place when subnational incumbents successfully
maximize influence over local politics and prevent local opposition forces from accessing
national allies and resources.71
Non-Mormons in Utah, beginning in the 1870s, had successfully nationalized their plight
and gained substantial support from the national leaders. Anti-Mormon legislation began to be
passed. As Gibson notes, in a political conflict between two groups with obvious power
asymmetries, the central goal of the regionally powerful group is to keep the struggle as private
and confined as conceivable. The goal for the politically weaker local group is to make the
political skirmish as nationally publicized as imaginable.72 So, for example, when a political
institution controlled by a regionally powerful religious majority like the Mormon people
disregards the preferences of the non-Mormon minorities living within its borders and instead
instituted policies favoring the Mormons majority, the non-Mormons which were marginalized,
lost confidence in the regional government’s institutions and attempt to nationalize their
conflict.73The present chapter applies the causal mechanism of boundary control, but it is applied
to the context of nineteenth century territorial Utah. Because of unique ethno-religious dynamics
in the region, the results of the implementation of these boundary control strategies are largely
undertheorized.
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Figure 2
As shown visually above in Figure 2, nineteenth century Utah can be considered a
subnational illiberal regime embedded in a national political arena. This national political arena
was more democratic and comparatively more liberalized than the theocratic Utah territory.
Comparing nineteenth century Utah politics to contemporary subnational politics in many parts
of the developing world is a reasonable comparison because just as in contemporary Latin
America, there were in Utah local strong men and a powerful a “selectorate” comprising a small
governing body of the church that decided who would run for office and which party would win.
In many ways, Utah was not unique in having a nominal subnational democracy.74
However, the nineteenth century subnational elite in Utah faced distinctive problems
from other similar cases in contemporary Argentina or Mexico, because of the religiously
constituted nature of Utah’s society. Subnational church hierarchs not only had to pretend that
they were committed to democratic ideals but, more important, they had to constantly fend off
local and national opponents to their rule all while also maintaining religious legitimacy. Since
Utah Territory only existed at the will of the central government, the entire territory could have
been dissolved with a congressional decision. To hold off the threat of their religious dominion
being undermined, the LDS church hierarchs sought to bring national allies into their local
conflict. The church hierarchs had organized a quasi-official church political party that competed
with the organized non-Mormon political opposition. By dividing the Mormon people equally
into the national political parties forced the local opposition and their national partners to divide.

74

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, Alastair Smith, James D. Morrow, and Randolph M. Siverson. The logic of political
survival. MIT press, 2005.

41

Church hierarchs sought to coopt and neutralize the local opposition by artificially creating an
equal partisan divide and to encourage the local non-Mormon opposition to buy in to the national
party system. This national party adoption undermined the coalitions between national and local
non-Mormons which, had they remained intact, were more likely to dismantle the local
religiously dominated governance in Utah. When this equal party division proved difficult to
manufacture, the church hierarchs resorted to informal controls of local politics. Since Utah was
a territory, under direct congressional supervision, the Mormon elites had relatively low
autonomy. This low autonomy incentivized the Mormon elite to resort to informal (instead of
legal and formal constitutionally protected arrangements) to control local politics.75 These
informal controls in Utah came in the form of corporatist control of interest groups, regional
political parties and local newspapers. Since Utah Territory had comparatively few formal
powers to shape their local institutions and elections laws, the church hierarchs implicitly
sanctioned voter suppression. They would also coordinate with village level church leaders to
throw elections one way the other.76
Cleavages and Critical Junctures
Nineteenth century LDS church hierarchs sought to orchestrate an equal party divide in
response to real threat of their territory and their church being dismantled. Scholarship of similar
periods of history have theorized that elite leadership becomes most important during periods of
extreme regime crises. The outcomes of political agents are least constrained during periods of
crises. Collier and Collier would call these periods, critical junctures.77 As has been mentioned,
critical junctures are short periods of time “during which there is a substantially heightened
probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.”78 Critical junctures provide
an opening for a type of strategic action, which then can serve to construct a new political
cleavage. This new political cleavage can that endure until the system changes or again breaks
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down.79 Within this critical juncture framework, mechanisms can be seen as the menu of options
that leaders can choose from during choose during this critical juncture.80 The mechanisms I am
most interested in, are the boundary control strategies used to maintain local control in Utah. In
this chapter I will specifically analyze the mechanisms that initiated the transformation of the
political system in nineteenth century Utah. Below, I show how LDS elites’ use of the boundary
control mechanisms during the pre-Manifesto era. These same mechanisms were less successful
during the post polygamy manifesto era because during the recently post-polygamy era there was
more uncertainty about LDS church positions and polices and thus more freedom for other
political cleavages to became salient instead of exclusively the Mormon vs. non-Mormon
cleavage.81
Nineteenth Century Utah: a Case of Subnational Authoritarianism
Instead of seeing temporal pursuits, such as economic development and political
engagement as a necessary evil, nineteenth century Mormon theology placed kingdom building
on equal footing with the welfare of souls. These two pursuits were inseparable. The
establishment of God’s Kingdom on earth, according to Mormon belief, required equal attention
to the temporal and spiritual needs. The founding prophet of Mormonism, Joseph Smith received
a revelation in the 1830’s that explained why nineteenth century Mormons felt no need to
separate their religious life from their secular pursuits: “Wherefore, verily I say unto you that all
things unto me are spiritual, and not at any time have I given unto you a law which
was temporal.”82 Mormonism had often been accused of collapsing the space between the sacred
and the secular in ways that offended American Protestants.83 For example, digging irrigation
ditches for pioneer Mormons was described as just as important manifestation of religious
devotion as constructing baptismal fonts or chapels.84 Nowhere is the radical collapsing of sacred
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space more extreme than within the realm of Latter-day Saint involvement in politics. Both
preaching and politicking, campaigning and street contacting-all were indispensable in the
realization of the kingdom of God. In a radical way, politics and government services and duties
were incorporated in religion.
The ambitious scope of nineteenth century Mormonism’s kingdom-building pursuits
necessitated a lot of political maneuvering and deliberation with the U.S. federal government and
its agents. For the pioneer Mormons settling the frontier of Utah Territory, they did not
deliberately separate between civic duties, political involvement or government service from the
spiritual duties of administering sacraments, and caring for the welfare of the inner spiritual life
of a congregation. Priesthood leaders purported to receive spiritual impressions and revelations
which revealed the mind and will of the Lord about politics in the same manner they clarified the
nature and attributes of deity.85
This kingdom building theology was secretly revealed decades prior to their application
of it in Utah. In the 1840s in the Mormon city-state of Nauvoo, Illinois, a small group of
Mormon church leaders and a few non-members created a council designed to create a governing
structure replace the governments of the world upon the second coming of the Messiah. This
council is an example of this collapse of the sacred and the profane. The Council of Fifty, as it
was called, was a secret organization meant to be the proto-state that would rule in all matters
secular and spiritual, pastoral and political in preparation to Christ’s return to Earth.
Mormonism’s founding prophet Joseph Smith had in his journal a plan to assign members of the
Quorum of the Twelve Apostles to “ame[n]d the constitution & make it the voice of Jehovah and
shame the U.S.”86 When it became apparent that improving the U.S. Constitution was easier said
than done, Smith received a revelation which made it clear in the minds of the early Mormon
leaders that written constitutions in God’s kingdom were an unnecessary formality; pieces of
paper would only slow them down in their quest to literally establish Gods Kingdom. Smith
recorded a revelation directed to these early church hierarchs: “Verily thus sayeth the Lord, ye
are my constitution, and I am your God, and ye are my spokesmen. From henceforth do as I
command you. Saith the Lord.” As the clerk of the Council of Fifty wrote, “The priesthood
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leaders were to become the living constitution and thus transmit the mind and will of God.” This
radical departure from constitutional democracy was political heresy. The members knew this
enterprise required oaths of silence. One Council member proposed that “every member of [the
council be] bound to eternal secrecy as to what passed here, not to have privilege of telling
anything which might be talked of to any person even our wives and the man who broke the rule
should lose his cursed head.”87
When this governing structure was put into place in Utah by Brigham Young and his
successors, the Mormon theocratic regime did not suffer from the same problems of instability
that other non-democratic regimes faced with change and durability over time. For example,
innovation, industrialization and social and political change was possible without a threat to the
ruling religious elite’s credibility or stability because of the theological mechanism of continuing
revelation. Religious legitimacy was maintained in the face of alterations to the cause of building
an earthly religious constituted society by prophetic revolution. In 1883, church president John
Taylor purported to received such a revelation. In this revelation, the Lord promised to continue
to bless the Mormon people with revelations through their prophet: “I will reveal unto you, from
time to time, through the channels that I have appointed, everything that shall be necessary for
the future development and perfection of my Church, for the adjustment and rolling forth of my
kingdom, and for the building up and the establishment of my Zion.”88 Thus, if the appointed
channels of communication from God designated that national political parties should be
adopted, that would not necessarily have precipitated a major schism within Mormonism. The
nature of the theology that Mormonism espoused called for a gathering of all truths (no matter
the source). Under prophet direction, all truths would be synthesized in the dispensation of the
fullness of times with everything that was “virtuous lovely or of good report or praiseworthy.”
All truths were to be sought after and brought home to their Zion community.89 Thus, if the
Latter-day Saint priesthood holders became “a living constitution,” which transmitted the mind
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of God, then Mormon leaders could adapt to new political social and theological arrangements
without widespread apostasy or threats to their ruling legitimacy. 90
Mormonism’s belief in the modern day guidance of prophetic revelation has largely
limited their adherence to any formal creeds. But largely in protest to the massive incarceration
of polygamists and the extorting of Mormon leaders, Mormons adopted an informal Mormon
creed which stated simply: “Mind Your Own Business.”91 The idea is that outsiders should
worry about their states and their affairs. Also this defensive pseudo-creed admonished insiders
that Mormons should do a better job at keeping polygamy discrete.
Figure 1 below, provides a map of the emergence of national parties in Utah during the
nineteenth century. It presents the various stages of the ethno-religious regimes’ responses to
pressures to democratize. The political institutions existing before the critical junctures in these
periods differed fundamentally from the resulting system. These changes are the result of
changes that occurred during the critical juncture. Once confessional parties emerged and
religious identity became politicized, the two-sided cleavages represented antagonist positions
with respect to the fundamental axis of cleavage. The scope of this chapter focuses on three
mechanisms and the output of a new cross cutting cleavage which was manufactured in the LDS
congregations in Utah. My unit of analysis is the LDS hierarchy. I analyze their decision to
manufacture party competition along the national partisan cleavage in responses to pressures to
democratize.
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Figure 3. Cleavages, Critical Junctures and Party Evolution in 19th Century Utah. Each
segment of the figure should be read across; the description of the resulting party system at the
end of each segment is then represented at the outset of the next segment down.92

For the analysis of the boundary control mechanisms during the 1887-1892 adoption of
political parties, I limited the galaxy of potential rival independent variables that make up the
background [B] of the case to: (1) The goal of LDS elite in Utah to get statehood (as will be
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described below as a boundary control mechanism). (2) The salience of the ethnic cleavage: nonMormons versus Mormons.93
A Mormon Ethnicity?
More must be said to justify the use of describing the conflict in Utah Territory as an
“ethnic” conflict. For many social scientists the primary defining characteristic of an ethnicity is
a myth of common ancestry.94 Unlike Catholics, Jews, Irish immigrants, or African-Americans,
the Mormons could not be easily classified or recognized based on foreign origins, racial
markers, a distinctive dialect or dress. The Mormon people’s lack of ethnic distinction from other
Americans is what made their successful missionary efforts and practices so disturbing. While
sociologist Thomas O'Dea calls Mormons “the clearest example to be found in our national
history of the evolution of a native and indigenously developed ethnic minority,” Mormons were
clearly not a distinct ethnicity. Yet, non-Mormons, disturbed by the Mormon people’s lack of
easily discernable physical distinctions, began to construct Mormons as racially distinct and
degenerate in their fiction, travelogues, news reports, medical studies and political speeches and
sermons. Americans began constructing and imposing an ethnic identity upon Mormons.95
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Figure 4 Racializing Mormonism into a Suspect Ethnic Minority
The Mormon story in America is an interesting example of the how racial identities are
constructed.96 In the case of the Mormon people, white Anglo Saxon Protestant nineteenth
century American leaders felt threatened by the growth of “alien” religious populations in
America such as Mormons. But these WASPS face obvious tensions with their political
traditions. On the one hand, American political leaders avowed the ideals of religious tolerance
and pluralism. At the same time, they were convinced that the creation and growth of a group as
religiously heterodoxical as the Mormons, was insufferable to “the sacred spheres of church,
family, and American society.”97 Republicans and the religious motivated moral crusaders that
lobbied them, constructed clear means to resolve this paradox: Mormonism was reimagined in
American rhetoric, as a degenerate ethnic group and not a group of religionists that should be
afforded protection under the First Amendment. This allowed Protestants and political elites the
convenience of mollifying their consciences because they could simultaneously lay siege to the
Mormon community while still profess a belief in religious toleration if Mormons were not a
religion but an ethnicity.98
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The historian Paul Reeves further describes that in the nineteenth century, outsider travel
writers came to Utah Territory in droves, and they described finding enormous groups of pale,
yellow-haired, sunken eyed and narrow-featured Mormon polygamists subsisting as dirt farmers
in a narrow strand of desert settlements. The Mormons, according to these authors, travel writers,
and scientists looked jaundiced their skin hanging off them like a walking corpse. Even the
Mormon lips were distinct. They were thicker than a white persons lips. The forehead was
unnaturally low, almost like a neanderthal. One writer explicitly concluded that these physical
characteristics had the “appearance of the new race.” But he argues that this new race was born
out of the morally depraved actions of the Mormon people. From these travelogues written by
outsiders, the Mormon ethnic stereotype was born. Terryl Givens gives an example of how this
ethnic contrast is later adopted in literature. For example, in Jack London's Star Rover (1914), a
character described the besieging Native Americans in the Mountain Meadows Massacre as
being accompanied by what appeared to be white men. To this observation the boy replies,
“They ain’t whites… They’re Mormons.”99 Most worrisome was the fact that “Mormonism
threatened the progress of Western civilization by initiating a racial regression to barbarism and
savagery.”100
With the helpful fiction of equating Mormons as a degenerate ethnic group, post-Civil
War Republicans began to unleash a flurry of explicitly anti-Mormon legislation without feeling
like religious freedoms were being curtailed. The above political cartoon in Figure 4
demonstrates the extent that nineteenth century Republicans viewed Mormons a distinct
ethnicity. Uncle Sam is portrayed as giving Chinese immigrants and Mormons the boot out of the
American bed.101 White Protestant Americans associated Mormons with both African Americans
and Native Americans in the nineteenth century, grouping them together with the enemies of
white civilization. Thus, like Native Americans, Mormons were faced with removal treaties they
were forced from homes and were also subjected to dehumanizing rhetoric. Also like American
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Indians, Mormons were consigned to a smaller land base over time in Missouri. Eventually, this
forced Mormons to their new land in northern Mexico, which eventually became Utah.102
This racialized view of Mormonism became ever increasingly pervasive. For example, in
1874 William Tecumseh Sherman wrote a friend about the American Indian “problem” and
while discussing the complex and difficult policy decisions that faced public officials, Sherman
compared the problem of the American Indians to that of the Mormon people. Sherman argued
that the both the Native American and the Mormon case were tough. In essence, Sherman wrote
that if the U.S. could not even get the Mormons to assimilate, then what chance did the U.S. have
in getting the Native Americans to do it? Sherman explained that both Mormons and Indians
needed to assimilate to the “White man’s habits,” but Sherman was skeptical about whether
either group would ever successfully be able to accomplish it. Sherman jadedly remarked that it
would be easier for a leopard to change his spots than for whites and Indians to, “live in peace
side by side…Even the industrious Mormons could not abide in Illinois.” Even after the
Mormons were exiled to the Rocky Mountains, Sherman continues, the “danger exist[ed] if
[Mormons were] to be permitted much longer to stay in…the desert of Utah.” Sherman predicted
that there would be further violence between whites and Mormons. He ended his letter
expressing relief that he was not responsible for dealing with either the Mormons or the
American Indians, because he was “certain there’s no peaceful solution except that of military
force.”103
While it is obvious that Mormonism generated no real ethnicity by the definitions
commonly used by social science, the political cleavages were organized and perpetuated as if
there were an ethnic conflict instead of a religious freedom debate. The political cleavage
between Mormons and non-Mormons remained salient a generation or more because of steady
non-Mormon population growth in Utah, and the subsequent discomfort that non-Mormons felt
towards Mormon claims of prophetic leadership as articulated by a U.S. president James
Buchanan in his State of the Union): “The people of Utah almost exclusively belong to this
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church, and believing with a fanatical spirit that he[Young] is governor of the Territory by divine
appointment, they obey his commands as if these were direct revelations from Heaven.”104
Furthermore, the Mormon millenarian world view reinforced the cleavages between
Mormons and non-Mormons in Utah. Many Mormons anxiously awaited the dissolution of all
nations and the creation of a literal ‘Kingdom of God’ on the Earth. Nineteenth century
Mormons believed in their ability to hasten Christ’s second coming by their actions and nonMormons took note of their apocalyptic rhetoric which seemed to betray a lack of loyalty to the
United States. For example, one non-Mormon living in Utah Territory recorded a sermon by
LDS President John Taylor. Taylor’s rhetoric raged, “And when the nation with which we are
associated is shaken to its center and crumbles to pieces…it will continue to fall and to crumble,
until it is no more, and bye and bye there will be an end of it. Not so with the kingdom of God; it
will stand, and continue to exist and spread and go forth.” Further apocalyptic rhetoric was also
employed by Taylor’s successor, Wilford Woodruff. One of Woodruff’s sermons contained a
line that Woodruff had hoped that Brigham Young had lived to see the United States “broken in
pieces like a potter’s vessel and swept from the earth.”105 Accounts of Mormon Apostles
requesting local town leaders to become Republicans are prime examples of persistent Mormons
beliefs [B] on creating a Zion community to hasten Christ’s return as rhetorical justification for
manipulating partisan divisions [CJ]. Layer1 represents the Manifesto of LDS president
Woodruff, which signaled to the nation and the Latter-day Saints that he had ceased the practice
of polygamy. This act was precipitated by lengthy discussions with potential Republican patrons
and was also occasioned by the emergence of virulent anti-Mormons seeking to take away the
vote from polygamists.
Nationalizing Inﬂuence [Context3]
This background context is important to mention because interactions between contextual
layers may be just as important as scrutinizing a single causal mechanism. But the thrust of this
chapter is not a rhetorical analysis of justifying the partisan manipulation, but an explication of
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the three portable boundary control mechanisms and how they interacted within context depicted
below in Figure 5.
B

Contextual Layers

L1
tO

E
L2
L3
C0

1870

C1

C2

C3

1889

1890

tI

C4

1891

C5

C6

C7

C8

1892

1893

1894

1895

1896

[CJ]
Note: B=Background; L=Layer; E=exogenous shock; C=context; t=time; I=input; CJ=critical juncture;
O=output.
B=Background: “rival independent variables:” modernization, the salience of ethnic cleavage, non-Mormons versus
Mormons which was fueled by population increases and the persistence of particular LDS doctrinal positions.
Layers definition: multiple unsynchronized layers of institutions, policies, and background conditions.
Layer1: virulent anti-Mormon’s winning local elections and attempting to disfranchise Mormons locally and the
“official” abandonment of polygamy by the LDS hierarchy
Layer2: actively seeking of patronage from national Republican Party
Layer3: non-Mormons Mormons adopting national parties
E: exogenous shock: Federal crackdown on LDS church  Republican extortion of Mormon elite.
C: context defined broadly, as the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or institutional) in
which a set of initial conditions leads (probabilistically) to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via a
specified causal mechanism or set of causal mechanisms.
t: time
I: input (independent variables)
O: output (dependent variables)
CJ: critical juncture

Figure 5. Periodization in multilayered contexts of National Party Adoption in Utah, 18701896.106

Having articulated the three main contextual layers that contributed to the emergence of
the boundary control strategy of creating the partisan division on LDS parishioners in Figure 2, I
now turn to the analysis of the boundary control strategies that are present in context 3. National
Republicans sought to coopt Mormons in Utah, but first Republicans had to appear to have
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successfully eradicated “the relic of barbarism: polygamy;” along with its cousin-vice: ethnoreligious authoritarianism.107
The salience of the ethnic cleavage in Utah Territory in 1891 is still a persistent
background constant [B]. The church had officially abandoned polygamy in 1890 as is shown in
[L1]. With the intervention of the federal marshals and a non-Mormon election commission, the
anti-Mormon Liberal party in Salt Lake City won municipal elections and was threatening to
disfranchise all Mormons from elections [E]. The LDS elite had successfully obtained the
patronage of key members of the Republican Party [L2]. The Liberal Party in Ogden divided
along national party lines [L3]. The LDS elite were faced with a different set of circumstances.
Prior attempts to parochialize power had led to an expansion of the conflict and the intervention
of the national government. Gibson’s boundary control mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.
One boundary control strategy could be seen as serving two positive outcomes for the Mormon
elites. For example, the Mormon elite could have been seeking to nationalize their influence by
promising national Republicans that Utah’s electorate would be manipulated to guarantee
Republican patronage election. This same strategy also served to parochialize the local elite’s
power in the subnational context by neutralizing the ethnic cleavage in favor of weak partisan
cleavage. Such was the case with the dividing of the LDS membership along national party lines.
It was motivated by a desire to parochialize power through splitting the anti-Mormon Liberal
party vote and also create a new cleavage of conflict other than religion. But it was also a
strategy to secure powerful patrons in the national Republican Party.
Securing National Patronage through Party Divisions
Abraham Cannon described the need to secure patronage through primarily courting
Republicans in these words: “Self-protection demands that we look to the Republicans for relief,
now that the Democrats have proved themselves cowards on our question.”108 In order to limit
the effectiveness of the non-Mormon minorities nationalizing the conflict, Mormon elites sought
to become players on the national stage. The Mormon elite did this through: (1) establishing
patronage networks with Republicans by promising to deliver votes to Republican candidates.
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During the intense federal raid period (1887-1891), but prior to the abandonment of polygamy in
1890, the Mormon elite began courting Republican patrons who would provide benefits such as a
reverse of the anti-Mormon legislation, granting amnesty to polygamists and being advocates for
statehood. In order to make their claims of vote assurance credible and to assure that the greatest
amount of influence, the Mormon elite sought to engineer an equal balance between Democrats
and Republicans in Utah.
From a strategic perspective, the logic made sense. Mormons sought to become a swing
state. Office seekers, like Republican Party politicians have different incentives than benefit
seekers such as the Mormon people. As the decades of anti-polygamy legislation made clear, the
Mormon people’s political goals were often in direct conflict with the Republican Party.109 The
Mormon elite “all believe[d] that this suspension [of polygamy was] merely temporary and that
God will open the way for his divine revelation to be established.” Whereas, national Republican
Party officials wanted assurances that polygamy was a “dead issue.”110 However, non-Mormon
office seekers wanted to win in Utah by a wide margin. Benefit seekers such as the Mormon
people, wanted the office seekers to win by a very narrow margin so the Mormon elite could
convincingly press their claims on the winning office seeker as to their being the critical deciding
factor that tipped their election to victory. With a narrow victory, office seekers would be more
constrained to reward their faithful – and pivotal- supporters with the benefits they sought.
However, the only way to convincingly press their claims, the Mormon elite had to demonstrate
how pivotal Mormon votes could be. Thus the equal divide was meant to engineer a swing vote
population. As Cannon cryptically suggested, “If we can divide them about evenly between the
parties, leaving an uncertain element to be converted to either side, it is thought the best results
will follow.”111 For example Francis M. Lyman preached to the Mormon congregations that
“[church] Authorities desired [Latter-day Saints] to divide about equally on national party lines
in order that we could receive favors from whichever party was in power… those who had not
already declared themselves Democrats and could conscientiously do so, should ally themselves
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with the Republicans.”112 In August 1891, Apostles Anthon Lund and Francis Lyman toured the
stakes in southern Utah and told them, [Republicans] can do something that Democrats can’t…at
least not until [the next election]! [So,]Court the side that is in power!”113 Apostle Abraham
Cannon recorded a report on the successes of overtures towards the Republican party prior to
polygamy being abandoned: “Though rabid anti-Mormons are working against the people…the
leaders feel as though Utah should be admitted as a State into the Union. Even Secretary of State
[James G.] Blaine is desirous of Utah’s admission.”114 In sum, the above section highlights the
strategy of the Mormon elites attempting to nationalize their influence to have their election
influence be decisive in key Republican races so that Mormon support would become decisive so
Mormon benefit seekers could convincingly press their claims on their Republican patrons.
By the summer of 1891 the plan to divide the Mormons politically has been leaked to the
local anti-Mormon newspaper. It correctly surmised that “the plan of the Saints [was] to give a
certain number of voters to the Republican Party and a certain number to the Democratic Party,
and to await the issue of the Presidential election next year. And if the man elected happens to be
a Democrat every mother’s son of them will be Democrats. If he happens to be a Republican an
overwhelming majority of them will be Republicans”115 National Republican operatives in the
past had listened to the opposition newspapers in Utah. However, in the 1890s, national
Republicans ignored the local non-Mormon outrage over political manipulations in Utah.
Patronage had trumped rhetoric about self-rule. Neither LDS Church hierarchs, nor their new
patrons in the Republican Party, desired a messy unruly sincere democratic arrangement because
that would be more difficult for them to control. Likewise, a volatile unruly electorate would
undermine the Mormon elites’ ability to establish predictable national party linkages by
consistently delivering elections to the party in control of Congress.
Defusing the Ethno-religious Cleavages in Utah Territory
Another major strategy of boundary control which was meant to parochialize power in
context3 was to assign national partisan on Mormons in order to defuse the salience of politics
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revolving around a particular axis of ethnic cleavage: non-Mormons versus Mormons. In 1890,
just one year prior to the divide along national party lines, President Wilford Woodruff had
argued that the Mormon people should stay unaffiliated with both national parties. However, The
context changed drastically after the municipal elections in Salt Lake City in early 1891 resulting
in Liberal Party majority candidates in control of the city government positions in Salt Lake
Valley. Influential Liberal Party politicians had to be neutralized. Adoption of national parties
was a possible solution for church hierarchs but they worried that a protracted social conflict
along sectarian lines would be perpetuated if a natural political alignment was permitted. The
sectarian conflict became more pronounced the more powerful the local non-Mormons became.
Apostle Cannon recorded a conversation with local People’s party official that predicted the next
steps of the Liberal party after their municipal election victories:
Charles W. Penrose said the effort will be made this fall by the Liberals to capture the
legislature, and then pass laws to disfranchise all Mormons. Hence every effort should be
made to reserve our rights. Every eligible man should become naturalized. He should
then see that he is properly registered and on Election Day should not fail to cast their
votes. Men have been appointed to visit the various Stakes and give instructions to the
people in regard to their duties.116
Threats of wholesale Mormon disenfranchisement were very real. Non-Mormon judges
barred Mormon voters that could not prove citizenship and they denied granting citizenship to
Mormon immigrants that wished to register to vote. Mormon disenfranchisement would have
allowed the non-Mormon minority to potentially dismantle the entire Mormon religious
community in Utah Territory. Then something happened in Ogden Utah that no one in church
hierarchy expected or knew how to handle. The anti-Mormon Liberal Party in Ogden, Utah
dissolved. Its members divided along national party lines. After weeks of cautiously observing
and constraining Mormons from abandoning the People’s Party, the Mormon elite acted. One
elite recorded the motives for the divide in his journal as being in reaction to the threat of an
aggressive local non-Mormon political power grab:
The brethren feel that these National Party organizations now taking place in our midst
will eventually bring us great relief, whereas if we do not give them our support the
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Liberal or Tribune gang will finally rule and ruin our fair country…The Tribune ring are
laboring very energetically to prevent the division of the people in this Territory on party
lines. They desire to continue the old antagonism until “Mormons” are robbed of every
vestige of right, and the control of the Territory is given into their corrupt hands. I hope
the Lord will thwart their vile schemes.117
In these entries above, we can read the anxiety of the Mormon elite. They feared that their
“country” would be ruined because all Mormons would be stripped of local control and rights.
The Mormon elite were responding to a very imminent threat and opted for a strategy that they
had deliberated over previously and had decided against. But now, the conditions were right and
the coordinated adoption of national parties began.
A First Presidency member, George Q. Cannon, met with and warned a group of People’s
Party officers about the specter of continued local anti-Mormon antagonism if the polticized
religious identities continued to be the key organizing feature of elections.
Our people think they are Democrats, but they as a rule have not studied the differences
between the two parties. If they go into the Democratic Party, the Gentiles will go into the
Republican Party because the great majority of them, especially the leaders, are Republicans
anyway. The Democrats will follow, and we will have the old fight over again under new
names. So, as many as possible of our people must go into the Republican Party…Those who
have no such strong predilections on politics should go into the Republican Party, and they
should feel that this is their right. One thing is certain, and that is that the old party fight as
between Mormons and non-Mormons must not be allowed to continue.118
Splitting the anti-Mormon vote to create a new cleavage of conflict would avoid this “the old
religious battle.” The non-Mormons would be weaker, but would be organized to engage in
political conflict that had less to do with polygamy and church doctrine or revelations and more
to do with securing votes for a national party and accessing mining contracts.119 Abraham H.
Cannon also reported the results of meeting mentioned above. He recounts that President Wilford
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Woodruff Joseph F Smith and George Q. Cannon took turns addressing the leadership of the
People’s party. Abraham Cannon said the combined message of all three members of the First
Presidency was that “they desired the Saints to join the different [national party] organizations.”
However, the First presidency expressed their concern that they did not want the former People
Party members to go as a groups to just one party: “If we can divide [all Latter-day Saints] about
evenly between the parties, leaving an uncertain element to be converted to either side, … the
best results will follow.”120 The uncertain element was apparently so local church leaders could
assure the outcome of any election at any level. At least some of the People’s Party leaders
seemed to have understood the strategy that the First Presidency was advocating got the
message. John Morgan a member of the council of the Seventy was present in the meeting as
well. John Morgan’s journal corroborates Abraham Cannon’s journal. He adds the language
discouraging a rush to join the Democratic Party. The People’s Party leaders were “advised that
the present Democratic tendency was not as it should be and more equilibrium should be
sought.”121 Cannon sought to replicate a system that was already in place in other regions of the
United States. Whether it was thousands of so-called “floating voters” in Indiana in 1890s
elections that exchanged their vote for liquor, a sandwich and five dollars or Mexican American
voters in Texas that were literally held in corrals and marched to polling stations by their ranch
bosses voter, rural elections in the nineteenth century were often manipulated by party
machines.122
Since the Liberal Party would split among Democrats and Republicans in Ogden and the
Mormons were to split evenly, the hope was that the anti-Mormon opposition LDS control of
Utah Territory would be significantly curtailed. For example, partisan breakdown of the 1896
Utah legislature illustrates the splitting of non-Mormon power from the assigning of equal party
affiliations. Had there been no manipulation of the party system, the following graph is what we
might have expected:
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Figure 6 Expected political alignment with sectarian conflict when ethno-religious parties
nationalize

As seen above, the counterfactual that the Mormon elite wanted to avoid, was the adoption of
the national parties with the same composition of the politically charged religious cleavages
which present during political warfare since the 1870s. What in fact occurred was an exquisitely
orchestrated division of the first Utah legislature. The Mormon and non-Mormon legislators were
split between the two parties. This diluted the local political power of the coopted non-Mormon
minority in Utah organized politics around national labels sufficiently to get non-Mormon buyin. The Mormons sought liberalize their society enough to secure local control free from
continued federal intervention. This local control finally came in the form of statehood in 1896.

Figure 7 Political alignment of legislature in the presence of manufactured political competition
Source: Drumm’s Manual of Utah, 1896.
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Conclusion
In sum, after three periods wherein a critical juncture included mainly boundary control
strategies such as the parochialization of power, in the period 1887-1896 the Latter-day Saint
elite adopted strategies in addition to trying to maintain local control. During the period I study
here, as the context changed in ways and stayed the same in others, the LDS church hierarchs
adopted different boundary control strategies to fit the changing local context. The decision to
divide on party lines was motivated by similar incentives as prior boundary control strategies
used by the church. Yet in the three other contexts 0-2 discussed, the conditions present were
necessary for a critical juncture but not sufficient. The salience of the ethnic cleavage intensified
as the non-Mormon population grew in Utah [Background condition].It was not until the
abandonment of polygamy [Layer1] and after the LDS church hierarchs had begun to make
overtures to the Republican party [Layer2] and when local non-Mormons were poised to
disfranchise all the Latter-day Saints [Exogenous shock] did the Latter-Day Saint elites resort to
adopting national parties [Layer3]. However this was not just an act of desperate capitulation, nor
was this an act of enthusiastic assimilation. The LDS elite felt the decision to assign national
parties would shore up their local power and establish important patron client relationships with
the Republican Party. When the LDS church hierarchs divided their congregations into national
political parties, this served to nationalize their power and helped them maintain their insular
religious community. The LDS church hierarchs wanted to expand all possible risk-and-reward
combinations. This expanded menu of options gave them the ability to creatively make (or if you
see this more cynically, to manipulate) political bargains that would ensure priesthood control of
the territory.123 The institutional outcome of the territory after a crisis of federal extortion was
determined by how successful political leaders were in embedding institutions that determined a
future leader's menu of options for the religious community. It inadvertently put them on a
course where future similar boundary control strategies would be met with greater hostility not
just from the outside but from with their own Mormon elite.
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CHAPTER 3

U.S. Federalism, State Capacity and Political Identity in Postbellum America

In the nineteenth century, the evolution of state capacity in the United States was
incredibly uneven. Why did the postbellum Supreme Court sanction federal intervention in some
regions of the U.S. and oppose federal intervention in others? By comparing two similar cases
with differing outcomes, this paper helps to explain why the Supreme Court permitted the
expansion of state power in the postbellum West and not in the postbellum South. This
discussion provides further evidence supporting the attitudinal model of Supreme Court decision
making.
Question of Interest
Following the rationale of the legal model, one explanation for uneven expansion of
federal power is that federal intervention into U.S. territories is explicitly sanctioned in the
Constitution. The legal model posits that when Supreme Court Justices decide cases dealing with
territories that they submitted to the legal constraints of the Constitution and placed their own
preferences aside. The legal model posits that this accounts for the uneven nature of federal
intervention. In addition to the legal model, which helps explain much of why federal
intervention was inconsistently sanctioned, what role did white supremacist124 attitudes in the
postbellum Supreme Court play in the uneven expansion of federal intervention?
Thesis
The attitudinal model of judicial decision making posits that Supreme Court justices’
decision making can be explained by their policy attitudes. Consistent with this model I argue
that racist attitudes and their accompanying policy preferences are an important explanatory
variable in the postbellum Supreme Court Justices judicial decisions dealing with how much the
federal government is permitted to intervene in subnational affairs. Thus, the Court struck down
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Reconstruction legislation in the South and upheld anti-Mormon legislation in West in part
because of white supremacist attitudes.

Regional Conditions

Federal Response

Postbellum South
 Semi-Sovereign
States
 Peripheral
 Pre-industrial
 Rural
 Illiberal practices
where white
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slaves



Federal
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intervention to
protect white
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Postbellum Utah
West
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 Pre-industrial
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Judicial Decision
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 Dual federalism
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opposition to
 State action
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doctrine
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 Federal-regional
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Justices/ fear of
racial degeneration





Dual federalism
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Congressional
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Judicial sanction
of Federal
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Figure 8. Method of Difference approach to Postbellum Supreme Court Decisions on Centralized
Federalism

The above figure highlights the relevant conditions in the two regions compared. It also
includes the federal response to these conditions, the arguments and attitudes in the Supreme
Court decisions and finally judicial outcomes. In order to identify important explanatory
variables between the racial policy preferences and the judicial decisions, I use two similar
regions that both experienced federal intervention. The comparative method of difference
involves comparing and contrasting cases that share attributes but differ on the outcome being
explored. The first column lists salient conditions that existed both in the postbellum South and
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the postbellum Mormon West that might help explain the judicial outcomes. Both regions are in
the political periphery within the U.S. federal system, though not to the same extent. Both are
rural and pre-industrial. Both regions’ local government engage in illiberal practices that
disadvantage a minority group in their region. The second column reports the federal response to
the illiberal practices in the regions.125 In both cases the federal government intervenes in support
of the minority to undermine the regional elites. The third column gives both the legal arguments
and the attitudes that may explain the judicial decision. The fourth column reports the Supreme
Court’s decision. The method of difference would have us identify in what significant ways the
two cases differ in order to infer a causal link to explain why the outcomes vary. The two major
differences are: the Southern states have a claim of sovereignty and autonomy that territories do
not have and the second difference is that in one case a white majority is persecuting a nonwhite
minority and the other case a non-white majority is persecuting a white minority. The legal
model (Cross 1997) would explain the variation based upon the territorial/state difference.
However, analyzing the language and arguments of the opinions provides significant support for
the attitudinal model as well.
The organization of my paper is as follows: First, my literature review discusses the most
prominent counter explanation to my thesis, political doctrine of dual federalism. I illustrate the
problems of competing identities that a federal system creates. I then explain how racialized
policy attitudes help to better explain the motivation for the Supreme Court’s sanction of federal
intervention in one case and its opposition to federal intervention in the other. Following my
review of the literature I discuss an example of federal intervention in the South and trace the
process of how such federal intervention was eventually opposed by the Supreme Court.126 I
contrast this example with a discussion of federal intervention in Utah Territory and discuss why
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the attitudes of the Supreme Court Justices best explain why they sanctioned intervention in this
case. I follow this with an extended discussion of how underlying white supremacist attitudes of
members of the Court help to explain why the expansion of federal power was unevenly upheld
by the Supreme Court. I now turn to the discussion of dual federalism.
Literature Review: Dual Federalism Legal Doctrine and the Attitudinal Model
Most political science research that seeks to explain judicial decision making, gravitates
around the debate between the attitudinal model, the rational choice or strategic model and the
legal model of judicial decision making. The legal model assumes that Justices submit to the law
and that they set their personal preferences aside to deal with the facts of the case.127 Consistent
with the legal model, a legal concept that partially explains the Supreme Court’s decisions about
federal interventions at the subnational level is called “dual federalism.”128 It was used to
designate the relationship between the federal government and the states during the period from
1800 to 1932. For the period of 1800 and 1932, many scholars characterize dual federalism as
having very clear demarcated responsibilities between state, territorial and federal
governments.129
When conflict did occur between the federal and state governments during the dual
federalism period, the U.S. Supreme Court played the role of arbitrating and establishing the
theoretical meaning and operational parameters of U.S. federalism. For example, prior to the
Civil War, the Court sided strongly on the side of states in deciding who was authorized to define
rights and citizenship standards. The 1833 Barron v. Baltimore decision made it clear that the
Bill of Rights only restrained the federal government. It decided the question, “Are civil and
political rights defined nationally, or are their important civil rights and liberties be determined
and enforced by the states?” The Courts’ answer was unambiguous: Americans were
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simultaneously “dual citizens.” Americans were citizens of their state and simultaneously a
citizen of the larger federal nation-state. But most rights of citizens were granted by the states.130
The court interpreted a very limited view of National rights. Rights such as the right to exit from
one state to another was national right. Given the language of the Bill of Rights which explicitly
stated that Congress shall make no laws (and does not mention states until the Fourteenth
Amendment), the Supreme Court could hardly have ruled otherwise. As would be predicted by
the legal model, the Courts found that the federal government’s power to define political rights
was limited by the language of Constitution. The power to determine a significant amount of
American’s rights, was passed on as responsibility of the state governments.131 The practical
outcome of the 1833 Barron v. Baltimore Supreme Court decision was that this decision gave
subnational power holders that controlled state governments the legal authority to construct and
to institutionalize illiberal subnational regimes inside states or territories.132
According to Rubin and Feeley, federalism is “a means of governing a polity that grants
partial autonomy to [subnational units which] are allowed to establish their own goals and
maintain their own values.”133 Both the American South and the Mormon West in the postbellum
period desired to establish their own goals and maintain their own distinct values and thus came
into bitter conflict in the postbellum period with the federal state which desired to impose
national goals and standards of citizenship and rights. In the face of federal legislation, the Court
remained adamant that the Constitution “authorized a political subunit of its own regime to adopt
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policies that…the leaders or the populace—regard as undesirable or objectionable,” such as de
jure racist policies that placed one race as inferior.134
Dual federalism is a potent legal doctrine that helps explain the legal rationale for many
nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions. I find it unnecessary to create a false dichotomy
between the legal model and the attitudinal model of judicial decision making. I view them as
existing on a blurred spectrum with overlapping explanatory power. As such, I seek to
demonstrate that one is not necessarily more successful in explaining judicial outcomes than the
other, but to demonstrate that empirically both were operative. However, in some cases the
attitudinal model provides more explanatory power. I now turn to discussing two comparisons
that highlight the utility of analyzing Supreme Court decision making based on policy
preferences.
Case Study: The Postbellum South
White Supremacy and Judicial Opposition to Federal Intervention
I begin with a discussion of the process by which the Supreme Court reached the decision
to oppose the expansion of federal capacity and the subsequent federal intervention into the
South. Following many scholars, I define state power as the nation-state's authority to
legitimately coerce individuals or organizations.135 Whereas state capacity is a state's ability to
achieve its specified goals. Therefore, an expansion of state power does not necessarily coincide
with an expansion of state capacity. For example, the U.S. Federal Government expanded its
legal power through expanding physical territory that legally was considered a part of the United
States when it signed the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. But state capacity, or the ability of the
state to achieve the specified objectives, came later when the military and federal marshals
combined with federal courts began imposing national standards of conduct on Western
settlers.136 I use the term state capacity to describe the policing of both the Southern states and
the West. The federal government exercised de facto authority in both the South and the West
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during the postbellum period, but since all facets of the implementation of their policies were not
explicitly sanctioned, their actions would fall under the concept of expanding state capacity.

Figure 9 In an 1867 Harper’s Weekly, portrayed an African-American man casting his ballot as
President Andrew Johnson and others look on. Getty Images

After the Union’s win in the American Civil War, a central government alliance in the
Republican Party took control of Congress and began passing laws directed at the former
Confederate states. Congress passed laws allowing full citizenship to former slaves. The
Reconstruction Amendments provided the justification for an expanded vision of federal power.
The Reconstruction Amendments were intended to extend national citizenship and national
political equality and implied a power to coerce noncompliant regions into adopting a shared
standard of citizenship for a largely integrated democratic system.137 Radical Republicans
viewed federalism in the Constitution as “not simply a set of limits on government but a source
of sovereign, positive regulatory government [which was] able to establish and enforce national
137
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rights.”138 Radical Republicans attempted to centralize federalism. Emboldened by the passage
of the Reconstruction Amendments that allowed federal control over the South, Radical
Republicans were initially successful in curtailing the political power of the enemies of their new
political clients, freed slaves. As Goldstone states, “Radical Republicans wanted probably the
largest experiment in social engineering ever... they wanted the federal government to take these
four million newly freed slaves and integrate them fully into society virtually immediately.”139
A Supreme Court test to the radical vision of the Reconstruction legislation was
inevitable. While the legal model may have reasonably explained judicial decision in the
antebellum Court, the attitudinal model is a more useful model to explain and predict judicial
behavior after the Civil War. As mentioned above, the attitudinal model posits that judicial
behavior can be explained by a Justices’ policy attitudes and the actual legal language was
merely post hoc rationalizing of the Justices policy preferences. However, the Justices retreat
into the so-called “plain language” of the Constitution to justify their white supremacist policy
preferences became even more tortuous and strained after the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments. These Amendments were intended to prohibit the racially based subjugation of
individuals and to provide for the political equality of citizens regardless of race. But the Radical
Republicans in Congress were clashing with the racist attitudes of Justices in the Supreme Court.
These racist attitudes constituted what scholars refer to as a racial order. The postbellum
Supreme Court “employed racial concepts, commitments, and aims in order to help bind together
judicial coalitions and to structure governing institutions through their decisions that expressed
and served the interests,” of other adherents to the belief in white supremacy.140 According to
King and Smith, racism was not simply an aberration of American liberalism. Racism constituted
American judicial politics. King and Smith further posit that uneven federal administrative state
formation in the U.S. has been the result of the conflicts within and between competing racial
orders. Therefore Radical Republicans in Congress competed to enshrine a racially inclusive
democratic order in the South and met resistance from the white supremacist attitudes in the
Supreme Court.
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In response to the Radical Republicans agenda to enfranchise former slaves and diminish
the old power of the white elites in the South, the U.S. Supreme Court began evaluating the
constitutionality of this Reconstruction era legislation and employed a number of different legal
arguments. In the 1870s, through a number of different Supreme Court decisions, the Court
reinforced an antebellum view of federalism and the Court struck down Reconstruction-related
laws passed in Congress. For example, the Court argued in the “Slaughterhouse” cases that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not make the Bill of Rights binding on states and state constitutions.
The majority opinion claimed that there were very few federally guaranteed rights. According to
the decision, trying to impose the Bill of Rights as rights that the states have to protect would be
“a great departure from the structure and the spirit of our institutions.”141 The Court tried to
safeguard their part of balancing state and federal power.142 The Slaughterhouse cases were the
first major legal blow to the federal government’s attempt to enhance and expand state capacity
and to allow interracial democracy as the standard in the United States. The rationale of the
Court was unmistakable: the Federal Government had illegitimately assumed powers to shape
the goals and character of Southern state’s political regimes. However, when racial attitudes of
the Court are taken into account it is clear that these legal arguments are post hoc rationalizations
of the decision and not really the causes of them.
The attitudinal model of explaining judicial behavior would interpret this same judicial
outcome from the perspective of policy preferences of the Supreme Court Justices. The majority
of the Court viewed nonwhite races as biologically inferior and therefore public policy would
dictate that they maintain the viability of the “white race.”143 The social construction of race in
the nineteenth century which permeated scientific and societal attitudes assumed that “inferior”
races would undermine political and social institutions associated with a healthy communities.
Civilized races were seen as capable of self-governance, whereas “barbaric” and backwards
races were predisposed to authoritarian rule. Even a close proximity to an uncivilized race may
even jeopardize the white race and leave them racially degenerate and their institutions polluted.
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Thus, nineteenth century ideas of race were fluid and this racial fluidity caused a heightened
sense of anxiety for white Americans because a white person could catch racial degeneration like
one might catch a cold if they were exposed to a so-called racially inferior population for long
intervals.144 Therefore a government policy of separation of the races was thought by the
majority of the Court as the “order of Divine Providence” and therefore good social policy. This
policy preference of segregation is more clearly seen in subsequent cases.
The “Slaughterhouse” decision was followed by two more important decisions that
undermined the Radical Republicans’ attempt to mandate a uniform national identity with
common goals and values onto the South. These two subsequent cases were Cruikshank and
Reese. In the Cruikshank case, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment gave the federal
government authority to act only against actions perpetrated by the state government when the
state government violated civil rights. The Cruikshank case did not give the federal government
authority to intervene into the states if a private citizen's violated another private citizens civil
rights.145 The Courts argument was that Congress could pass laws against official “state action.”
This argument would result in tying the hand of the federal government. The federal government
would not be able to prosecute extrajudicial violence perpetrated by subnational political actors
unless they were official state actions. Thus, lynch mobs and domestic terrorist groups such as
the Ku Klux Klan were out of the purview of the federal government.
In addition to the Cruikshank decision, the Reese decision further undermined the federal
government’s ability to impose a uniform national identity. In US v. Reese, the Court nullified
important parts of the 1870 Enforcement Act. The 1870 enforcement act sought to protect voting
rights of newly freed African American slaves.146 But again, the state action doctrine, as
interpreted by the postbellum Supreme Court, argued that the protections of the Fourteenth and
the Fifteenth Amendment can only be enforced when the coercive power of the state is used
against an individual. The federal government or state government could not criminalize the
discriminatory infringements of the Fourteenth Amendment when one private individual used
force to discriminate against another individual. The postbellum Supreme Court used the state
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action doctrine as an implicit sanction for racial subjugation and they retreated back into dual
federalism interpretations of the Constitution while dealing with the South.
While overt racially charged language betraying the white supremacist preferences of the
Supreme Court justices are missing in the Slaughterhouse, Cruikshank and Reese decisions,
these cases do result in policy preferences that enshrine white supremacy in the South. The fact
that the policy implications of these three decisions resulted in racial subjugation provides
support for the argument that the Court sought to perpetuate the racial order which benefited
whites and excluded blacks so as to maintain the racial integrity of democratic institutions and
so-called “civilized” society. Furthermore, a preponderance of decisions that strengthened the
white supremacist racial order and highlighted the need for racial separation in the South is
further evidenced by the Courts’ upholding the state bans on interracial marriage in Pace v.
Alabama. In Pace v. Alabama the Court argued, “Whatever discrimination is made in the
punishment prescribed…is directed against the offense designated and not against the person of
any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is
the same.”147 In other words, the state law was not violating the Fourteenth Amendment because
it was not directed against interracial marriage but the “evil” results of such marriage: “a
mongrel population and a degraded civilization.” In the eyes of the Court, the true severity of an
interracial couple’s offense did not really stem from the interracial relationship, but instead that
sexual intercourse could end in a mixed-race child and subsequent racial degeneration. Further
fears of racial degeneration and implied inferiority of African Americans are evident in the
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) decision, in which the majority opinion of the Court argues,
“Following the order of Divine Providence, human authority ought not to compel these widely
separated races to intermix.”148
In sum, the Court undermined the Republican Party’s remaking of federalism and struck
down their attempts to apply the Bill of Rights to states and private citizens within these states in
order to further their policy goals of undermining the perceived threat of an interracial
democracy. Their post hoc rationalizations for their decisions often hinged on the worry of the
growth of federal power and the unauthorized increase of federal state capacity. This resulted in
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the repudiation of centralized federalism that saw the role of the federal government as meaning
to be able to assure certain standards and uniformity of the national identity. Republicans wanted
the federal government to have sufficient strength to mandate the cooperation of citizens to
overcome the historical cleavages resulting from sectionalism, industrialization and racism.
Instead, the Court attempted to protect the rights of regional governments and limit the
expansion of the federal government.149 By undermining the key Reconstruction legislation, the
Reconstruction coalition in Congress was undermined and eventually fell apart giving rise to the
“Solid South” and the denial of civil rights and liberties.150 These Court decisions legally
reaffirmed the sub-systemic autonomy of the states in the name of curtailing the federal footprint
in local and regional affairs. Southern states reconstructed home rule and established de facto
subnational authoritarian regimes and de jure racial segregation that persisted into the midtwentieth century.
Case Study: The Postbellum Mormon West
White Supremacy, Judicial Sanction of Federal Intervention
In contrast to the outcome of the Reconstruction legislation where the Court opposed
federal intervention in the South, the Court sanctioned drastic intervention in the Mormon West.
Why did the Court decide that the Radical Republican coalition in Congress was acting in a
dangerously invasive way towards the Southern United States but upheld Congress’ efforts in
dismantling the Latter-day Saint institutions inside Utah Territory? Perhaps the most obvious and
consequential answer is that as a federal Territory (not a State), Utah was ultimately subject to
Congress and thus did not have the Constitutional protection rewarded the Southern States. This
cannot be overlooked. The Courts role of protecting states’ rights and limiting federal rights did
not apply in territories of the United States. The language of the Reconstruction legislation
extended the explicit powers of the federal government as worded in the Reconstruction
Amendments and Congress was on safer footing when legislating on behalf of a Territory. As
Article 4 states in part, “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
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Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” The key
here is that Congress has explicit power with respect to the oversight and administration of
territories. Thus, the Court was constrained in the South in ways that they were not constrained
in deciding on the cases involving federal intervention in Utah. The Supreme Court had more
difficulty striking down Congressional acts governing territories by using arguments about a
federal-state balance of power when such federal state asymmetries did not exist.
However, an emboldened federal government with an expanded national role in the
territories is like a hammer looking for some nails. Surely the language of the Supreme Court
decisions, while admitting that Congress could undertake a massive expansion of federal
capacity, would also at least warn of the danger this expansion implies. Did the Supreme Court
fear that an expansion of state capacity might lead to assumed federal authority to intervene in
ways that are not expressly sanctioned in the Constitution? Did the Court worry that today’s de
facto federal capacity might later become tomorrow’s de jure federal authority? The minority
opinion in Late Corp did fear this expansion of federal power. But in Late Corp., the majority
Court decision sanctioned the draconian mass incarceration and the turning over of legal
property rights of church owned land to the federal government. The Court did so, in part
because the Mormons were constructed in American popular imagination as sexually
nonconforming and ethnically distinct from white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Given the
incremental expansion of federal state capacity to police its citizens, it is worth noting how little
the Court in 1890 worried about the centralizing trend of federal state capacity that the campaign
against the Mormons symbolized.151 A helpful model to discuss the Courts sanction of federal
intervention is the racialized nature of the federal administration of territories. The attitudinal
model best explains why the Courts role as the arbiter of federal power was not used in the Late
Corp. decision. The Court was more concerned with implementing policies that protected a
besieged white minority population from a lecherous non-white Mormon majority.152 While the
Court recognized the Congressional role in the administration of territories, the Court did not
engage in a robust discussion about the federal power grab and the expansion of federal capacity.
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Nor did the Court attempt to similarly curtail the activist federal government from assuming
powers not enumerated in the Constitution as they had done in the cases striking down
Reconstruction legislation. Instead, the Court gave Congress a blank check to expand to the point
where it had the capacity to disenfranchise voters and dissolve religious institutions.
White Anglo Protestants within the Eastern States and within Utah Territory viewed
Mormons as an ethnically degenerate group. Eastern WASPs viewed settler colonies in the
western U.S. as a tabula rasa. These new settlements were to be a place of new beginnings in
which “civilization” would arrive and domesticate and regulate the rough spaces and barbarous
peoples.153 Many thought the federal government should intentionally engineer the Western
United States’ settler communities to include “civilized” peoples to ensure their success and to
fill up the so-called “empty spaces” with whites. The historian Paul Reeves argues that the
boundaries of whiteness in the nineteenth century were flexible and fluid. This created a lot of
white anxiety about racial degeneration. Proximity to racial inferior groups threatened racially
superior groups with the specter of civilizational decline. The fluidity of racial categories also
enabled Eastern WASPs to assuage their fears of “catching the disease” of racial impurity by
rhetorically distinguishing their whiteness from those they considered as racially suspect. In this
time period, copious amounts of uneasiness about Mormon religious ideas and social practices of
polygamy, racially integrated worship and rumored cases of interracial sexual relations and even
marriages was evident in the news reporting, travelogues, Congressional testimonies and
salacious dime novels.154 As a result of these White Protestant fears, the phenotypically white
and native-born Mormons were cast as a racially backsliding separate race. Reeves shows how
the U.S. Anglo-Protestant majority marshaled preexisting stereotypes of the native savage, black
slavery, sexual nonconformity and non-Western barbarism to further “otherize” Mormons and
deny them full participation in the American polity. As part of this process, Mormon bodies were
marked as different and degenerate, a physical regression from the white ideal and a threat to the
progress of Western civilization and thus incapable of self-rule.155
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Figure 10 “Woman’s Bondage in Utah,” from Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 1882.

It is worth emphasizing that this pervasive theme of casting Mormons as backward
oriental barbarians was an attitude that was echoed by both Congress and the United States
Supreme Court as well. Republicans adopted a racially constructed view of Mormon
backwardness and barbarism as evident in a speech of a Republican Senator on the U.S. Senate
floor amidst the fury to pass stricter anti-Mormon legislation. He justified these draconian
measures by roaring, “It is said that an altar of sacrifice was actually built… in the temple block,
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upon which human sacrifices were made.”156 Such vitriolic rhetoric was common place for
Republicans to toss around in late nineteenth century America.
As a result of racializing Mormons in their rhetoric, influential Protestant leaders took
special relish in fomenting hatred for Mormons. Reverend DeWitt Talmage gave a sermon in
1881 on the subject of President Garfield’s assassination. This minister solaced his audience with
the thought that “if the death of Garfield shall arouse the nation to more hatred of that institution
of Mormonism…he will not have died in vain…though I can’t be sure of the assassins affiliation,
the villain clearly had the ugliness of a Mormon, the licentiousness of a Mormon, the cruelty of a
Mormon, the murderous spirit of a Mormon.”157
Given the widespread public disdain for Mormon’s sexual nonconformity in the
nineteenth century, Republicans in Congress found it was politically advantageous and infinitely
less divisive to shift the attention away from their failure to establish Reconstruction federalism
in the South and instead focus on dismantling the illiberal practices of allegedly “nonwhite”
Mormons oppressing white Anglo-Protestants in Utah Territory. Radical Republicans viewed the
Mormon elite much as they viewed the Southern slaveholders. Mormon leaders, like the
backward South, were viewed as tenaciously deep-rooted lords living off the backs of those
beneath them through a form of the serfdom of polygamy and priesthood. Both systems were
abhorrent deviations from representative government and free enterprise.158
A series of legislations targeting Mormons in Utah contributed to the increase of federal
capacity and authority in the Western territories. For example, when Congress passed the
Edmunds Tucker Act it accomplished a number of things that enhanced the role of the federal
government in Utah Territory. One way for the federal government to encourage frontier
territories to develop a nationalist identity was through compulsory education. Compulsory
education is meant to build a common language for problematic populations as well as
indoctrinate students with a particular nationalist identity centered on patriotism, heritage, and
the “right” ideas about religion.159 Compulsory education also expanded the central
156
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government’s power to impose a unitary identity on a population across different regions. The
Edmunds Tucker Act stripped the Mormon Church of its legal status and the federally appointed
officials in Utah to use church money, properties and buildings to run public schools in the
Territory. The Edmunds Tucker Act eliminated the job of Territorial school superintendent. This
essentially gave the federally appointed Supreme Court in Utah the ability to appoint outsiders
aligned with the national government to take control of all public K-12 education in the territory.
The Edmunds Tucker Act further gave the federal government control of the curriculum of
public school by demanding that Mormon themed texts or authors be banned for use in schools.
It also called for the federally appointed education officials to monitor, through data collected,
how many Mormons and non-Mormons attended and taught in the schools. This data would
allow the federal education officials to ensure that Mormon teachers did not outnumber the nonMormons teachers.160 Since Mormonism was considered a criminal organization and a peddler
of superstition, it went without saying that Protestant Christianity would be the basis of morals
taught in the schools. The Edmunds Tucker Act also mandated that prospective voters, all
people serving on juries and all public officials take an oath where they publically renounced
polygamy.
The Edmunds Tucker Act also drastically restructured the legal landscape in Utah. It replaced
powerful local probate judges that beforehand had expansive jurisdictions. The probate judges
were stripped of their extensive jurisdiction federally appointed judges were to fill this legal
vacuum.161 Federal law enforcement officials and a massive military presence had been
intervening and penetrating Utah society to dismantle the illiberal institutions of polygamy and
theocratic dominance. The Edmunds Tucker act allotted funds for hundreds more of nonMormons to become deputized federal marshals with the resources to visit even the most remote
Mormon villages and enter house after house looking for sexually nonconforming Mormons. The
Edmunds Tucker act transferred seized Mormons assets to federal control so the federal
government could continue to afford to intervene into Mormon communities to attempt to
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radically reimagine the social makeup of Utah.162 By policing the polygamists in Utah Territory,
the U.S. federal penal state also exponentially increased as the penitentiary population exploded
with incarcerated Mormons.163
Just as with the backlash to the Reconstruction legislation, the anti-Mormon legislation was
destined to be challenged in the Supreme Court. One might expect that this mushrooming of the
federal intervention into the private lives of individuals in Utah Territory would have worried the
Court. After all, path dependence would dictate that these assumed federal capacities were less
likely to retreat and more likely to become entrenched and be used on other populations even
within the states.164 However, the Court sanctioned the coercive federal surveillance and the
policing of Utah along with the accompanying expansion of state capacity and the centralized
federal power. Unlike the cases that undermined the Reconstruction legislation, in the language
of the majority decisions upholding federal intervention in Utah the Justices spent very little time
worrying about the out of control growth of the federal police-state. Instead they focused on the
sexual nonconformity of the Mormon people and the innate criminality of their leaders. The
Courts policy preferences were to protect the white minority population from a radical
transformation of the social order by the racially suspect Mormons.165 In the South, the
Republicans were trying to dismantle the powers of whites to favor freed black slaves. In the
West, the Republicans were trying to dismantle white slavery and the system that disadvantaged
the so-called white Anglo protestant (non-Mormon) minority. The Court sanctioned their efforts
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with little to no hand wringing about the expansion of federal government that was present in the
language of the Reconstruction decisions.166
When the Supreme Court upheld the Edmunds Tucker Act, the Court used overt racial
language and orientalist arguments that made clear their policy attitudes. As the majority
decision written by Justice Bradley in the Late Corp. case argued, “Schools and education [are]
the most natural and obvious appliances for the promotion of religion and morality.” He
continued, “Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”167 The
function of federally funded public education, according to the majority court opinion, was to
reeducate the Mormons and teach [real] religion, morality and other knowledge necessary for the
cultivation of self-governing citizens and the eradication of barbaric uncivilized tendencies
among the Mormons. The U.S. Supreme Court called Mormonism an “open offense against the
enlightened sentiment of mankind.”168 As Justice Bradley argued in sustaining the law
disinvesting the LDS church of property, he argued that Mormonism was criminal and
“abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized world.”169 Justice Bradley further
reflects the nineteenth century belief that to officially sanction the existence of Mormonism
would hasten a return to barbarism and that Mormonism’s propaganda was a blot on Western
civilization. He continues: “[Mormonism] is in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to
the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western
world. The question, therefore, is [should] the promotion of such a nefarious system and practice,
so repugnant to our laws and to the principles of our civilization…be allowed to continue by the
sanction of the government?”170 In other words, were Mormonism permitted to grow, it would be
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repugnant and would hasten racial degeneration. Thus the policy attitudes of the Court majority
was clear. Mormonism had to be stopped so as to maintain the “Anglo system of laws.”171
Simply put, Justice Bradley and those joining his decision voted the way they did because they
preferred the separation of barbaric and civilized races from coming into proximity until the right
education was implemented to uplift the Mormon people.
Further evidence from the language of the decisions that the attitudinal model more
successfully explains the Courts decisions than the does the legal model, is found in the voting
behavior of Justice Miller. Although in the Slaughterhouse cases, Justice Miller wrote the
decision striking down the federal governments’ attempt to radically expand its role in granting
and enforcing national rights, in the 5-4 vote in Late Corp. Miller sided with expanding federal
role in policing the citizens of Utah. Meanwhile, the dissenting opinion in Late Corp. argued in a
similar vein as did Miller in the majority Slaughterhouse opinion. Justice Lamar argued in the
dissent:
congress is restrained, not merely by the limitations expressed in the constitution[sic], but
also by the absence of any grant of power, express or implied, in that instrument. And no
such power as that involved in the act of congress under consideration is conferred by the
constitution, nor is any clause pointed out as its legitimate source. I regard it of vital
consequence that absolute power should never be conceded as belonging under our
system of government to any one of its departments. The legislative power of congress is
delegated, and not inherent, and is therefore limited.172
The worry of federal overreach was expressed in the dissent but the majority were more
concerned with dismantling a racially degenerate and toxic subnational institution parading as a
“religion.” The Supreme Court decisions supporting federal actions in the West and stymying
this action in the South are explained, in addition to the significant difference between territories
and states, by a perpetuation of white supremacist attitudes that Mormons were less deserving
recipients of protection and more akin to the “thugs of India [who] imagined that their belief in
the right of assassination was a religious belief.”173
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Conclusion
I have compared two similar cases with very different outcomes: the postbellum
American South and postbellum Utah Territory. During Reconstruction Radical Republicans in
the U.S. Congress desired to remake the federal state into a strong, more centralized body with
the power to impose a consistent goal and vision on all citizens within the United States.174 The
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions to nullify Reconstruction reforms in the South and to sanction
similar reforms in the West, is best explained by (in addition to Constitutional constraints) to
racist policy attitudes among most of the Supreme Court Justices in the postbellum era.
Decisions concerning federal intervention and expanded federal capacity “may [have been]
motivated by considerations other than those of a legal character.”175 Attitudes about white
supremacy help to explain why in the post-Reconstruction era in territorial Utah, the Court
sanctioned the Republican controlled federal government in its efforts to expand the federal state
capacity and to centralize power in the federal government and in the South a call for similar
federal expansion was curtailed.
The U.S. Supreme Court was able to enshrine white supremacist preferences in the
Southern states by arguing that the federal legislation unconstitutionally centralized and
consolidated power in the hands of the federal government and gave the central government too
much authority to intervene into state affairs when citizens of the state were threatened. In the
case of Utah Territory, the Court largely ignored fear of federal consolidation of power and
upheld federal legislation that centralized federal authority in the federal government and
allowed the central government to generate the capacity to intervene when citizens’ rights were
threatened. Federal intervention into both the postbellum South and the Mormon West and the
Supreme Court’s response to these interventions, is most successfully explained by the policy
attitudes of the Justices rather than the legal meaning and intention of legal texts.
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CHAPTER 4

“Securing Mormon votes and influence:” Federal Intervention and Clientelism in Late
Nineteenth Century Utah
In the late nineteenth century a popular American pastor said, “Unless we destroy
Mormonism, Mormonism will destroy us.”176 Most nineteenth century Protestant Americans
agreed that the “miserable corpse of Mormonism” needed to be buried by the U.S. Government.
Therefore, between 1870 and 1896 the national Republican Party used the power of the U.S.
government to incarcerate thousands of Mormons for their sexual nonconformity.177 The
government stripped thousands of Mormons of their voting rights and supported initiatives to
help convert Mormons to Protestant Christianity. These explicitly sanctioned state actions were
couched in language of eradicating barbarism and theocracy. However, this rhetoric was a mere
ruse. Republicans wanted to become political patrons of the Mormons to ensure that Mormon
authorities directed their congregations to vote for Republicans.
After the American Civil War, federal officials in Utah Territory sentenced and
imprisoned thousands of Mormons. One historian has call this the most coordinated act of
religious repression within the history of the United States.178 Legal historians have wondered
why the federal government stopped short of completely dismantling the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints when the federal Government had the Mormons on the ropes.179 Moreover,
scholars have wondered why the federal government permitted the Mormon religious institutions
to remain fused with politics in Utah in the 1890s and beyond. The Republicans that controlled
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both Congress and the White House in 1890 could have finished the job of disfranchising
Mormons and wrestling political control from a truly crippled church power structure, had the
federal government confiscated more church property and dismantled the cash flows to the
church hierarchy.180 The answer to the question of why the U.S. federal government stopped
short of “burying the corpse of Mormonism,” lies in National Republicans incentives to engineer
Utah Territory into a viably Republican region. The Mormon elite were vulnerable to being
coopted by Republican operatives.181
The National Republican party had every incentive to maintain Utah a patrimonial
theocracy (while cosmetically appearing to be more politically pluralistic democratic). A
patrimonial regime controlled by Mormon elite could encourage large masses of Mormon voters
to vote in any way necessary “in order to gain [Mormon] liberty.”182 While the Mormon majority
Territory of Utah had many unique and historically contingent aspects to it, American politics in
the post-Civil War era displayed all kinds of corruptions and distortions in other regions as well.
Neither Radical Republican dominance in the Reconstruction South, nor the autonomous local
governments of so-called “redeemers” after 1877 bear scrutiny in terms of fairness and
procedures. While it may have been, as historian Brian Balogh argues, that during the nineteenth
century, the American national state seemed largely “out of sight,” many special groups—Native
Americans, African American freedmen, and western Mormons, for example—keenly felt the
exertion of partisan administered state power in the final decades of the nineteenth century.
There are serious continuities that between this fairly obscure case and democracies in the
developing world today.183
Thesis
Since the federal government had enough leverage to force the Mormon subnational
regime to cooperate, the federal state had an incentive to perpetuate the subnational regime.
Subnational regimes are useful allies in elections, especially if their leaders can mobilize voters
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to vote as a bloc.184 But given the rhetoric used by allies of the Republican Party in power in
Washington about burying the “Mormon corpse,” Republican support for Mormon regime had to
come with cosmetic concessions of the local regime. In the case of nineteenth century Utah,
Mormons wanted to be released from the federal encroachments that came along with territorial
status. For example, the federal government appointed Utah’s governors and most of Utah’s
judges. These federal appointees were openly hostile to Mormon social norms. In addition to the
judges and governors, Federal marshals had tenaciously arrested polygamous Mormon men and
women for decades. The Mormon elite sought relief from the enforcement of laws aimed at the
Mormon people and church institutions. For their part, the Republicans in control of the federal
government sought a reliable political client. In order to form the patronage linkage with national
Republicans, the Mormon elite sought to demonstrate that Utah Territory was not “hopelessly
Democrat” and that there was a chance for Mormons to elect Republicans to Congress. 185
The institutional conditions of Utah’s religious hierarchy further encouraged Republicans
in Congress to coopt by the Mormon people. Mormons in the intermountain West constituted, to
a remarkable degree, a separate non-democratic body politic that effectively competed with the
U.S. government for legitimacy for decades.186 Nevertheless, the Republican operatives saw, an
opportunity to forge an alliance for elections with the LDS church hierarchy. As defined
previously, patrimonial regimes are defined as regimes where the state and its resources mostly
belong to the individuals who lead it. Patrimonial regimes favor the rulers’ own family and
friends in the control and administration of the system.187 Nepotism in LDS church leadership
and the fact that much of the church property and holdings were legally owned by the president
of the church or his family, indicate that describing the religious governance of Utah Territory as
184
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patrimonial as a reasonable classification. Patrimonial regimes, such as the one operating in Utah
Territory in the postbellum period, had incumbents that could monopolize state resources. LDS
church hierarchs could influence their local religious population. Church hierarchs could also
hinder or help coalition-making between opposition politicians at both the national and local
levels.188 The Mormon social structure was patrimonial. The institutional framework in Utah was
centralized power in the hands of the local religious leaders who often held the property rights in
their own names for large amounts of church land and goods. Lower level local religious such as
bishops and stake presidents, reported to their superiors in the church hierarchy. National
Republicans further observed that Mormon teachings and practice often blurred the distinction
between public and private interests which would make religiously motivated requests for votes
more consistent with the expectations of the lay Church members. Finally, the communitarian
Mormon village identified dependencies within the village that could be mobilized and exploited
for political gain. In sum, if the Republican Party were successful in coopting the Mormon
people, electoral victories for Republicans in Utah would be more likely.189
While the patrimonial structure of Mormon society would ensure a ready-made voting
bloc, the patrimonial structure of Mormon society also explained why the Mormon elite had
withstood and neutralized federal attacks for decades. These same institutional characteristics
that would be beneficial for winning electoral victories for Republicans, also contributed to the
Mormons’ capacity to withstand federal intervention for such a long time. With power in Utah
Territory in the hands of Mormon elite, the Apostles and prophets of Mormonism were able to
effectively communicate the church’s official defiance to federal intervention in Utah Territory
to members in the pews. As one of the Mormon elite and counselor in the First Presidency,
Joseph F. Smith, wrote to one of his wives, “I cannot see the use of mothers with whole flocks of
little helpless children being driven about the country for fear of a mob of deputy marshals. If
they call on you, my darling, to go before the Grand inquisition or court--I want you, and I mean
it too, to tell the God damned fiends that you are my wife now and forever, and they may help
themselves.”190 Never were the Mormons more united and defiant than when they felt they were
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being persecuted. Joseph F. Smith’s private defiance expressed to his wife, was also echoed to
the whole church by the President of the Church, John Taylor in 1884:
God has given us a revelation in regard to [polygamy]. I did not make it. He has told us
certain things pertaining to this matter, and [the federal government] would like us to
tone that principle down and change it and make it applicable to the views of the day.
This we cannot do; nor can we interfere with any of the commands of God to meet the
persuasions or behests of men. I cannot do it, and will not do it.191
This hardline stance which was encouraged all the way down the church hierarchy and which
permeated the most remote Mormon villages, would explain why the Mormon people were able
to rebuff federal intervention for more than two decades.192However, after the passage of federal
legislation in 1887 attacking directly the church institutions, Republicans in Congress had
enough leverage to force the Mormon elite to cooperate.
Although much historiography focuses on Republican opposition to polygamy and
church-influence in Mormon politics, archival sources describe that Republicans cared less about
polygamy or democracy in Utah Territory and more about getting Mormons’ votes.193 State
power was used and manipulated by the Republican Party to muscle its way into Utah territorial
politics in ways reminiscent of urban boss politics or organized crime. The Republicans created a
threat (I.E. incarceration for polygamy) and then turned around and offered protection from the
threat to church leaders if they would encourage Mormon voters to vote Republican. The
national party politicians permitted non-democratic political tactics in Utah to gain a consistent
and loyal stream of votes. In return, the Mormons received federal relief from mass incarceration
and disfranchisement. In sum, if we assume that national parties in the nineteenth century
coercively coopted sections of the electorate for political advantage, then this bears a striking
resemblance to the patron client linkages that were aggressively formed in other examples of
nineteenth century party politics.
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Creating the Threat
The two competitive national political parties in nineteenth century America viewed
themselves almost as if they were opposing armies. The parties were hierarchical. The most
politically engaged in the parties, saw “campaigns” as hard fought battles with victories and
defeats. They had plainly recognizable opponents in the opposing party.194 If one party lost, or
was “routed,” they would to fall back, recover, and plan for political battle in a subsequent
campaign. In the postbellum era many political leaders had experience as military officers during
the Civil War, and most likely had engaged in combat. Constructing party organization similar to
a military chain of command is an example of institutional memory being employed in new
context.195 But more than just the legacy of military language informed how party politics
operated. Political parties in the nineteenth century were also especially predatory. The metaphor
of the organized crime boss is perhaps a useful way to understand how these parties incorporated
disparate voting blocs within their orbit. Party leaders made voters feel politically unsafe, then
offered them political patronage in exchange for their votes.196 In sum, postbellum politics in the
U.S. had yet to move beyond campaigns where candidates sought to overwhelm their opposition
with both verbal and sometimes physical attacks. Party campaigns were still a “war-like
affair.” 197
Throughout the United States in the late nineteenth century, both major political parties
operated in a warlike and predatory fashion vis-à-vis potential voting blocs. National
Republicans punished white Democrats and coopted black Republicans during Reconstruction in
a clientelistic fashion. Meanwhile, the same radical Republicans that pushed for the
democratization of the South during Reconstruction were simultaneously working on conquering
the polygamist Mormons, which Republican’s denounced as an undemocratic and barbaric
institution. However, what was unique about Republican coercion of Mormon voters in Utah
Territory, was their strategy of threatening Mormon leaders with incarceration for their private
behavior if the Mormon elite did not make political concessions.
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Figure 11 George Q. Cannon seated in middle and Apostle Francis Lyman to the left standing
along with other Mormon men incarcerated for their sexual non-conformity.

Beginning in the 1880s the U.S. Federal government’s crackdown on polygamists in Utah
intensified the exercise of partisan driven state power. Mormon and polygamist, Harvey Cluff
described a myriad of state actors that coordinated their efforts to impose federal sovereignty in
Utah Territory. To Cluff, it felt like a dictatorial abuse of power: “Judges, Marshals, Deputies
and Commissioners became so imbued with a spirit of enthusiasm that their proceedings became
despotic.” Federal officials raided Mormons homes and prosecuted and incarcerated more than
1,300 men for their sexual nonconformity. Cluff bitterly recalled non-Mormon men that Cluff
knew by name and were not even formally deputized engaging in extra-legal searches of
Mormon homes. Cluff probably had business dealings with many these types of men in his tight
knit town. They would barge into homes often without a warrant but armed. These raids to catch
polygamists “cohabiting” with a wife that they were not legally allowed to marry often occurred
in the middle of the night. Court records cite the most dubious of evidence that these raids
uncovered to infer that a sexual impropriety had taken place; such as rumpled sheets or a “slept
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in” bed. Later Cluff would tell this story for his posterity. Probably because the continued
presence of the perpetrators of the raid in his village Cluff omitted their names: “A few Men in
Provo of the most disreputable characters, whose names are unworthy to appear on the pages of
history, would break into homes of [p]olygamists, in the dark hours of night, and frighten women
and children.” Cluff was ensnared in one these nighttime raids. Before Cluff was dragged off to
stand before a federal judge, he offered a cursing of biblical proportions to his captors: “I shall
yet walk the streets of Provo, which I have helped to make from a sage brush plain, in perfect
liberty and peace, when you are dead and rotting in the ground.” When later recounting this
experience and the curse he pronounced on his treacherous neighbors, Cluff smugly wrote of his
prophetic insight, “This has been fulfilled.”198
As Harvey Cluff hinted in his account, the effort to enforce anti-polygamy laws in Utah
was not really about “law and order.” With the power of the Latter-day Saints diminished, nonMormons in Utah stood to financially benefit greatly. Both “greed and grievance” motivated
these raids. Many non-Mormons that were deputized to help invade the private residences to
catch “cohabitating” polygamists stood to benefit financially from eliminating a business
competitor.199 As B.H. Roberts described the situation, the non-Mormon minority within Utah
had other important incentives to encourage federal intervention. Since Utah was a Territory, its
principal political offices were appointed by the president of the United States. The U.S
President rarely appointed Mormons to fill government positions in the Territory in the 1880s
and 1890s. Instead, territorial political positions were filled by non-Mormons from outside Utah
Territory who stood to benefit financially from the diminished influence of Mormons in the key
industries of the region. These non-Mormons, according to Roberts, “had no interests or
sympathies in common with the [Mormon] people.” Thus, it was in the interests of the nonMormon office holders to keep Utah a Territory so that the political offices might be given them
by the President “until such time that the gentiles should outnumber the Mormons, so that the
[non-Mormons] might have control of the state.”200
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Anti-polygamy raids were sometimes perpetrated by non-Mormon neighbors in the
community seeking the twenty dollar reward for capturing a polygamist. Extra judicial capture of
polygamists by private citizens were often carried out with the complicit knowledge and support
of the federal marshals. The non-Mormons’ financial benefits from proto-prison industrial
complex was apparent to Mormons. In addition to resenting their economic exclusion from
Mormon economic markets, religious outsiders in Utah also found polygamy morally repugnant.
Thus, disrupting or eliminating a prestigious Mormon business rival served to benefit nonMormon businesses and their reinforced the outsiders sense of morality. For this reason, it made
sense the initial targets of the raids were often wealthy polygamists.

Figure 12 Interior of Utah Penitentiary where thousands of Mormons were incarcerated during
the postbellum period.

In addition to local non-Mormons fully collaborating with the capture of polygamists,
non-Mormons in Utah had other incentives to vocally publish on the national stage their local
economic and political feuds with Mormons. One Mormon lawyer Franklin S. Richards
explained that “the active and aggressive part of the Gentiles [non-Mormons in Utah] have long
had the ear of congress at the expense of the Mormons as they have had the ear of the nation at
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large.” A sympathetic national audience, that viewed Mormonism as a ghastly aberration,
clamored for Congress to pass harsher anti-Mormon legislation, which in turn benefited NonMormons in Utah. As Utah territorial delegate John T. Caine explained, anti-Mormon
congressional legislation “place[d] the Mormon people at the mercy of men whose object [was]
first to plunder them of all earthly possessions and [second to] drive them from their homes.”201
While the rhetoric against Mormons was often framed with the goal of dismantling theocracy
and restoring liberty, Richards saw this as a pretext. Richards wrote a friend that “other objects
and designs have been too often at the bottom of their exertions.”202 With the federal government
taking church property and incarcerating the wealthy and prominent Mormons, Mormon families
often would have to liquidate assets for legal fees and court-imposed fines. Land and capital
investments were transferred to non-Mormons at below market value. However, the cessation of
federal hostilities would have brought the price of land back up and would negatively impact
non-Mormons in Utah. In 1893, the non-Mormon Elizabeth Wood wrote to her son who was
attending school at Princeton. She urged him to come home immediately because the family
needed his help raising money to buy up land before the federal policing of the Mormons ceased.
Wood wrote urgently that “if the Mormons get statehood,” there would be “the worst rush after
land you ever saw and if we cannot get money to buy it, we will lose it.”203 Statehood was seen
as the Latter-day Saint salvation from federal raids. The non-Mormon Wood family worried that
with statehood, the price of land would increase and their window of opportunity to grab the land
cheaply, would close.
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Figure 13 Utah Territorial Penitentiary 1880s, Utah State Historical Society

In addition to cheap land, non-Mormons benefited from federal raids in other ways.
Federal escheatment of church property appropriated for secular schools run by non-Mormons
also created a source of good paying jobs for any nominally educated non-Mormon in the
Territory. Elizabeth Wood saw what was good for the Mormons as being detrimental to nonMormons’ economic prospects. Her solution to the worry of a price increase of land and homes
was having her son leave Princeton and get a job teaching public school in Ogden, Utah (on land
confiscated from Mormons). This additional money would help her to buy as much land as
possible before their Latter-day Saint neighbors could recover from the Federal raids.
Meanwhile in Washington, the committee of territories of the U.S. Senate in 1888
continued to perpetuate the rhetoric of championing civilization and democratic institutions as
pretexts for continuing the aggressive crackdown on both individual Mormon polygamists and
the church economic power. The Senate report read, “Utah ought not to be admitted into the
union as a state until it is certain beyond doubt that the practice of plural marriage has been
entirely abandoned…And until it is likewise certain that the civil affairs of the territory are not
controlled by the priesthood of the Mormon Church.”204 In response to this Senate report,
Apostle Moses Thatcher called the Senators idiotic “fossilized statesmen.” Thatcher predicted
204

As quoted in Maxwell, John Gary. Robert Newton Baskin and the Making of Modern Utah. Vol. 37. University
of Oklahoma Press, 2013.

93

with pathos, the electoral defeat of these statesmen as soon as the tide of public opinion changed:
“the fickle [sic] goddess fame does but lure them out to dash them down, finally.”205
Mormon lobbyists and church leaders that visited Washington D.C. in the 1880s found
the task of securing protection from their oppressors as not only irksome, but hopeless.
Supposedly sympathetic Republicans pointed to the massive public support for anti-Mormon
legislation as justification for the continuation of the draconian crackdowns on the Mormon way
of life. Moses Thatcher remembered:
Members of the Republican Party… would come privately and say: “We view …the
Edmunds' bill—as infamous in its measures; we can see that it is unconstitutional, that it
seeks to rob a whole people of their political rights. But our profession is that of politics;
we have no other business, and numerous petitions are coming here daily from our
constituents, praying us, commanding us, to pass some law for the suppression of
“Mormonism.” Now what shall we do? If we comply not with their demands our
constituents will, at future elections, reject us at the polls.206
The Republican Party leaders when pressed for relief by Mormon lobbyists blamed their support
for the draconian legislation on the demands of their constituency. Meanwhile, Mormons saw the
private admissions of sympathy to their plight by Republicans as disingenuous. To one Mormon
observer, Republican’s feigned regret for their support for the “suppression of Mormonism,” was
just part of the protection racket “to set snares for our feet, to bring us into subjection to the
political will of the Republican Party.”207

Meanwhile, far from Washington, the politics in Utah continued to be organized around
religious identity with consistently diminishing returns for the Mormons. Prior to the adoption of
national parties, as James Henry Moyle remembered, “politics in Utah [was] not Democrat or
Republican, populist or prohibitionist, socialist or communist or laborite, but simply Mormon vs.
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Gentile.” The main political cleavage that citizens adopted to organize politics was Mormon and
non-Mormon. Moyle explained that the “Mormons [imagined themselves as] the Israelites and
the non-Mormons were the Gentiles, and the contest had nothing whatever to do with national
politics.” Moyle remembered, (with no doubt a healthy dose of hyperbole) that the elections
between Mormons and non-Mormons rivaled the intensity of the Thirty Years’ war in Europe
where fights between Protestants and Catholics resulted in “men and women and
children…burned at the stake for their religious beliefs.”208 Mormons were not being burned at
the stake and their villages were not plundered nor were their children massacred during the
1880s-90s. However, while U.S. Soldiers had not resorted to rounding up Mormons and coercing
creedal confessions or forcing them to renounce polygamy, federal marshals had started
enforcing anti-Mormons legislation in a draconian fashion. Federal marshals oversaw the mass
Mormon incarceration for sexual nonconformity and a significant societal disruption in the
Mormon region.209
As the years dragged on in Utah Territory, the ethno-religious conflict between Mormons
and non-Mormons became more pronounced. Alma Greenwood described in his journal this
massive exclusion of Mormon voters in the late 1880s: “The Latter-day-saints…passed through a
chain of tyrannical & despotic circumstances, in a political capacity.” Greenwood, like many
other Mormons, viewed the federally appointed rulers in the Territory as insensitive and
autocratic; imposing values and norms that Mormons did not share. He continued in his journal
to lament the imposed federal appointees as lacking all local legitimacy and acting as local
despots: “The governor of Utah, working conspiratorally[sic] with the board of Commissioners,
exercised every illegitimate means to deprive us of our political rights & priveliges[sic], as
American Citizens.”210 Greenwood caustically recorded that the same ruffians, gunslingers, and
drunkards that on Monday were in jail for their shenanigans, were on Tuesday empowered to
determine whether Mormons were good citizens and fit to vote. In addition to their own moral
turpitude, Greenwood painted these non-Mormon electoral commission officials as in no way
capable of acting as neutral arbiters of justice. The governor had deliberately packed the electoral
208
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commission with men that were antagonistic to Mormons. These non-Mormon officials made no
secret of their doubting the fitness of Mormons’ loyalty or Mormons’ ability to self-rule. Thus,
these morally dubious officials on the Utah electoral commission were successful in massively
suppressing the vote of not only polygamists but also Mormon immigrants from Europe and
other voters who could not prove their U.S. citizenship.211
The electoral commission was not the only arm of the state used to suppress Mormon
voters. On election day in 1888 Joe Fish, a Mormon and a polygamists with wives in both Utah
and Arizona wrote in his journal about trying to vote just across the Utah border in Arizona
territory: “A man stood in front of the polls armed as if for war and I was not allowed to come
nearer than fifty feet of the polls and was threatened with arrest. I went up to vote and was
marched back by the constable John Conley who again threatened me with arrest. In the
meantime others who belonged to the party in power went up and voted without being
molested.” Fish wrote a few years later in 1891 about the deliberate decision of splitting the
Mormon vote along the national parties in this same Arizona town to avoid the repeat of the
armed police force barring Mormons from casting ballots and not having any problem being
barred from voting in subsequent elections.212
By 1890 one of the churches political operatives, Charles Penrose, warned that if nonMormons gained a majority in the Utah territorial legislature, they would certainly “pass laws to
disfranchise all Mormons.” The situation had never been so dire for the Mormon people. Penrose
urged church leaders to “see that [all are] properly registered and on Election Day should not fail
to cast their votes. Men have been appointed to visit the various Stakes and give instructions to
the people in regard to their duties.”213
In preparation for the 1890 municipal elections in Salt Lake City, the LDS church elite
implemented a plan to overwhelm the anti-Mormon Liberal party by calling young men from all
across Mormondom to move temporarily to Salt Lake City and to establish residency so they
could vote against the enemies of the church. One young local church officer described the
meeting in which the Mormon elite directed all the regional church leaders from across Utah
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Territory to muster potential voters to come to Salt Lake City to vote in municipal elections: “It
was proposed that those stakes who could spare young men to come to this city and acquire
residences as to be able to vote, do so, and that we here provide employment and pay for
such.”214 Compliant village elders agreed to employ, on city business, a large number of
workmen to build a joint city-county building which would be able to employ 200-400 additional
men immediately. For example, Joseph Christensen travelled 125 miles all the way from
Gunnison, Utah for a mission like no other. In the past he had served proselyting missions but
never had a church assignment to come to vote. He remembered, “In the spring of 1889, I was
called to Salt Lake City on a political mission, and with many others was called on to vote. The
anti-Mormons were determined to steal the city government, and they were without scruples.”215
While the church went to great lengths to alter the composition of the electorate to
manufacture a political victory in the Sat Lake municipal election, they were still
unsuccessful.216 Christensen describes the result of the election: “The People's Party was ahead
in votes, but the political machinery was in the hands of the Utah Commission, appointed by the
National Government. They were anti-Mormon and controlled the election. While we had the
votes, yet we were counted out.” Many Mormon diarists reported the howls of the victors as they
triumphantly took to the streets in drunken revelry. Mormon’s felt that the vandals had sacked
Rome. Now the seat of Mormon power was in the hands of the non-Mormon minority.
According to the territorial census, non-Mormons comprised 45 percent of the population in
Utah in 1890. As Moyle asked rhetorically, “Is there any wonder that the religious leaders were
terrified when they were defeated in the city elections of 1890?”217
The non-Mormon minority in Utah were successful in the 1890 Salt Lake election
because they had successfully nationalized their conflicts with the LDS church to the point that
policy makers in Washington listened to non-Mormon petitions and they successfully lobbied
Congress to take away voting rights from polygamists and to restrict political participation of
Mormon immigrants. Moses Thatcher lamented in a letter that “the gentile ring in [Salt Lake
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City] have had far more success than should ever have been accorded them.”218Congress had
appointed members of the Utah electoral commission. The electoral commission was
sympathetic to the cause of non-Mormons in Utah. Thus if non-Mormons were able to
externalize the conflict nationally, they would frequently find a sympathetic audience. The NonMormons, such as Robert Newton Baskin, saw themselves as “American Citizens” suffering
under Mormon despotism.219 The fallout of the 1890 municipal election set in motion a chain of
events that resulted in Mormons elites attempting to strengthen Republican patronage.
“Threats from below” in the form of disaffected Mormons and non-Mormons with
newspapers and political parties consistently attempted to publicize their feuds with the Mormon
elite on the sympathetic national stage. With the support of the federal government, the
opposition elites in Utah Territory had been successful in wrestling local power out of the hands
of the Mormon elite.220 As one elite leader described, the initial decision make overtures to the
national parties was meant to relieve the Mormon people from local pressures from vocal
opposition elites among the anti-Mormon Liberal party. The Mormon elite maintained that
without making some concessions, and entering into a patronage relationship with a national
party, the “Liberal or Tribune gang [would] finally rule and ruin our fair country.”221 Heber J.
Grant privately noted among his fellow colleagues that he “would like to see the Liberal ring
broken up.” Electoral victories, such as the 1890 Salt Lake municipal election, by the regional
non-Mormon Liberal Party greatly distressed the LDS church leadership. In hopes of diluting the
brand of the Liberal Party and by forcing their hand into integrating into national party politics,
Mormon elite hatched a plan to shake up previously safe districts for the Liberal party.222
Mormon leaders in 1890 became ready to capitulate and enter into an asymmetric patron
client relationship with the Republican Party. The Utah electoral commission had suppressed the
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Mormon vote in Salt Lake municipal election of 1890 to the point that anti-Mormon candidates
won in in the heavily Mormon concentrated Salt Lake Valley. But the Latter-day Saint leaders
faced two apparently contradictory tasks in order to cement the patron client relationship. They
had to exercise control over the local politics but the local politics had to appear consistent with
national institution expectations. Exercising local control while appearing democratic would only
work, however if the Mormon leaders had a monopoly on national-subnational linkages.
Mormons leaders did not have this. As has been noted above, Mormons had their lobbyists and
non-Mormons did as well.223
In the fall of 1890 President Wilford Woodruff sent a press release that explained that he
was to going to discourage the practice of polygamy among Mormons. The publishing of the
Manifesto made national headlines. It signaled the churches decision to distance itself from
polygamy and was precipitated by lengthy deliberations with potential Republican patrons. The
manifesto was also signed in the context of the emergence of virulent anti-Mormons seeking to
take away the vote from polygamists. When the church distanced itself from polygamy as a rule
of the church, Ogden Utah political parties began abandoning Liberal and Peoples party labels
and started to organize themselves along national party lines.
Recognizing the significance of the polygamy manifesto, the Utah Commission called the
manifesto “the most important of the documents the church has issued, and contains the most
direct and positive statements of its desires and promises.” Territorial governor Arthur L.
Thomas and Chief Justice Zane both endorsed the petition. In a personal letter to President
Harrison they both stated, “Were full amnesty granted, to date that date would be coupled with
your name and in the future the Mormon people would turn to them as does the Colored race to
Abraham Lincoln and the day of Jan. 2nd 1863.” Perhaps no one was more vocal in his
excitement that the Latter-day Saints had changed their perspective on plural marriage than
Judge Zane. Once known as the Saints’ most intractable foe, Zane became outspoken in his
support for accepting the Saints as a changed people. In 1891 he declared, “The Mormon is with
us.”224
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Offering Protection from the Threat
Once the Republican Party created the threat of annihilation, the extortion came next. The
federal government stopped short of using American guns to eradicate Mormons. Instead of
eradicating Mormons, Republicans extorted them. Extortion is the practice of obtaining
something through coercion or threats. The phrase protection racket is often used when a group
frames their demands as reciprocity for protection from threats from other parties; though almost
always, the person or organization offering protection is the same one willing to cause harm if
the money is not paid, and such is implied in the protection offer.225 In the case of Mormons,
national Republicans sought to obtain a solidly Republican voting bloc in Utah Territory in
exchange for relief from continued federal intervention into Utah Territory. Once the Mormons
officially abandoned polygamy in 1890, Republicans began offering the Mormon people
protection after having decades of Republican led anti-Mormon legislation.
When they were not punishing the public political behavior of the Democrats in the
South, National Republicans intervened into the private bedroom of Mormons in the West. They
used Mormons private behavior as leverage to coerce them into a patronage relationship.
Mormon leaders reported about closed door meetings through Republican back channels that the
national Republican Party operatives were “becoming more favorably impressed with regard to
the importance of securing Mormon votes and influence.” Republicans had mounted the
polygamy attacks and now they are selling Mormon leader’s clemency: “Even Secretary of State
[James G.] Blaine is desirous of Utah’s admission [to the Union]; while [Republican] Stephen
Elkins says he is in favor of admitting the territory ‘polygamy or no polygamy.’” 226 Republican
efforts to democratize Utah adopted a similar strategy that they undertook in the South. As in the
South, they sought to make the Western United States a Republican stronghold by building a
Republican Party in the Mormon West.227 Abraham Cannon recorded a discussion among his
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colleagues in the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles in which they stated, “Self-protection demands
that we look to the Republicans for relief, now that the Democrats have proved themselves
cowards on our question.”228Although Republicans controlled Congress during much of the
postbellum period, they were notably reluctant to bring Democratic leaning Utah Territory into
the nation of states. Morris M. Estee, former chairman Republican National Convention
established communication with the Mormon elite in 1890 and in a classic racketeering move
reminiscent of mafia intimidation, Estee warned the Mormons that the president of the United
States advocated a thirty-year ban on Mormons being able to vote. Estee then offered them
protection if the Mormon people made some cosmetic concessions. In January of 1891 a letter
from the Estee was read aloud to the Latter-day Saint hierarchy. Estee told the First Presidency
in the letter that “President Harrison was opposed to Mormons…When [Harrison] was told
concerning [Mormon] power in Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona and Idaho he said, ‘Such
people should be checked.’” However, if Mormons complied with cosmetic concessions and if
church leaders still delivered Mormon votes to the Republican Party, then the Republicans in
Congress would facilitate pardons for LDS church leaders “on the underground.” The
Republicans would help to get a bill passed getting Utah statehood with all the autonomy that
came with it.229 As Estee put it, “People in the east must be educated concerning the Mormon
question and this must be done by the means of the press and otherwise. They must also be
convinced that polygamy is indeed a dead issue. It must be shown that Mormons are at liberty to
vote according to their political convictions and not according to the dictates of the Mormon
priesthood.”230 However, Estee’s conditions did not require the Mormon leaders to actually
significantly transform their religious and political institutions. Elections in Utah just had to
appear more free and fair and competitive. Estee’s letter was an extraordinary example of a party
leader coercing patronage under the threat of annihilation. It was a powerful tactic to consolidate
regional party control at the expense of democracy. The Republican party desired Utah to be
Republican but before the Republican party would be willing establish political patronage with
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the Mormon people, the Mormons had to send strong signals to the nation (especially Republican
voters and supporters) that both Mormon polygamy and theocracy were in the past.

Figure 14 Republican operative Morris Estee warned the Mormon elite that they were in danger
of wholesale disfranchisement if they did not grow some Republicans in Utah Territory.

Republicans in Congress were willing to allow the persistence of a subnational illiberal
regime in Utah Territory (as long as it was not blatantly autocratic) because the Mormon West
met important strategic needs of their national party. What makes it clear that Estee was asking
the Mormon elite for a mere cosmetic repackaging of the Mormon image and not for sincere
competitive elections free of church involvement, was evident later in the same letter when he
stated that “more harmony in local affairs must be established, and [the Mormon] people must be
willing to yield in their feelings to promote peace and good will at home in order to command
respect and confidence abroad.” In other words, Estee euphemistically stated that the Mormon
elite needed to mediate between the interest groups and parties and orchestrate predictably
Republican leaning political behavior in Utah. This would signal confidence to national
Republican leaders outside of Utah that Mormon Utah was a stable viable Republican region.
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Previous historians have interpreted this letter as a call to merely deemphasize the Mormon/NonMormon political identities that had been institutionalized in confessional parties in Utah since
1870, but subsequent Republican Party correspondence make it clear that Republican operatives
were after the form of democracy without necessarily requiring the substance of democracy in
Utah. This was not some idealistic plea by Republicans wanting to eliminate what they
considered illiberal practices. Estee’s letter revealed him to be an avatar of a more ruthless and
cutthroat party period; pragmatic patronage politics and not ideological divides characterized the
major U.S parties. Republicans were only willing to become patrons to the Mormon people if the
Mormon elite were going to deliver elections to Republicans. Thus democratically elected
Republican officials at the U.S. national level saw that the costs of continuing to challenge the
peripheral Mormon majority in Utah Territory outweighed the beneﬁts coopting them to serve
the interests of Republicans governing at the national level. As George Q. Cannon stated, “We
would doubtless have been disfranchised…if the Republican leaders in Washington had not been
given to understand that there were Republicans in Utah and that a wise course on the part of the
Republicans would doubtless make more.”231
Further evidence that Mormons were willing to assuage the Republicans in Congress with
votes in exchange for protection is found in a letter from a sometime paid lobbyist and friend of
the Mormons George Ticknor Curtis. Curtis wrote to the George Edmunds, the namesake of the
infamous Edmunds Act and Edmunds Tucker Act. Curtis floated the idea that Utah was poised to
becoming a swing state and explained why Edmunds should support statehood for Utah: “I
believe that my Mormon friends will avoid all efforts to conciliate either party with promises or
prospects respecting the political character of Utah as a state…I am persuaded that the chances
of the result are…about equal.” Curtis still made it clear to Edmunds that while “a few more
electoral votes to the Republican Party and two more republican senators,” was not the reason
Curtis was helping the Mormons, Curtis implied there was nothing wrong for that being
Edmunds’ reason for supporting statehood for Utah.232
Prior to Morris Estee’s overture to establish patronage, the Mormon elite had attempted
to establish national patronage linkages in hopes of getting relief from intervention. The power
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asymmetry was not imbalanced enough. The Mormons were not vulnerable enough to make any
linkage worthwhile for the Republicans. Still Mormon operatives had tried to bribe multiple key
federal officials in exchange for relief from federal intervention but were largely unsuccessful in
stemming the tide of anti-Mormon law enforcement officials, because Utah Territory was still
openly defiant and resisting federal attacks. John Willard Young stated in many letters to church
leaders in 1887 that he had a clear conscience “buying men” if that meant they would treat the
Mormons well. John Willard Young tried to convince his associate church hierarchs that just
about “any judge or particularly obnoxious official” could be removed from being an obstacle to
Mormon self-determination with enough money.233 In another letter John Willard Young further
tried to convince his fellow Mormon elite that “politics was governed by finance.” In other
words, he tried to convince his brethren that most politicians would respond to cash bribes if the
price was right.234 But, not until the Republicans in Congress had enough leverage to force the
Mormons to cooperate did Republicans initiate conversations in person with the Mormon elite.
As Republican Secretary of State John Blaine said to George Q. Cannon, “Believe me, it's not
possible for any people as weak in numbers as yours, to set themselves up as superior to the
majesty of a nation like this. [Republicans] may succeed, this time, in preventing your
disfranchisement; but nothing permanent can be done until you ‘get into line.’”235 In July of
1891, Estee met with the Mormon elite in Salt Lake City. Estee again suggested that, in
exchange for gaining “the people of this territory to Republicanism,” Estee would recommend
“the Republican National Committee … [use their] influence with Pres. Harrison…to get
amnesty for the Saints.”236 Republicans were offering protection to Mormons from the threat the
Republicans helped create.
Electoral success for Republicans in exchange for amnesty from Republican motivated
federal intervention became the clear message for many among the Mormon elite. Six months
after the Estee threat of a thirty year ban on voting, Joseph F. Smith, a regime soft-liner among
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the Mormon elite again raised the specter of the thirty year voting ban. He unabashedly tried to
convince his fellow elites that although “Republican bandits ...preach[ed] the gospel of hate from
every federal office in the territory,” Republicans would “yet grant [Mormons] amnesty if we
encourage[d] them to believe that [Utah] may become a Republican state.”237 Joseph F. Smith
again explained that “Pres. Harrison had been in favor of a law that was to take away from
Mormons all the rights of citizens for thirty years and the only reason this law and others against
us had not been passed was the impression had been given to the Republican Party leaders that
there was at least a fighting chance for them in Utah if they would stop making laws against the
people.”238
In a pamphlet promoting the Republican Party in Utah, Joseph F. Smith attempted to
explain to his Mormon readers how political patronage in the party system worked. He argued
that the Republicans had not provided amnesty Mormons previously because Republicans in
Congress were convinced that Mormons were “hopelessly Democratic in preference.” Smith
continued to explain that “had Utah not been so Democratic, the Republicans would not have
enacted twenty five years of anti-Mormon legislation.” Smith pointed out that while the Utah
Electoral Commission was supposed to be a neutral arbiter of free and fair elections; it was
implemented and run primarily by Republicans. Mormons should not forget that within the
political patronage system in the Gilded Age, “the Republican Party viewed Utah as political
opponents,” and thus they had used the publically funded justice and law enforcement
institutions as well as the electoral commission for their private political advantage. That was
just how the game was played. Smith further explained that the Democrats should have been the
Mormons’ political patrons. Democrats should have biased the justice system in their favor. Yet,
Democrats did little to protect Mormons from the fierce enforcement of anti-Mormon legislation:
“Under the domination of these Prominent Democrats hundreds of the people of Utah had the
leisure, within the walls of the penitentiary, to ponder upon the insincerity and hollowness of
Democratic professions.”
The quality of the U.S. government in the 1890s was generally poor and administered in
biased fashion based on patron client relationships. In the pamphlet called Another Plain Talk,
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Joseph F. Smith explained to his readers that the major party’s organized governmental
institutions discriminated against citizens that were aligned with the opposition party: “The
Democrats do all they can to deprive the negro of the right to vote and the Republicans desire the
right preserved…however the Democrats are perfectly willing that the negro shall vote where his
vote is in favor of the Democratic party.” Since “the Republican Party has changed its attitude
towards [the Mormon people],” Smith argued that it would behoove the Mormon people to align
with the Republicans lest they were to end up disfranchised like black Americans in the South.
Voters in the U.S. were often bought with the currency of patronage and often corralled into
voting in blocs by strongmen or powerful interests.239 For Mormons, this patronage came in the
form of amnesty from anti-polygamy laws. Because of the relative weakness of state capacity
much of the routine duties that modern bureaucratic states do, were administer by political
parties. In sum, Smith tried to explain that, as sordid and biased as the political system was, the
Democrats had been bad patrons and so now the Mormon people should seek patronage from the
Republicans who could guarantee their protection because the Republicans currently were in
control of the on/off switch to federal persecution against Mormons.240
Conclusion
Utah’s initial incorporation into national politics in the decade of the 1890s was a
historical watershed that had a major impact on the subsequent evolution of how Mormons
participated politically in both local and national elections. Mormonism’s founding prophet,
Joseph Smith would have agreed enthusiastically with the notion that beginnings matter and that
they shape the subsequent paths that people and institutions take: “if we start right, it is very easy
for us to go right all the time,” Smith preached, “but if we start wrong it is hard to get right.” An
apt metaphor to understanding the beginnings of the Latter-day Saints adoption of political
parties is to view the Latter-day Saints as John the Revelators’ woman coming out of the
wilderness, like a dewy eyed debutant, being dragged out of the wilderness and being introduced
to the “not-so-polite society” of national politics. The church was eligible to marry whichever
political party she chose. However, to gain formal entrance to the ball of national patronage
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politics, debutantes usually had to be endorsed by a board or sponsored by an already established
member of elite society. Mormonism’s formal “coming out” into the debutante ball of late
nineteenth century national politics was a story of an illiberal religious group at the periphery
(both regionally and politically) initially unwilling to adopt all the political trappings of the
society. The Republicans coerced her into showing up to the ball and threatened this Mormon
debutant that if she did not show up and “acted the part” of a proper civilized citizen on the
national stage, then the federal government would essentially burn her house down and take her
possessions. Thus Mormonism’s transition, from the theocratic wilderness to engagement in
gilded age politics, was largely an unintentional bi-product of failed attempts to maintain local
control.
Because of the Republican-led extortion of the Mormon people and the mass
incarceration and disfranchisement of Mormon men and women for sexual nonconformity,
Mormon leaders sought patron-client linkages with the national Republican Party. In the
subsequent chapter, I will discuss how Mormons secured Republican patronage. Church leaders
had to appear to allow the Mormon people to affiliate with national parties but at the same time,
Mormon elite encouraged or just assigned many of their Democrat leaning church members to
become Republicans. The church leader’s involvement in orchestrating an equal party divide
contributed to Mormon Democrats resenting church involvement in manipulating the electorate.
Both National Republicans and the Mormon elite underestimated how unpopular this alliance
would be for many Mormons. Largely in spite of attempts of establishing this Republican
patronage, Utah Territory began to democratize in part because of internal divisions at the elite
level and because of resistance from normal Mormons in the pews. The church’s involvement in
the assigning party identification to its members lead to the increasing salience of political
identities and the decrease emphasis of aspects of Mormon identity such as solidarity and
communitarianism. The remnants of their gradual, messy process which was full of contingency
have reverberated on into the twenty first century.241
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CHAPTER 5

“Almost ready to fight each other:” Elite Divisions among the LDS Quorum of the Twelve
Apostles as a Catalyst for Democratization, 1891-1892

Many scholars have argued that the beliefs and attitudes of political elites can often help
explain political change in regimes. This is especially true during brief, unsettling, critical
junctures during which elite decisions are more consequential to the outcomes. Scholars have
also begun fill the gap in the literature to address the decisions of elites in subnational regime
changes.242 Few scholars, however, have explored the ideational role of elite agency in
subnational regimes changes. This omission is critical because more and more evidence is
available that suggests that diverging values and political ideologies of the subnational elite lead
to a dismantling of elite cohesion. Below the case of subnational elites in late nineteenth century
Utah Territory is analyzed within this framework.
Territorial politics in Utah prior to the church Manifesto on polygamy, was organized
around the cleavage of politicized religious identities. The overwhelming majority of Mormons
comprised the church-run People’s Party. Meanwhile, a small but politically influential group of
non-Mormons and dissidents comprised the Liberal Party. Once the LDS church officially
abandoned polygamy, the Mormon/non-Mormon political divide began to be erode in towns with
large non-Mormon populations in Utah territory. Local Mormon Church leaders sought advice
from the ruling church authorities as to how to proceed.
As discussed in the previous chapter, national Republicans used the threat of dismantling
the LDS church as leverage against the Mormon general authorities in Utah Territory to coerce
them into corralling the Mormon electorate to vote Republican. In exchange for electoral support
Republicans offered the Mormons a reprieve from federal intervention.243 This partisan use of
state coercion contributed to the LDS church officially abandoning polygamy and dissolving
their political arm the People’s Party. This pressure precipitated the erosion of elite cohesion.
With the local party system influx, divisions among the Mormon elite began to emerge.
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Question of Interest
What were the major sources of contention among Mormon elites in this new political climate
given their religious leaders’ religious restraints?244
Thesis
The Mormon elite had diverging opinions on how to implement the policy of adopting
national parties. These different opinions were often framed in overt religious language and
emphasized diverging interpretations of religious values. The different strategic approaches and
the doctrinal justifications for the approaches contributed the division among the ruling Mormon
elite. Three factions among the elite contested for control. One faction of soft-liners envisioned a
perpetuation of corporatist management of interest groups and political parties in Utah Territory.
These soft-liners sought to build linkages to external actors, such as the national Republican
Party. They sought to secure these external linkages by actively orchestrating the equal party
divide of the Mormon people. A rival faction of soft-liners saw the need to liberalize in a more
organic and pluralistic way. They sought a “bottom-up” adoption of national parties.
Meanwhile, hard-liners in the regime regarded all external actors as illegitimate. These hardliners saw the American political system as representing a non-desirable value system. Divisions
over how to manage the liberalizing of the society among the Mormon elite led to public and
visible elite defections which lead to more emboldened opposition to the church coordination of
social and political affairs in the Territory.
Literature Review
Top-down transitions to democracy frequently result from a split between soft-liners and
hard-liners in a regime. O’Donnell and Schmitter introduced the distinction between hard-liners
and soft-liners in authoritarian regimes.245 They describe some elites as valuing the regime status
quo (the hard-liners). Whereas, other elites are more pragmatic and are ready to sacrifice the
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regime status quo to try to hold on to their privileges. These are the soft-liners. O’Donnell and
Schmitter would argue that soft-liners prefer to liberalize on a limited scale to manage opposition
groups within society and to seek powerful patrons from outside their regime. A policy of
liberalization is a controlled opening of the political space and it might include the formation of
local political parties with national affiliations or holding elections. The goal of any opening, for
the soft-liners, is mostly pragmatic and is not usually meant to bring about unfettered democratic
change. Instead a policy of liberalization is meant to allow various opposition groups into the
umbrella of political institutions that are controlled by the ruling elite. Liberalizing processes are
typically, either an attempt by elites to co-opt opposition groups, or to divide and control them.246
During regime transitions there is typically a power vacuum that leaves an absence of
accepted rules and predictable behaviors for the elite. Elites, during critical junctures, are more
likely to be internally divided in their inclinations for the emerging rules.247 During these critical
junctures the structure of the political system is even less determined. This condition of
indeterminacy during transitions, enhances the import of elite’s choices. The menu of options
available to elites during a critical juncture is more extensive than just merely the status quo or to
liberalize. Elite actors in these conditions have an unusual amount of autonomy in making their
decisions. Elites can choose the rules of the game that will subsequently determine the nature of
the emerging, but not yet established regime. In sum, political elites have a distinct impact on
how the regime transformation occurs.248
Robert Dahl article formulated a simple and powerful model of democratic transition that
championed the rational strategic calculations of the ruling elites. Dahl’s model states that
regimes will liberalize only if the incumbent ruling elites expect the costs of suppressing the
opposition to exceed the costs of tolerating the opposition.249 So, if the elite calculate that
maintaining the status quo is just too costly, they will liberalize.250 However, as O’Donnell and
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Schmitter explain that elites interpret the costs of suppression differently, based upon their
ideological commitments. They argue that political elites are not only motivated by strategic
calculations but also by values ideologies and in some cases religious beliefs. Value-driven
behavior of elites inform how they understand the costliness of suppressing opposition.251 When
the values and ideology of elites differ, the elites often have internal debates about meaning of
values for the regime. These internal divisions undermine any claims to elite homogeneity.
Internal rivalry may be based on struggles over power and profit, but can also reflect differing
views in play during a critical juncture. The sources of division matter. 252
Corporatism and pluralism were the two major sources of division for the Latter-day
Saint church hierarchy. Corporatism is helpfully defined by Schmitter as an arrangement where
interests are represented where the interest groups are organized into a finite number of
noncompetitive, hierarchically coordinated interest groups. These interest groups are
acknowledged and sometimes officially authorized by the corporatist elite. In the Mormon case
described herein, these corporatist elite would be the Latter-day Saint church hierarchs and the
institutional controls they have at their disposal. The interests groups in a corporatist
arrangement are afforded guaranteed of representation within their particular interest group
category with no need to compete for representation.253 In other words, they will have a seat at
the decision making table as long as they adequately control how they select their leaders and
how the group expresses their political demands. In the case below, the church plays an active
part in shaping groups, parties, guilds etc. and then acting as a mediator between these groups.254
In contrast to the corporatist model of organizing society, pluralism can be defined as a system of
interest representation in which the societal groups are organized into an almost limitless number
of voluntary, competitive, interest groups which require no official approval from the church or
the state. The dominant church would not control these other interest groups or political parties’
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leadership selection or how they articulate their party platform or demands. Pluralism allows
societal interest groups and parties to organize freely in an unregulated way. 255

Figure 15 The Gardo House served as the LDS Church office buildings and the venue for the
Mormon elite debates over the extent to which the Mormon people should liberalize.

Tracing the Process of Divisions and Debates among Mormon Elite
On a warm July day in 1891 the 77 year old President of the Quorum of the Twelve
Apostles, Lorenzo Snow assembled the highest councils of the Latter-day Saint Church to
discuss a problem that had grown more intense as the summer marched along. The problem was
the introduction of national political parties among the Mormons. Lorenzo Snow was the
President of this governing Church council.256 He had called his fellow Apostles to the ornate
and stately mansion that served as church headquarters, to deliberate over the issue to achieve

255

Schmitter, Philippe C. "Still the century of corporatism?." The Review of politics 36, no. 1 (1974): 85-131.
An apostle in Mormonism is roughly equivalent to a Cardinal within the Catholic Church. Mormon Apostles are
appointed by the church president and there are usually twelve apostles.
256

112

unanimous support, as a council, on a policy dictating apostolic involvement in politics.257 The
comforts of the Gardo House did little for the oppressive Utah summer heat even with the
windows open for ventilation. The Apostles offered prayer and then began to argue. There heated
opinions rivaled the scorching temperature outside in down town Salt Lake City.258
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Figure 16 Lorenzo Snow, the hard-liner arbiter of Mormon elite debates over political divisions.

By the 1890s President Lorenzo Snow, the leader of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles,
had curly white hair and long white beard. A visiting minister from North Carolina described his
face as a “haunting…poem of peace.” Snow’s eyes were “the home of silent prayer.”259 Another
contemporary of Snow described him as not weighing more than 125 pounds, “but still very
active.” By the time political controversy disrupted the cohesion of the Quorum of the Twelve
over which he presided, Snow had dedicated most of his adult life to Mormonism. As a young
man he had attended Oberlin College, “full of worldly aspirations, with bright prospects and
means to gratify [his] ambition in acquiring a liberal college education.” But, by age twenty two,
the thoughtful college student had decided to cast his lot with the fledgling Mormons and he was
eyewitness to much of the theological innovations and political strife that accompanied the new
frontier religion. Once the Mormon people settled in Utah, Snow was assigned by Brigham
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Young to create a cooperative community settlement in an isolated valley in the northern Uinta
Mountains. Of Snow’s leadership of this communal endeavor Brigham Young gushed: “Brother
Snow has set the best example of the literal building up of the kingdom of God of any of our
presiding Elders.”260 Snow spent almost a year in prison for polygamy and had only been
released when his case was reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court. In sum, Snow was fiercely
dedicated to his people and to his principles and desired to instill a commitment to sacrifice in
his associates in the quorum. He was a religious hard-liner.
Among the ruling elite in the Mormon hierarchy in 1891 there was a sizable number of
hard-liners that the two competing factions soft-liners attempted to persuade to support their
competing proposals of how the adoption of political parties should take place. The vast majority
of the ruling elite initially held the position that since there was “fear of division and
antagonism,” within the ranks of the Quorum of the Twelve, the Mormon elite should hold
themselves “aloof from politics.”261 The hard-liners among the Mormon elite wanted to maintain
the order and unified political loyalties in their ruling councils. Hard-liners were largely
unwilling to cooperate with what they saw as outsider influence of politics meant to corrupt and
erode their religious system. Less than two decades prior to the 1891 pressures to adopt national
parties. Brigham Young had governed the Mormon people with what could easily be described
as an authoritarian rule and even after the emergence of the party politics in the 1870s, Utah’s
majority Mormon Church hierarchy retained an extraordinary level of influence in Utah
territorial politics before the adoption of the national political parties in 1891. The hard-liner
position was captured in the thoughts of Amasa Lyman, an nineteenth Mormon leader. Lyman
described the United States political system as “a damned wrotten thing, ful of lice, moth eaten,
corrupt and there is nothing but meaness about it [sic].” Lyman said his only loyalty was with
the Mormon people and that he shared no special loyalty or connection with any U.S. political
institution. Lyman only cared about “this church and this kingdom [and had] no regard for any
thing but God and his church, [I] dont care a damn for the rest. They may go to hell with their
laws.” Amasa Lyman went on to express apocalyptic rhetoric which was common among
Mormon leaders in the nineteenth century. This rhetoric helped to justify their hard-liner position

260

Manscill, C. K., Wright, D. A., & Freeman, R. C. (2008). Presidents of the Church: The Lives and Teachings of
the Modern Prophets. Cedar Fort.
261
April 2 1891. Lyman, Edward Leo. "Candid Insights of a Mormon Apostle: The Diaries of Abraham H. Cannon,
1889-1895." (2010).

115

towards resisting being incorporated into the national party system: “We never enjoyed any
liberty until we cut the cords that bound us to [the United States] and looked to ourselves for
protection. We are heaping together the funeral pile[pyre?] of this generation and the more
faggots we can heap together, the hotter it wil burn when we apply the torch.”262 A generation
later in 1891 the Apostle John W. Taylor argued in a similar vein as had Amasa Lyman. Taylor
thundered to the other Mormon elite that “with politics he did not want to be democrat or
republican.” Taylor wanted to dig in his heels and resist federal raids and calls to adopt national
party identifications. Taylor “did not care for any political party.” Taylor maintained the hardline
stance that “if we are united [then] earth and hell cannot overthrow us and we will prevail and
the warfare against us shall not prevail.”263 The initial decision in the spring of 1891 to
maintaining the status quo for the hard-liners in the quorum was short-lived. The two different
factions of soft-liners again quickly sought to win the hard-liners over to their respective
strategies of the implementation of the liberalizing policy.
Snow called the meeting to order and the quorum sang Charles Wesley’s hymn, “Come
let us anew our journey pursue.” This song invited a course correction and a refocusing for the
Mormon elite. Perhaps Snow thought a course correction for his politically agitated quorum
members was exactly what they needed; less engagement as ambassadors for a political doctrine
and more of an emphasis on being ambassadors for the Kingdom of God.264 Seated in the Gardo
House over the next few days, in addition to Snow, were the Democratic Apostles Franklin D
Richards, Heber J Grant and Moses Thatcher. As well as the Republicans: Francis Lyman, John
Henry Smith, Anthon H Lund, and Abraham H Cannon. And the apolitical hard-liners John W.
Taylor, Mariner W Merrill and Brigham Young Jr.
Heavy handed federal intervention into Utah territory in the 1880s had created pressure
for elites in the Mormon West to slowly liberalize. Diverging strategies for liberalizing and
differing interpretations of religious values to justify their political policy preferences
contributed to the erosion of elite cohesion. The fissure of LDS elite emerged over the question,
“how much influence should the church leadership have in orchestrating the adoption of political
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parties among the Mormon people?” President Lorenzo Snow began by framing the discussion in
overt language of covenant obligations; a language that all present would have easily recognized
and understood. According to Snow, the quorum needed to unify and do all that was necessary
for the building of Zion. They should be willing to make any sacrifice and obey any direction
form the prophet so that the kingdom would continue to roll forth. Snow felt that all the Apostles
“were willing to sacrifice life itself if necessary to promote the work of the Lord.”265 Snow was
invoking covenants that all the Apostles had made through sacred rituals. For these elite church
leaders, Mormon rituals “constitute[d] canon in both senses of the word: its original meaning as
the rule or standard by which all else is measured and later as the rule or law by which persons
are governed ecclesiastically.”266 Snow wished to have his council become one and to be
constrained by their shared commitment to their covenants. For President Snow and his quorum,
a covenant was a bond of reciprocal regard and care, a bond of giving for the flourishing of the
others in the Mormon community. Unlike political or legal contracts that protected interests,
Mormon covenants were meant to protect relationships. Snow understood that covenants were
critical as a regulatory principle in Mormon society. He meant to encourage all his colleagues in
church government to strive towards a conscientious covenant keeping.267
The debate that followed showed that while his colleagues “were on hand to make any
and all kinds of sacrifices for the benefit of the work of the Lord,” they disagreed on what
political sacrifices would be most beneficial to advancing the kingdom. Should they offer the
sacrifice of obedience to church authority or should they emphasize the sanctity of individual
agency for the good of the kingdom?268 The Mormon elite were debating whether to continue to
coordinate the interests of the community or to adopt a more pluralist model of interest group
development. But the language they used was void of overt concepts such as corporatism and
pluralism. Instead their debates use religiously charged language of individual agency versus
obedience to authority.
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Both the pluralist soft-liners and the corporatist soft-liners recognized, acknowledged and
began to grapple with the growing interest group diversity of the Utah Territory that adoption of
national political parties created.269 The pluralists and corporatists advocated competing political
remedies and diverging visions of what the system of interest representation would look like.
The pluralist soft-liners advocated for a more spontaneous party system formation, although they
were not overwhelmingly advocating for an unfettered proliferation of all interest groups free
from religious coercion.270 Whereas, corporatist soft-liners advocated a more controlled
emergence of party divides that are mediated and balanced and the continuity of the church
hierarchy’s oversight of less contentious complementary interplay of political parties.271
President George Q. Cannon, a soft-liner in favor of the coordinated equal divide
strategy, continued Snows discussion of sacrifice but void of the covenantal aspect of sacrifice
which Snow had hoped would regulate the actions of the council. Cannon along with Joseph F.
Smith and John Henry Smith wanted to subvert the Mormon people’s natural inclination to adopt
the Democratic Party. Instead, they favored a more clandestine manufacturing of the composition
of political parties. Cannon “felt that Brother John Henry had made a great sacrifice in entering
the political field as an active worker.” The First Presidency had not officially requested John
Henry Smith to labor but they “felt that what he had done had their full approval.” Joseph F.
Smith also told the gathered Apostles that he also sanctioned John Henry’s actions. He described
John Henry Smith as “to be about the only man that could be put forward and we have really
sacrificed him and he is now in the fight and he cannot very well get out.” Cannon further
explained that there were some among the Mormon people finding fault with Apostle John
Henry Smith. Cannon admitted that John Henry’s active role in politics did somewhat diminish
his ecclesiastical role, but Cannon reassured the quorum that “this would all pass away in time.”
John Henry’s sacrifice would be worth it.272
Pres. Cannon further argued that it would be impossible for the Mormon people to have a
political divide equal enough to credibly seek patronage from office seekers from either party
269
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without church involvement in politics. Cannon said, “Our [non-Mormon] friends felt that our
political affairs should be so managed that we would have the [patronage]… of both of the
political parties.” Cannon further explained that “the feeling that all of us should have was the
best interests of [the Mormon people] without regard to party.”273 Instead of describing this in
political terms, he defaulted to a religious explanation. Upon describing the Mormon elite’s
experiment in manufacturing political divides in Ogden, Cannon said, “[I] knew the Lords hand
was in it, though what the result will be I cannot say. I feel more and more how little is my
wisdom when contemplating the works of God ... still I know God is controlling and directing
them.”274
President Cannon went on to discuss the actions of a secret committee whose purpose
would be to “call on the leading brethren in the different stakes together and see what could be
done in a quiet way to have [party membership] nearly equally divided as possible.”275 The softliners in favor of a natural implementation of the division policy immediately expressed
discomfort with the idea of a secret committee whose purpose was to artificially divide the
voters. Moses Thatcher “felt sure that it would result in evil results to people.” Heber J. Grant
was confused and frustrated with the news of this secret committee since he had thought that all
the Mormon elite were “unanimous [in] feeling …that no effort should be made [by a]
committee … to try and see that the saints were as nearly as possibly equally divided.” Grant
concluded his remarks by stating that “such a committee was a great mistake.”276 Joseph F.
Smith and George Q. Cannon explained that the duties of the “proposed secret committee …was
only to try and prevent the people going overwhelmingly in either direction.” They tried to
reassure the Democrats among the ruling elite that if a committee was operating, it was not “to
influence or coerce them contrary to their desires [or] change the political faith of any man.”
However, Cannon and Smith went on to explain that the Mormon elite should “let the saints
know that it was in the best interests of the people that we do not all join one party.” According
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to Smith and Cannon, since the “great majority of the [Mormon people] had no real [political]
preferences,” it would allow “a greater chance of division that would be nearly equal.”277
For his part as the sacrificer, John Henry Smith chose to assign great value to who he saw
as the beneficiary of his sacrifice, the citizens Utah Territory. According to John Henry Smith,
his active campaigning for Republicans “was for the best interests of the people.” John Henry
explained with a tenor of self-congratulation that “if it had not been for [my] labors …we might
everyone have been disfranchised by this time.” Heber J. Grant remarked in his journal that “It
seemed to me that [John Henry] took considerable honor himself for the present mildness which
is shown toward us.”278 John Henry Smith, chose to stress the value of this goal of political
enfranchisement. John Henry Smith’s rhetorical emphasis on his sacrifice being for the goal of
benefiting Utah Territory, granted him more power and less anxiety about rejection from his
religious colleagues. However, the potential of aggression in sacrificing for a cause was also
there. As the sacrificer in a noble cause, John Henry Smith felt justified to commit a type of
violence for the cause through harmful campaign polemics. For example, Smith’s colleague in
the Quorum of the Twelve, Franklin D. Richards expressed being hurt “when Bro. Smith had
caused great offense by calling those who did not believe as he did some pretty hard names.
Many people felt insulted at his remarks.”279 The concern of speaking evil against those on an
opposite side of a political issue became an unfortunate byproduct of the political division. The
prevailing soft-liners either did not initially see it as a salient problem among the Mormon
communities or saw no way to avoid it at first.
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Figure 17 Political leanings of the LDS First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve Apostles
from 1891-1896

Instead of directly responding to the accusations of ad hominem attacks, the discussion
among the Mormon elite deflected this worry and turned towards arguing about the outcomes of
the opposing strategic decisions. George Q. Cannon and Joseph F Smith had seriously
considered their course of action and saw their corporatist strategy as the path to the most
optimal outcomes. Figure 18, visually diagrams the argument that the soft-liners in favor of a
corporatist management of the party divisions described to the hard-liners in their private
discussions among the elite. In the face of external pressure from the anti-polygamy
incarceration crackdown, even after officially abandoning polygamy, the Mormon elite faced a
choice. Should they maintain the defiant status quo, or liberalize by adopting national parties?
Once the soft-liners in the Mormon elite prevailed in choosing to adopt parties a new decision
confronted the soft-liners. How were they to implement the national party system? Should they
opt for an organic division of party affiliations which allowed for a pluralistic organization of
interest groups? Or should there be a more coordinated top-down management of the political
party divisions similar to the corporatist pattern of years past?
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Figure 18 The decision tree mapping out the argument of why coordinated political divisions
would result in more protection than would sincere political divisions.

For the proponents of coordinating the party formation, they saw their strategy as
ensuring strong national linkages with the ruling party in the federal government. Dividing
Mormons among the two parties would have also most likely split the anti-Mormon opposition
and thus would have weakened the local oppositions’ ability to mobilize for further reform after
the limited liberalizing measures the church introduced. The soft-liners that advocated a more
coordinated and equal partisan divide worried that an organic natural divide would merely result
in weak national linkages without patronage networks sufficient to provide relief from federal
intervention. They further worried that the same contentious political divide along the religious
identities would persist, but just with new national political party brands. According to the softliners in favor of coordinating an equal partisan divide, this persistence of politicized religious
identities in the party system would have resulted in an escalation of federal intervention at the
behest of the emboldened non-Mormon population in the Territory.
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Figure 19 Moses Thatcher, Democrat soft-liner and Joseph F. Smith, Republican soft-liner

The soft-liners among the Mormon elite that advocated for the sincere natural partisan
divide, feared that the local non-Mormon population would oppose their clearly unfavorable and
weakened position if the parties manufactured to be equal. These elite soft-liners worried that
non-Mormons would protest participation in the new adopted party system if they saw overt
church manufacturing of political victories. Moses Thatcher articulated these concerns in the
debate when he said, “I am opposed to the church using any influence to turn the people to one
party or the other, and if we play with these things it will bring ruin to us.” Thatcher passionately
objected to the Apostles trying to “have things equally divided.” Thatcher thought it would be “a
very dangerous thing.”280 He specifically worried about the “evil results” of a clandestine
committee of Apostles which had been gathering stake presidents and bishops to “see what could
be done in a quiet way to have things nearly equally divided as possible.”281 Thatcher warned
that non-Mormons might then revert to pre-division strategies of dismantling church influence in
Utah Territory, such as lobbying Congress to intervene on their behalf. Thatcher continued to
280
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argue that if non-Mormons in Utah Territory externalized their territorial conflict, then that might
result in an escalation of federal intervention into Utah Territory and further threats to the
Mormon people. Thatcher’s faction of soft-liners tried to convince their fellow elite that sincere
partisan divide was the only way to mollify the demands of the non-Mormon opposition in the
Territory.
Thatcher advocated for a competitive market place of political interests where
conscientious convictions could organically grow from the ground up and not be artificially
assigned from the top down. Thatcher was opposed to the church hierarchy putting gag orders on
some leaders while giving other Apostles free reign.282 He saw the result of this as a one sided
debate where one Republican Apostle such as John Henry Smith could make assertions,
broadside attacks and partisan speeches while the opposing church leaders like Thatcher, F.S
Richards and Heber Grant and B.H. Roberts were to just expected to let Republicans
monopolize the political discussion.
Pluralist soft-liners, like Thatcher, also saw sincere partisan divides as instrumental to
deemphasizing religion. If church leaders on opposite sides of a partisan debate were permitted
to “seek to make converts to their [political] principles,” a proliferation of interest groups would
occur and would form coalitions with the two major parties. For the pluralist soft-liners this
would have resulted in politics becoming more programmatic and more ideologically sincere.
Campaigns would less likely to resort to relying on personalistic appeals to a candidate’s church
prominence or personal piety as sufficient preconditions for political office. Opposing candidates
would be able to talk about different political traditions instead of attacking the moral failings of
fellow church members to score political points.
A further concern that Apostle Moses Thatcher broached was the impact that church
involvement in politics would have among loyal Mormons. He recounted a visit to the Mormon
settlements in Southern Idaho to illustrate the hazards of church orchestration of political
interests. When Thatcher visited church services in Idaho he saw scores of sullen men who
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attended the worship services and did not take the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper: “Rows of his
brethren in our meeting refuse to partake of the sacrament.” The non-Mormon Idaho legislature
had recently disfranchised Mormon men. Mormon men were barred from political participation
unless they could demonstrate they were not Mormon. Some Mormon leaders in Idaho instructed
Mormon men to officially renounce church membership to be able to vote in local Idaho
elections. This unusual strategy did not work and left the excommunicated men adrift and in a
spiritual limbo all at the behest of their church superiors. Thatcher worried that similar heavy
handed involvement of church leaders in Utah Territory would have similar spiritually
deleterious results and “hoped [that the church leaders] might never in the future sacrifice
principle to get down into the slums of politics,” by becoming overtly involved with political
campaigns. 283
Pluralist soft-liners made a direct appealed to the hard-liners’ disdain for church
involvement in the “slums of politics.” Previous to the adoption of national parties the church
hierarchy appointed Mormon political officers to serve in political positions. Now with the
adoption of national parties, Mormon campaign organizers circumvented normal ecclesiastical
channels and sought individual church elite for their name recognition and their influence among
the Latter-day Saints. Local Republican and Democratic Party leaders assiduously attempted to
collect Apostles to their respective party ranks. Moses Thatcher described this period of
recruitment process as being “drawn into politics by a train of circumstances which [he] could
not control.”284 Political maneuverings and partisanship began to influence more of Thatcher’s
interaction with others both inside and outside the Church. Fellow Apostle Heber Grant
sympathized with Thatcher about the pull from friends to engage in territorial politics. He also
worried over the impact that political involvement would have on his church position.
Newspapers and scrounging campaign operatives did all they could to capitalize on the celebrity
status of an implied or real apostolic endorsement for candidates or their party platforms in
elections after the spring of 1891. Much to his dismay, Heber Grant’s private support for friends
and colleagues running for office were often unwittingly turned into public endorsements by an
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Apostle of the Lord when his friends leaked his private feelings publically to the press. Grant felt
that he was “placed in an awkward position when he refused to come work for his democratic
friends.” But more worrisome than running afoul of his political friends, Grant worried that
personal favors done for Democratic friends would be co-opted by local party organizations and
his ecclesiastical role would be inappropriately used to advance the cause of a party. Grant saw
apostolic involvement in politics as largely inappropriate because such involvement would
diminish his legitimacy as an Apostle.
These elite debates took place over many months, but ultimately Church government
dictated that after all debates and discussion, the final decision making was deferred to superiors
in the church hierarchy. The Quorum of the Twelve Apostles had to defer to members of the
Quorum of the First Presidency in matters political because the three-member quorum of the
First Presidency out-ranked them. The three member Quorum of the First Presidency had
orchestrated much of the lobbying and the seeking of patronage at the national level. As a result,
the First Presidency often deliberately excluded the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles from
political deliberations for fear that their backroom deals with national politicians would be made
public and misconstrued by elites that disagreed with establishing patronage linkages with the
national Republican party. In explaining their decision of keeping their subordinates in the
Mormon elite in the dark about all the political maneuverings, George Q. Cannon explained to
the Mormon elite, “you have not studied” the political situation like the First Presidency.285
Lorenzo Snow had hoped that a robust private discussion about how to implement this
policy of party division would help create covenantal consensus. Rather than creating consensus
on a policy, these internal debates among the Mormon elite further polarized the positions
between the two factions of soft-liners among the Mormon elite. The corporatist soft-liners
shared the advantage of maintaining some semblance of continuity with the political order prior
to the adoption of national political parties and thus many hard-liners aligned with them in their
efforts to divide the Mormon people equally on party lines. The hard-liners were concerned
about the erosion of social cohesion in Mormon communities that accompanied unfettered party
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campaigns in Utah Territory. For example, Apostle Abraham Cannon “feared that [the Mormon
people] dividing on party lines would have the effect of creating antagonism between friends.”
Cannon gave an example to justify his concern where he had seen “two friends and brethren part
in anger on account of their political differences.”286
In Cannons view, the heated nature of the sincere political campaigns in which Thatcher
and Roberts participated accrued into socially destructive political aggression among the
Mormon men. This type of behavior had to be constrained by the rituals offered in Mormon’s
holiest buildings: temples.287As was the case in many wards and branches the dedication of the
temple in Salt Lake served as an opportunity to reach consensus on the church policy of
orchestrating an equal division of the two parties. After a particularly charismatic meeting in the
newly finished Salt Lake temple, George Q. Cannon spoke with over a hundred priesthood
holders from all over Intermountain West. Cannon added an interesting coda to what had been
described as an exceptional outpouring of the Holy Spirit in the temple. Cannon challenged the
priesthood leaders of the stakes and wards and branches to return to their ecclesiastical
stewardships charged with the spirit of God and to equally balance the partisan divide:
When you leave this meeting will you retain the Spirit you have now? I would to God
that you did all feel as we do, and make the people feel the same. We do not want to
dictate in politics, but we think we have a right to indicate the policy which the people
ought to follow. We must use wisdom in not antagonizing the Democrats nor discourage
the Republicans. The Republicans are still a power in the land. 288
Overt temple rhetoric combined with an appeal to sacrifice on behalf of securing the welfare of
Zion was the charge Cannon left with thousands of listeners in this session of the Salt Lake
temple dedication. The message was clear: Mormons should quietly and delicately engineer the
electoral outcomes to access patronage from the party that was “still a power in the land” without
resorting to disruptive competitive elections.
Early on in the elite debates Moses Thatcher had framed his political participation as
upholding an obligation made in the temple to sacrifice to build God’s kingdom. He had viewed
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his sincere party involvement as an offering to the Church and to God’s people. Thatcher felt
bound, through covenantal relations, to nurture alternatives to the corporatist discourse and
culture around the people and to “puncture the numbness of the status quo.”289 However, framing
his political campaigning for Democrats as a sacrificial offering presupposed a power imbalance
between Thatcher as the sacrificer and the recipients of his offering in the Mormon elite. This
created a terrifying dilemma: Thatcher may have said he sacrificed for the good of bringing relief
to the Mormon people, but the other Mormon elite rejected his offering. Many other members of
the Quorum of the Twelve interpreted Thatcher’s actions as breaking his ritual promise to
sacrifice for the kingdom. In their minds, Thatcher was selfishly choosing worldly success over
the kingdom of God.
As Thatcher became more active in Democratic campaigning the meetings among the
Mormon elite shifted from a discussion about how much they should coordinate the partisan
divide, to a discussion about what they could do to mitigate the influence of vocal Democratic
Mormon elite. Francis Lyman recounted the worries about defections from the ruling elite in one
elite discussion in which Thatcher was absent: “Our subject was chiefly the case of bro Moses
Thatcher which we all saw had been radically wrong. It was concluded he must be brought to see
that he had been working against the policy of the Presidency, thus heading a faction against the
Presidency and bringing them to disgrace in the eyes of the Saints.”290 The pressure for Thatcher
to extricate himself from politics reached a fever pitch until he was removed from the Quorum of
the Twelve Apostles in the October General Conference of 1896.
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Conclusion

Figure 20 LDS First Presidency and the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles in 1898
The Quorum of the Twelve Apostles in the 1890s were initially divided about how much
the church leaders should explicitly orchestrate the composition of the parties. They agonized
over how to maintain their “Zion community” while still desiring official acceptance into
American political life. The Apostles and the First Presidency contested this topic for months
until the debates spilled out into the public.291 Apostle contended against Apostle in politics,
spitting vitriolic speeches only slightly veiled at their intended subject. Utah’s adoption of
national parties happened in the backdrop of Mormon leader’s internal divisions over whether to
establish more stable Republican patronage linkages. Mormon leaders vehemently disagreed
about how much they should be involved in manufacturing the composition of political parties.
The political fervor of the partisan divide threatened to overshadow the cause of Zion. Religious
metaphors were often used in discussing the political arena such as “conversion” to a party or
291
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“preaching” on behalf of a party. Loyalty to a party threatened to supersede loyalty to the church
even while the men of the quorum proclaimed to be doing God’s work. For so long, the work of
God and man had been so thoroughly entwined in their communitarian system. Political acts of
religious fervor proved to be a significant test to the Mormon axiom, “all things are spiritual unto
me sayeth the Lord.”292
The Mormon elites wanted to build ties to external political actors, whom they perceive
as legitimate and just, and who would afford them protection. They debated the expediency of
cutting ties to any external political actor that they regarded as illegitimate and represented a
non-desirable value system.293 Those that did not prevail in debates among church hireachs such
as Thatcher, B.H. Roberts and Heber J Grant worried over the loss of their influence in the
church hierarchy. For them, public defection became more attractive. When cohesion of the
church hierarchs declined, the implementation of effective collective action by the LDS church
also diminished as will be more evident in the following chapter. The dominant faction among
the church hierarchs may have been able to respond coherently to liberalizing trends if they had
successfully overwhelmed their opposition in the internal church council debates, but the severe
split among the church hierarchs raised the likelihood of confusion, miscalculations and poorly
executed implementations of policy. There was no consistent message in favor of adopting a
more corporatist organization of political parties in the territory294
That which began as a private discussion among the religious elite, later spilled out into
campaign rhetoric that exacerbated the divisions and polarized many Mormons. The divisions
among the ecclesiastical elite mirrored many Mormon villages throughout Utah Territory.
Slowly the governing councils of the church reached a consensus only with the alienation of one
their members for his unwillingness to adopt the corporatist policy.
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CHAPTER 6

“Call the boys together:” Church Hierarchs Balance the Mormon Vote and
Local Ambivalence, 1891-1896

How did the Latter-day Saints disaggregate their hierarchal religious communities and reaggregate them into party affiliations that pitted co-religionists against one another? Most
scholars describe the church hierarchs in the 1890s as being forced to adopt the policies because
of federal pressure. However, the majority of church hierarchs adopted a strategy to gain more
local autonomy while simultaneously appearing to the U.S. COngress to have implemented
liberalizing reforms. Church hierarchs began reorganizing their society around the two national
parties. The orchestrating of elections and political parties was not conducive to liberal
democracy, but it served its purpose of allowing Utah to court patronage from either party. Utah
Territory became a swing state to which national politicians had to curry favor in exchange for
delivering electoral support. Below, I trace the top-down process of the ecclesiastical
implementation of an equal national party divide in a religiously homogenous region and the the
ambivalence among the majority of Mormons.295
Delegitimizing religion as a valid Political Identity
Beginning in February of 1891 the church hierarchs began to discourage any public
discourse that would reinforce the salience of political identities organized around religion. They
sought to delegitimize religion in politics in the territory: “to bury those questions on church
membership with Politics and adhere strictly to party lines and principles.”296 Burying religious
conflict and emphasizing the party conflict was also the explicit explanation that George Q.
Cannon gave to the leaders of the church-run People’s party leaders when they were told to
disband the party.
In June of 1891, nine months after Woodruff’s manifesto abandoning polygamy, a large
group of Mormon political leaders gathered in Gardo House to disband the church’s political
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arm-the People’ Party. John Morgan recorded George Cannon’s instructions. According to
Morgan, Cannon told the group that while the People’s Party would be disbanded, the possibility
of many Mormons adopting the Democratic Party “was not as it should be and more equilibrium
should be sought.”297 Cannon explained that officially, the Mormon people should feel free to
adopt whichever national party they felt most inclined. However, George Cannon gave an
important unofficial caveat. James Moyle remembered George Q. Cannon explaining that
orchestrating an equal divide along national party lines would help to deemphasize politicized
religious identities in Utah Territory. Political parties would not be organized along religious
cleavages. Moyle a remembered Cannon explaining that “our people think they are Democrats,
but…If they go into the Democratic Party, [then] the Gentiles will go into the Republican
Party…and we will have the old fight over again under new names….the old party
fight…between Mormons and non-Mormons must not be allowed to continue.” Cannon’s
solution to this worry of continuation of the old party fight was to get “as many as possible of
our people…into the Republican Party.”298 Cannon’s son recorded in his journal that if the
Mormon people abandoned the People’s party and all became Democrats, then “the results of
such a course would doubtless prove disastrous to us, for we would have a repetition of the
persecutions which we have endured for 5 to 6 years past.”299 George Cannon’s son, Abraham
similarly recorded his father’s instructions not “to go en masse to either party.” In sum, the equal
division of national parties would avoid the continuation of bitter religiously motivated political
tensions.300
Elite Orchestration of the Adoption of National Parties
Unbeknownst to the Democrat leaning Mormon elite, the “proposed Secret committee” to
engineer the equal political divide had been in operation in Southern Utah during the month of
June and parts of July of 1891. Republican Apostles explicitly ordered local church leaders to
divide their congregations in order to increase the chance of party equilibrium for the purpose of
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gaining political favors from the national political parties. For example, in Beaver, Utah Francis
Lyman explained to priesthood leaders that the goal of dividing members was to help establish
linkages with national party leaders.
Beaver, Utah was a significant location for the Mormon Apostle’s to “call on the leading
brethren in the different stakes together and see what could be done in a quiet way to have things
nearly equally divided as possible.” Beaver was the eye of the protection racket hurricane in
Southern Utah.301 In 1873, the U.S. Army established Fort Cameron at Beaver City presumably
to protect local citizens from Native American raids and to help bring the perpetrators of the
Mountain Meadows Massacre to justice, but also to observe and track Mormon behavior. Beaver
was also the location for the Second Federal District Courthouse where all arrested polygamists
in Southern Utah had to travel to stand trial and to be sentenced. By 1891, the U.S. Army
presence had begun to wane but by the 1890s the Second District Federal Court was in crescendo
with hundreds of polygamists being rounded up by deputy marshals to be temporarily
warehoused in the bowels of the Court house before being transported to the federal penitentiary
in Salt Lake City. It was fitting that in the shadow of the court house, with this tense history with
federal threats in the Territory, Apostles Francis Lyman and Abraham Cannon descended on
Beaver in June of 1891 to muster some political currency to buy protection from whichever party
would provide it.
Lyman and Cannon came to the June 1891 church conference with two goals: reorganize
the Beaver church leadership and to reorganize politics to balance the Mormon vote in Southern
Utah. This particular gathering was especially advantageous because representatives from most
Southern Utah Stakes were present.
In the public session of the regional church conference Francis Lyman freewheelingly
recounted some of his adventures in settling Mormon colonies “in the old Mexico.” Lyman liked
telling this adventure story. He had recounted the story frequently in many prior public sermons.
But on this occasion Lyman reframed his adventure in “old Mexico” as a quintessential
American manifest destiny narrative. Lyman imagined himself as an intrepid colonizer winding
his way through the desert canyons of Northern Mexico facing wind rain and murderous bandits.
Finally, on the 24th day of July 1885, he triumphantly raised the “Stars and Stripes” on Mexican
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soil on top a tree in Casas Grande Valley in the Sierra Madre Mountains.302 What Lyman omitted
from this account is key. In past versions of this story Lyman had emphasized that this act of
raising the U.S. flag in Mexico had (at the time) been an act of defiance and a form of civil
disobedience directed at the U.S. Government. When Lyman raised the U.S. flag in Mexico, he
raised it half-mast, in protest the precipitous decline of protections and liberties of the Mormon
people. Lyman probably found it ironic that he had to leave the United States to practice his
religion as he understood it. However, six years later, Lyman’s purpose in recounting that same
story changed dramatically. However in 1891 faced with the task of politically reorganizing the
Mormon People, he sought encourage reconciliation and integration with the American party
system; not defying it. The omission of this one detail transformed the story. In a stunning
transformation, Lyman had repurposed his flag raising story in Mexico into an act of patriotism
rather than an act of rebellion.303
On this same occasion Apostles Abraham Cannon and Francis Lyman further preached to
the Saints of the combined congregations of Mormons from Beaver, Panguitch, Kanab, Parowan,
and Millard “on …support[ing] the priesthood [leaders].” This was important for them to
emphasize because directly following the conference session, the Apostles met with the
priesthood leaders from the five different southern Utah Stakes in a “private and special
priesthood meeting.”304 According to Cannon, he and his colleague Francis Lyman “urged the
brethren to start the [party division] agitation in their respective counties, but to see that each
party had a fair show.”305 From the perspective of John Tolton, a Beaver priesthood leader
present in the secret meeting, “Lyman then and there stated that he had convened [the] meeting
for the purpose of talking politics.” Tolton further recorded that, “Apostle Lyman was surprised
to see such a political craze as had apparently struck us.” Lyman asked Brother Shepard, the First
Counselor in the Beaver Stake Presidency, “how it was that so many of the people were
democrats?” Lyman forcefully declared, “This is not as it should be.” Lyman explained how the
process of equal political division should occur continuing forward: so as to not arouse suspicion
302

June 21 1891. Lyman, Edward Leo, and Harvard S. Heath. "Candid Insights of a Mormon Apostle: The Diaries
of Abraham H. Cannon, 1889-1895." (2010).
303
Pulsipher, J. David. "" Prepared to Abide the Penalty": Latter-day Saints and Civil Disobedience." Journal of
Mormon History 39, no. 3 (2013): 131-162. See also, Tullis, F. LaMond. Mormons in Mexico: The dynamics of faith
and culture. Utah State University Press, 1987.
304
As quoted in Gibbs, Josiah Francis. Lights and shadows of Mormonism. 1909. Tolton affidavit.
305
June 21 1891. Lyman, Edward Leo, and Harvard S. Heath. "Candid Insights of a Mormon Apostle: The Diaries
of Abraham H. Cannon, 1889-1895." (2010).

134

from non-Mormons and outsiders, Mormon men that had not publicly or actively discussed
politics should become Republicans. This would be less likely to arouse suspicions about church
involvement in dictating political matters. The stake presidents were also to allocate a certain
number of Mormon voters to be “independent or neutral,” so the Mormon people “will have
more power in the nation and get [political patronage] from whichever party was in power.”
Lyman’s remark of pressing for benefits from which ever office seeker was in power highlighted
the Mormon elites understanding that the national Republican hegemony in the postbellum era
was not to last. The Mormon elite feared that linkages with only one party could potentially last
for one election cycle. Lyman concluded by further explaining the rationale: the church
authorities “desired [the Mormon people] to divide…equally on National Party lines,” so that the
two major political parties “will then cater to us.”306 The members of the stake presidencies were
to appear as if they were acting of “their own volition” as they clandestinely encouraged the
divisions in their congregations. They were to keep the counsel that Apostles Cannon and Lyman
had given them, secret. When Francis Lyman called for all the brethren who had not talked
openly about politics to become Republican, John Tolton recorded in his journal that Abraham
Cannon “placed his hands upon [Lyman] by way of restraint.” Tolton thought that perhaps
Lyman’s instructions “did not seem to suit Apostle Cannon. Cannon endeavored to check and
restrain Lyman by saying, ‘Brother Lyman, don't go too far.’”307
A few months after the Beaver Conference Francis Lyman now with Apostle Anthon
Lund toured the stakes in Southern Utah to follow up on how the balancing of the Mormon vote
was progressing. Lyman was not pleased with what he observed: “There are too many
Democrats here. [You] were told to divide[!] but here in St. George you have turned in a body
from People’s Party to Democracy.”308 Lyman sounds exasperated at Mormons that were
unwilling to help balance the Mormon vote. However he was largely successful in encouraging
Mormons divide equally. For example, a history of Sanpete County published in the last decade
of the nineteenth century demonstrates just how successful Lyman and other church leaders were
in orchestrating the equal party divide in this part of Utah. A local historian in Sanpete valley
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described the political makeup of the Mormon villages there in 1896: “the Peoples party had
always controlled [Sanpete County and] there being practically no opposition…Ephraim has
practically the same political history as other settlements in the county. The People's Party was
almost unanimous until the division on national party lines, when the two parties were about
equally represented.” The local historian continued to repetitively recite the suspiciously perfect
equal party divisions in town after town: “In 1891, when the national parties were organized and
local issues discarded, the two parties are about equally represented.” In yet another city “the
division was about equal, both parties having been successful.” In Fairview, Gunnison, Spring
City, Manti and other cities in Sanpete valley “the people are about equally divided in political
sentiment.” 309 Church hierarchs such as the quorum of the Seventy’s John Morgan, and Andrew
Jenson and Apostles Anthon Lund, and Francis Lyman and John Henry Smith all “made a tour
through Sevier Wayne, and Sanpete counties as a speaker in the interest of politics.”310 These
hand selected leaders were called to make clear to Mormon settlers that, despite twenty five
years of anti-Mormon legislation at the hands of mostly the Republicans, “it would not be a
crime to be a Republican.”311 In sum, the elite-led political divisions in many regions in Southern
Utah were met with very minimal vocal resistance. Where confessional party cohesion had been
the norm, exquisitely equal party divisions replaced it.
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Figure 21 Bishop David McKay became a Republican upon request from his priesthood leaders
and divided his congregation politically in Huntsville by alternating houses.

Exactly how the local leaders followed the council to balance the ticket is still in dispute.
According to some sources, church leaders in Mormon villages sometimes created either random
or arbitrary political divisions. For example, Joseph Nelson was present in his congregation in
Salt Lake City in the 1890s when his bishop simply stood at the pulpit and used the center aisle
as the division point and assigned half the congregation to one political party and the other half
to the other.312 According to one twentieth century scholar in Rockville, Utah church leaders
divided the community down Main Street along party lines. One twentieth century LDS church
leader remembered when his father, Bishop David McKay of Huntsville came home one Sunday
in 1891 and around “the dinner table [his father] said, ‘Now children I have something to tell
you… I have become a Republican.’” McKay’s son remembered being devastated at the news:
“how ashamed we children were, because father and [a local saloon owner every one called]
Whiskey Olsen were the only two Republicans in Huntsville.”313 Later in September of 1891,
Bishop David McKay, went from door to door, dividing his town into different political parties
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by assigning alternate houses to different parties assigning one family to be Democrats, the next
to be Republicans.314

Figure 22 Joseph Nelson remembered his Salt Lake City congregation being divided politically
down the middle of his meetinghouse.

Most written accounts of how church leaders implemented of the political divide describe
a less arbitrary process than just randomly assigning members. As they had done in Beaver,
church operatives would often seek out influential figures among the Mormon people in a town.
They would try to reason with them as Francis Lyman and Abraham Cannon had done at Beaver
church Conference. In the summer of 1891 Francis Lyman explicitly requested the Democrat
Alma Greenwood to become a Republican. Lyman’s argument was simple: An equal party
divide would make Utah a swing vote for office seekers. If Utah were a swing vote, that would
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encourage the two parties to seek to curry favor from the Mormon people and would thus
contribute to the Mormons gaining the benefit of local autonomy, such as relief from federal
intervention and further local control in the form of statehood. What was unique about this
particular exchange was not that Lyman asked Greenwood to be Republican, but that he wanted
him to compete against his own brother in party politics. The exchange between Lyman and
Greenwood took place in the isolated central Utah town of Fillmore. Greenwood was a
prominent businessman and a school teacher in Fillmore and a student of politics.315 Lyman
called unannounced at the house of Alma Greenwood and invited Greenwood to “walk with
him.” As the two walked down Fillmore’s main street and out of earshot of others, Lyman
proposed something that surely took Greenwood off-guard. Greenwood recorded the Apostle
saying: “Your brother, Joshua Greenwood, is a staunch Democrat, and it is only right that you
should be Republican, as it would hardly be fair for both of you to be on one side of the fence.
We will never get statehood unless we have more Republicans in Utah.” For good measure,
Lyman shifted rhetorical strategies and made an implicit covenantal plea for why Greenwood
should become a political adversary of his own kin: “Zion needs it.”316 In short, Lyman argued
that the charade of non-Mormon politics had to be played and party divisions needed to be as
equal as possible so the religious integrity of the Mormon people would not be further threatened
by the national political parties that controlled the federal government.
Even while on his mission in New Zealand in less than ideal conditions where Greenwood battled “hosts of
mosquitoes…armies of fleet footed flea[s], and the slow motioned tribes of lice,” he still took great pains to follow
and record world events and political news from Utah in his Mission journal. Other contemporary Mormon
missionary journals often seem to be conscientious in their emphasis of recording miraculous spiritual, mystical
and/or “faith-promoting,” stories. Greenwood spent page after page on the political intrigues of the “Old World” and
the National party composition of the U.S. Congress. What is telling about the tone of his journal while in New
Zealand is that he avoids all apocalyptic and mystical language and makes no reference to an imminent return of the
Christ when he recounts all the “wars and rumors of wars” around the globe. Instead, Greenwood optimistically
records the advances of modern technologies and where around the world the “iron Horse” has been able to
penetrate to bring civilization. Even Greenwoods’ study of the scriptures centered around the political regimes of
the Old Testament kingdoms and which were the most effective. When Greenwood recorded exchanges with
potential Mormon converts he told of debating people on the constitutionality of the Edmunds bill: “I had a warm
discussion with Mr. Satchell on the Polygamy & Edmunds Bill,” and gives sermons, not on faith and baptism, but
on “the Government of God.” Thus, a decade before this unannounced visit with Francis Lyman, Greenwood had
revealed his independent thinking and his proclivity for the study of government within a secular-rational framework
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Figure 23 Fillmore Utah, Alma Greenwood circa, 1893

For his part, Lyman denied ever using “his influence...in any way or another to go change
a man’s opinion in regard to politics.” Lyman probably assumed that Greenwood, like most
Mormons, was indifferent to the party identifications. Lyman thundered in the meeting: “is there
any church influence felt in Mt Pleasant in regard to politics?’ Which received several “no’s” in
response.” According to Lyman, “the First presidency & Apostles [had been] accused of
falsehood & underhandedness, but they [were] free from these things.”317
Lyman stated in another church meeting, “Men should be wise, not become wild over
politics.” Lyman’s ‘Mormon’s first’ stance and his apparent assumption that Mormons shared
his position, explained why he was stunned when he did see Mormons become wild over
politics. Similarly, prior to a divisive election in the fall of 1892, counselor to the president of the
church George Q. Cannon attempted to persuade the fellow elite and Democrat John R. Winder
of the necessity of supporting the Republicans. Cannon argued aggressively and “very plainly
that he believed [the Mormon people’s] safety and prosperity in a political way depend[ed] on
our voting the Republican ticket. The talk was kind and yet forcible.”318 These personal private
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appeals were sometimes interpreted by church leaders as mere expressions of their political
opinions as private citizens. Whereas, their interlocutors sometimes viewed members of the
Mormon elite’s full throated arguments in favor of Republicanism as carrying the weight of their
ecclesiastical office.
Apostle John Henry Smith, asked his colleague in the ruling elite, Apostle Anthon Lund,
“to work among the Scandinavians,” to encourage influential emigrants in their communities
who were unaffiliated with either party to become Republicans. Lund recorded a political “talk”
he had with Peter O. Thomassen, a Danish Mormon who had immigrated to Utah thirty years
prior.319 On June 1, 1891 fellow Dane Anthon Lund broached the subject of Thomassen
becoming a Republican. Lund found that Thomassen “was rather Democratic.” Lund was not
expecting such stubborn party identification in Thomassen. In fact church leaders had bemoaned
in the past the Scandinavian saint’s inability to assimilate to church culture in Utah Territory.
One leader described the “tendency among some of the Scandinavian brethren to hold onto
customs and affiliations of the countries of origin.” Instead church leaders desired the
Scandinavian Saints “to put aside nationalism and be citizens with the rest of their brethren and
sisters here,” in Zion; including in political habits.320 Thomassen had not clung to a national
identity from the country of origin. He had thoroughly adopted the political habits of his fellow
Saints over the past thirty years and had assumed that Democratic Party affiliation was obvious
choice. Thomassen recognized that federal interventions and the anti-Mormon legislations were
largely instigated by the “carpet bagging” Republicans. In the course of their discussion,
Thomassen also told Lund that operatives from the local Democratic Party in the Territory had
promised Thomassen three hundred dollars to vote and affiliate with the Democratic Party. Lund
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does not record the argument or discuss the logic he used to convince Thomassen to switch his
political affiliation. Lund only proudly remarked, “I turned him.”321
Influential men and women were approached by the church hierachs to help coordinate
the political division. But, when the so-called division movement began and Mormons began
adopting national political parties, women were initially left out; their inclusion in politics was
an afterthought. In 1891, however, women’s exclusion from the political divisions was not
always viewed as a negative. As Emmeline B. Wells observed, “considerable feeling and some
pettiness,” had arisen from division in politics and was “another trial to many and hard to
comprehend.”322 Similarly, the Women’s Journal magazine opined more overtly of the disgust
felt by women over the spread of partisan fervor since both parties were dubious about woman’s
suffrage. Women sought to view their lack of involvement in the political divisions in 1891 as
almost a form of protest to a corrupt process that was tone deaf to women’s issues. The editor of
the Young Women’s journal pined for the days when the church-run People’s Party had actively
advocated for Women’s suffrage: “the disbanded Peoples party…comprised the great majority of
Utah’s voting population, [and] was pledged to…Woman’s Suffrage,” but both of the national
parties “contemptuously ignore[d]” women’s rights.323 However, by 1895 the LDS church elite
had all but coopted the suffrage movement in Utah and encouraged its leaders to engage in local
Republican party campaigning.324 The leading counsels of the church not only desired to
coordinate an equal divide along partisan lines but also the local suffrage movement.
The church hierarchy saw an opportunity to coopt the women by recruiting them to the
ranks of the local Republican Party. The women of Utah had lost the vote with the passage of the
Edmunds tucker act in 1887 and by 1895 they had yet to regain it. To an audience of male High
Priests in central Utah in 1892 the Apostle Abraham H Cannon encouraged his audience to
support women’s suffrage once again: “the women of Utah...have proven themselves in such a
manner that they are worthy of all the trust we can repose in them.”325 A vocal supporter of
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women’s suffrage, Emmeline B. Wells wrote a letter to the head of Beaver’s local suffrage
association chapter to assure the leader of the chapter that the women’s actions in advocating for
equal rights for women was in harmony with the First Presidency’s political policy. Wells wrote
that she had visited with the First Presidency for advice and they had encouraged women to
become active in Republican Party politics. However, she warned the Beaver women’s suffrage
president, “You must not make this public, not even in the association.” Wells was quite aware
that non-Mormons and Democrat leaning church leaders would view her coordination of
women’s suffrage decisions with the high ranking church officers as a “union of church and
state,” and the non-Mormon suffragettes in Utah and abroad would “make a point of division in
it.”326
Non-Mormons in Utah worried about church support of women’s suffrage because nonMormons in Utah still viewed themselves as living under theocratic authoritarianism. NonMormon men who had been active in the anti-Mormon Liberal Party before its dissolution,
argued that if women were to get the vote in Utah, the “weaker sex” would either follow their
husbands or be mere puppets controlled by the lecherous Mormon priesthood puppet masters and
vote for more church dominance. In sum, non-Mormon men feared that coopted local
legislatures would only increase religious influence in local policies if Mormon women were
granted suffrage.327

Mormon Emily S. Richards articulated what she viewed as the Non-

Mormon discomfort over the official Mormon involvement in the Utah suffrage movement. She
recounted the opinions of opponents to women’s suffrage in Utah. According to Richards, these
opponents viewed the “woman mind [as] largely actuated by sentiment and sympathy,” and as
such women in politics would “greatly augment the sphere of church influence, and thus become
a menace to public welfare and independent government.”328 Non-Mormons in Utah further
worried that potential women political candidates from prominent Mormon families’ would
further increase church influence in politics and exclude the marginalized non-Mormon women
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or women from the lower classes in Utah.329 Non-Mormon opponents to women’s suffrage in
Utah also worried that a massive influx of Mormon women voters and legislators would
legitimize remnants of the illiberal regime in Utah and help Mormon incumbents resist political
reform.330 Thus, Emmeline Wells’ desire to keep her coordination with the church hierarchy
secret from even fellow suffragettes was politically expedient given the persistent tensions
between non-Mormon and Mormons in Utah Territory.331
In addition to the Mormon elite appealing to both female and male local church leaders
for help to manufacture a more equal divide, they also asked influential Latter–day Saint
newspaper owners to become overtly partisan in their publications. The more heavily populated
Mormon towns, such as Salt Lake City and Provo often had a number of small newspapers. NonMormon lawyer Orlando Powers recalled “that there were men in Utah, when we came to divide
upon party lines who, for years, I knew claimed to be Democrats, who suddenly were
Republicans.” One example was on June 9th of 1891 when the LDS First Presidency along with
John Henry Smith and John Morgan met with the Presidency of Utah Valley Stake. Also in the
meeting was John C. Graham who published the Inquirer in Provo. According to Morgan’s
journal “the political situation in Utah Stake [was] very thoroughly canvassed.”332 Prior to this
meeting Graham ran a Democratic newspaper, but after the June 9th meeting, Graham “suddenly
discovered he was a Republican and began running a Republican paper.”333 The dialogue and
discussion of this meeting was not captured in any of the surviving journals. Based upon the
timing of the partisan shift, it is reasonable to infer that one of Graham’s ecclesiastical leaders
may have directly requested Graham to make the change. Apostles asking Mormon newspaper
men to make their papers Republican was not unheard of. For example, that was also the case
when Apostle Anthon Lund privately spoke with a newspaper man, Janne M. Sjodahl in Sanpete
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valley near Manti. The valley was largely settled by non-English speaking Scandinavians. In the
course of their conversation Sjodahl reassured Lund that Sjodahl was a Republican and “will
make the Swedish paper so.”334
Suppressing prominent Mormon Democrats and encouraging the political speech of
prominent Mormon Republicans was a further corporatist strategy to encourage an equal political
divide in Utah Territory in 1890s. These charismatic linkages between politicians and voters
were something the Mormon people understood. Mormon politicians in “high authority” were to
attract votes based on their ability to cultivate a following based on their personality or status in
the Mormon community.335 According to Orlando Powers, Joseph F. Smith said in this Gardo
House meeting in June 1891 that “men in high authority, who believed in Republican principles,
should go out among the people, but that those in high authority who could not endorse the
principles of Republicanism should remain silent.”336
Similar to Joseph F. Smith, his cousin and fellow Republican, John Henry Smith would
also often use his assignment to speak in a stake or ward conference as an occasion to organize
local ward or stake Republican clubs. One of his travelling companions described his familiar
modus operandi. B.H. Roberts recorded in his journal that “the last day of the conference…Bro.
John [Henry Smith] said to me that he thought he would call the boys together who were
Republicans and make them a little talk and organize them and set them at work.” Smith’s
travelling companion, B.H. Roberts was a Democrat. Roberts told Smith that he opposed Smiths’
political meeting with “the boys” on two grounds: first, it would be a one sided affair with only
one political position being represented. Roberts interpreted the church policy as directing equal
time and equal access to both political perspectives. Second, Roberts thought it was unwise to
advocate his political “doctrines at improper places, times and manners.” Roberts suggested if
the brethren were to be organized into political parties, then the two travelling Elders should both
“call on all the brethren to stay and both [Roberts and Smith should] talk and then let the
brethren divide and organize to suit themselves.” Smith said such a course would be “unwise,”
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and so “there the matter dropped.” Smith held two political meetings before leaving the
conference and Roberts was, for a time, muzzled.337
One of the most brazen and failed attempts of the LDS church leaders to coordinate the
political divide to access patronage occurred in this same settlement where Smith and Cannon
had ask for “a goodly number” of the residents to become Republican. Estee had said in his letter
that the proper signals needed to be sent that signaled that Mormons could vote for themselves
and that competitive elections exist in Utah. Logan was the hometown of the fiercely Democratic
Mormon Apostle Moses Thatcher. Election manipulation caused greater controversy because
publicly the church had denounced its interference in politics. George F. Gibbs, clerk to the First
Presidency, admitted that he conveyed the impression to church officers in the town of Logan
that the LDS Church First Presidency wished for the “republicans [to] gain ground and
preponderance at the election.” Prior to the elections George Gibbs began a “whispering
campaign” and sent word to Cache Stake President Orson Smith, that the First Presidency was
“desirous that the Republican Party be the dominant party of Utah.”338A group of Logan
Democrats (Mormons and non-Mormon) including the church’s own legal counsel, Franklin S.
Richards, sought a meeting in with the President of the Church. John Henry Smith remembered
the meeting as well, “A large Democratic Committee waited on the Presidency of the Church and
made complaints over the Logan election.” They read letters and affidavits showing that George
F. Gibbs had used his influence as the secretary of the First Presidency to imply a desired
outcome that favored the Republicans in Logan. These Democrats presented a handful of
affidavits demonstrating that individuals had intimated that the First Presidency wanted the
Logan election to “go Republican.” During this meeting, young Franklin S. Richard acerbically
complained to the Mormon elite, “Congress admits we are honest and sincere in our religion, but

337

Roberts, Brigham Henry. History's Apprentice: The Diaries of BH Roberts, 1880-1898. Signature Books, 2004.
See also Diary of John Morgan. Morgan’s diaries expose a shift after the electoral failures of 1891 away from
Republican campaigning to visiting Mormon villages outside Utah to orchestrate an equal divide or to throw all
support to the Republicans so as to convince national party leaders that Mormons could become a reliable
Republican base of support: “October 12 A Priesthood Meeting convened at 10 a .m. the name of Francis Platt was
sustained as Patriarch in the church f or this Stake and –George Noble as a member of the high council. Brother
Smith and myself occupied the time principal on political matters. Brother Greer was set apart to a mission to the
South. After the close of the meeting, a special meeting wass[sp] held and the arrangements for the organization of
the Republican Party here perfected.’
338
Isaac Smith Journal 13 Sept 1894 in Uncat WA Ms 98 Box 4 fd 2. as quoted in Moyer, Jonathan H. "Dancing
with the Devil: The Making of the Mormon-Republican Pact." PhD diss., Department of History, University of
Utah, 2009.

146

in politics we are harlots.” John Henry Smith, although a Republican, admitted that “some one
in this business has done wrong.”339 The critical Salt Lake Tribune surmised correctly in their
response to the mysterious party reversals in the Logan elections: “It would be good to show in
Washington that the tendency of the territory was towards republicanism by showing that Logan,
which was a Democrat last summer, was Republican this spring.”340
Elections became especially disruptive when Mormons elections where close (which
happened often because of a manufactured equal divide). Voter suppression was a common
accusation that Democrats used to explain how Republicans orchestrated victories in Democratic
majority Utah Territory in the 1890s. After a closely contested election in the small town Mt.
Pleasant in Sanpete Valley a young Mormon Democrat Amasa Aldrich wrote a letter to the
Manti Sentinel describing the electoral irregularities at the voting station. Aldrich was one of the
defeated candidates. In his words, “The whole election machinery was manipulated by the
liberals and republicans.” Aldrich explained that “invariably those who were voting the liberalrepublicans ticket were allowed to vote and Old residents of the city were not allowed to vote,
although they had lived there for years. When they came to the polls they found that their names
had been stricken from the list, and they were not allowed to vote.”341 The Liberal party had used
voter suppression techniques in the years leading up to the division on party lines. Mormon
Republicans began using it after the political divisions to suppress other Democratic Mormon
voters. Republican Peter A. Nielsen noted in his journal that on one Election Day he confronted
fellow Mormon “jessy newbolt, about being an illigal voter.”342 As mentioned above, a Mormon
bishop who was also the election judge in Deseret, Utah tried to disqualify one of his
congregants from voting because he still lived with both of his wives.343 All three cases of voter
suppression drew vicious outcries from the Democrats who were disadvantaged in the outcomes.
The clandestine political manipulations that distorted the outcomes of the local elections
across Utah Territory, created significant blowback for the Mormon elite. They would have to
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shift tactics to try to make converts to Republicanism. A few months after the disputed local
elections in Logan of Joseph F. Smith made a direct public appeal to a congregation of Latterday Saints in Cache valley. He tried to explain that “as soon as the Republican Party is sure that
there is strong representation of Mormons who are Republicans, they will restore us to our
rights.” Cache valley was a Democratic stronghold and was still the hometown of one of the
settlement’s founders, the Democratic leaning Moses Thatcher. In Thatcher’s own backyard,
Smith “expressed the hope that a goodly number of the people will become Republicans.” And
just in case the Saints in the audience were confused why Joseph F. Smith was overtly asking
them to become Republican at a church meeting, Smith’s traveling companion and fellow
Apostle Abraham H Cannon explained, “Pres. Smith had given them the will of the Lord.
[Cannon] told them that when they saw the presidency and twelve at variance they should always
take the counsel of the Presidency in preference to that of the Apostles.” 344The implicit swipe at
Thatcher was surely not lost on the gathered Saints. In essence the two church leaders had
expressed that no matter what Moses Thatcher said, they were expected to ally themselves with
the Presidency and not some rogue Apostle that was increasingly out of step with his colleagues.
Joseph F. Smith spoke from experience about having rights restored in exchange for
political support. Smith had received a pardon from Republican President Benjamin Harrison.
Smith wrote a Democratic leaning friend in 1891, “I am happy to inform you, that, through the
kindness of…good Republicans, I am now in possession of a paper bearing the signature of Benj.
Harrison, and the impression of the seal of the United States, giving me freedom from indictment
for ‘unlawful cohabitation’ under the Edmunds laws, to date. I feel very grateful…to my
Republican friends for this distinguished kindness to me.”345 Smith trying to convince his friend
that protection from persecution would come from Republicans described the Republican Party
as “the party of advanced ideas, of progress, of good government, of union and of strength and I
believe that my amnesty will prove to be the precursor of a general amnesty to all polygamists, if
we continue to use wisdom and patience.”346
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Apolitical Ambivalence to Elite Manufacturing of Political Divide
While many Mormons bristled at having their conscientious political preferences
curtailed by leaders orchestrating the political equilibrium many other Mormons were supportive
of hard-liner policies in Utah Territory and resistant to political parties. This demonstrated that
democracy was far from being consolidated. As one influential scholar explained, a regime has
consolidated its democracy when a number of conditions are met. One condition is that the
attitudes of clear majority people hold the belief that democracy and competitive elections with
strong multi party competition is the most suitable method organize public life. Also, democratic
consolidation is more assured when support for alternatives to democracy, such as explicit or
tacit advocates of theocracy, are relatively inconsequential or socially marginal in a regime.347
As will be demonstrated below, these conditions were not met in Utah territory in the 1890s.
Many Mormons in 1891 were either supportive of or ambivalent to the political culture
advocated by hard-liners in the regime and would not have been the least bothered by the blatant
partisan nature of some talks or meetings.348 For years most Mormons frequently had questioned
the legitimacy of the U.S Government and its accompanying institutions. Many older Mormons
that had lived through federal policing the longest did not desire for incorporation into the United
States. Instead, many Mormons in the 1890s still agreed with William Morrison’s desires that he
expressed decades earlier: “I long for citizenship in Zion, the metropolis of God's kingdom.” 349
William Morrison was not unique in doubting the legitimacy of the U.S government. Eliza Mary
Litson’s zeal exemplified the pervasive rhetoric of many Mormon pioneers: “Uncle Sam is
determined to destroy this people if he can,” Litson wrote. Despite the machinations of “Uncle
Sam,” God’s Kingdom would triumph. Litson wrote with confidence that although the federal
government was “trying to send soldiers here all the time to keep the Mormons under subjection
to their corrupt laws…they never will do it.” There was no federal law to which she would
submit herself. Litson did not view herself as a bamboozled sex slave desperately trying to
escape from theocracy in Utah. Instead, she felt she was participating in the founding of a nation
of Saints. Her letter reflected the fact that Mormonism in the intermountain West constituted, to
347
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a remarkable degree, a separate religiously constituted nation-state that competed with the U.S.
government for legitimacy.350 She begged her parents to join her in fleeing from Babylon to
acquire the only citizenship that mattered to her: “[W]e want you here…to help to build it up and
become legal citizens in the Kingdom of God.” Much more salient was religious identity for
many Mormon immigrants. U.S. citizenship was of little importance when compared to
citizenship in God’s Kingdom.351 Well into the 1890s many Mormons continued to express
similar defiance n their public sermons and private utterances.
While the Mormon elite attempted in the 1890s to broker deals that would allow external
linkages with the national political parties, many Mormons continued to express an abiding
distrust of the central state power and an ambivalence to political parties.352 Elections through
competitive political parties was a sordid affair and was far from the religious ideal. This disdain
for electoral politics was evidenced in the May 1891 visit of Republican President Benjamin
Harrison to Salt Lake City. A local Mormon Bishop and polygamist, Joseph Kesler wrote in his
journal of his repugnance towards Benjamin Harrison who “arrived in our city.” Bishop Kesler
wrote, “Went to the depot… [I] seen him…with 10 to 15 thousand people [but] the prest. is no
friend of the latter day saints. I could readily detect the hatred in his bosom towards the saints &
the work of God.” Kesler betrayed no giddy anticipation on listening to a sitting U.S. President
speak. From Kesler’s vantage point, President Harrison was like some culturally insensitive
viceroy imposing unjust laws and harmful political practices on an undeserving and righteous
people. Not only did Kesler question the legitimacy of the federal government, a year later in
April 1892 he further questioned party politics as the official mode of organizing the election of
leaders in the United States. Bishop Kesler expressed disgust at the “foolish enthusiasm over
political matters & much ill feeling engendered by over-anxiety on those matters.” Party politics
was an aberration to Kesler. It sullied the participants and sowed ill feeling. Enthusiasm over
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competitive electoral victories was misplaced in his mind and there was a more excellent way
“for the Mormon people to be governed.”353
In addition to distrust of competitive party politics governed by patronage, opposition to
the outsider influence persisted in many quarters of Utah Territory. This opposition to secular
influence intensified as the LDS church began coordinating the adoption of political parties.
President Joseph E. Taylor of the Salt Lake Stake presidency frequently urged that Mormons
keep their distance from the world. In his mind, any political participation was merely for the
ultimate purpose of subsequent separation from the world once local autonomy was achieved.
Taylor worried that in the midst of a political feud between Stake President Angus Cannon and
his other counselor Charles Penrose, that outsiders were bringing “their religions political and
social proclivities with them.” Taylor rhetorically questioned how the Saints could protect
themselves from the political influences of the outside world. He provided his solution: “I feel
that we should pursue such a wise course as to secure to ourselves the rule and government in
Zion and then HOLD the dominion for God and should work unitedly to this end.”354 In other
words, some Mormon leaders argued that the political party division should not result in sincere
party adoptions among Mormon people, because once dominion of the Territory was fully
obtained, the parties would not matter and local governance could return to the Mormon elite.
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Figure 24 Peter Ludvig Quist and his two wives defiantly document their polygamous family in
the face of persistent political alienation in the 1890s.

Rank and file Mormon polygamists that continued to live in polygamous relationships
during the decade of the 1890s were often especially indifferent to the political divisions and saw
politics as distraction from kingdom building. For example, while Herman F.F. Thorup was
languishing in prison for the second time in a decade for maintaining his polygamous marriages
with his two wives, he heard that the church was officially abandoning the practice of plural
marriage. During the October general conference of 1890 Thorup, a Danish-born Mormon, was
surrounded by inmates in the federal penitentiary with what he described as “Swearing and
cursing … in such a degree that it almost could raise the hair on a person’s head.” Polygamists in
Utah Territory were often incarcerated in the Utah territorial prison along with felons of all
stripes including other individuals incarcerated for homosexuality. Thorup expressed his disgust
with discovering next to him in the opposite bunk “some young criminals…committing
themselves by practicing those wicked doings of Sodom & Gormora.” In this same breath of
describing his surroundings, Thorup described in his prison journal about hearing the
announcement that the church was distancing itself from the practice of plural marriage. He
defiantly wrote that no man would convince him to abandon his wives and he would rather
apostatize than comply with, what he considered, a politically expedient manifesto. Not
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surprisingly, when partisan politics became “boiling hot” in Utah in the 1890s election cycles,
Thorup vacillated between indifference and disgust. The Mormon people had constructed a
bellicose communal identity for decades. This fierce religious identity was not going to give way
to democratic civil society easily or quietly.355
Similarly, hundreds of polygamous wives, unlike their monogamous Mormon
coreligionists were too preoccupied in the 1890s in evading capture to engage in party politics
that swept across every Mormon village. One example from countless others demonstrates the
extent to which not abandoning polygamy could disrupt normal life for families in the post
manifesto climate. Prior to manifesto when Deputy Marshals raided the farm of onto the land of
plural wife Juliaett [sic] Wood and her husband George Wood, the two polygamists had a plan.
When Juliaett first saw the two Marshals, she dashed around the house and secreted herself under
a pile of dried manure which was overgrown with vines. She breathlessly waited for the deputies
to search the house. Minutes must have felt like hours under the pile of refuse. Suddenly a
marshal ripped off the vines from the dung heap and yanked Juliaett from under the manure to
which she had retreated. She was caught. The Federal marshals took her and her husband to
testify before a judge at the federal building in town. After their confessions before the judge,
Juliaett’s husband, George, was sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence for unlawful cohabitation.
While George was in prison, Juliaett became deathly ill with typhoid fever. After George Wood
finished his prison sentence he hesitated visiting his sick wife because he worried that her house
was being watched by the marshals. George Wood snuck into the house where his second wife
lay “close to death.” When Juliaett looked up from her sick bed to see her husband in the dim
lantern light, she was both excited and terrified. While her husband had returned home from
prison, she feared that their enemies would again betray his location to the deputies again. His
visit was painfully brief.

355

MSS 7413 Herman Frederick Ferdinand Thorup papers, 2 folders Brigham University Library L Tom Perry
Special Collections

153

Figure 25 George C. Wood is standing in the right hand side of the prison portrait with his hand
behind his back and a finger bookmarking a page of a book in the other.

Three years later after George Woods’ release from the Mormon elite had made
significant public overtures that signaled a commitment to practicing monogamy in exchange for
political patronage and protection from federal intervention. However, party divides or official
church statements about the cessation of plural marriage made little difference for George Wood
and his plural wife Juliaett. Juliaett still lived in hiding as she had before the 1890 polygamy
manifesto. She gave birth to a boy she named George just a few months after the Republican
parties began making overtures to the Mormon elite and dangling the carrot of amnesty to them.
By 1895, while local political campaigns were in full swing and many Mormons got the
“political itch,” Juliaett remained in hiding on the underground. She called it hiding in “the
above-ground,” because she was often in some attic or upstairs room in a borrowed space that
was never her own home. Juliaett wondered in her journal whether her personal sins and
shortcomings had somehow brought her circumstances on her. She prayed for the day to come
when she could have a home of her own and live without fear of arrest.
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Juliaett Wood hid in safe houses with only her small children for company for the entire
decade of political upheaval in Utah Territory. Most days she tried desperately to keep her young
children from making noise that might alert her enemies of her whereabouts. She did not attend
church meetings or socials or holiday events and could not even call down from the upstairs
window to her family members when she saw them on the street. In February 1895 rumors of
another raid began to concern Juliaett. She weighed her options. A fellow polygamist and
acquaintance had been “subpeaned one week before, and [was] taken before the grand Jury,” and
Juliaett was frightened that her captured neighbor would “tell all.” Juliaett had no way of
knowing what the subpoenaed polygamist had told the judge about other polygamists in the area.
So, Juliaett decided to steal away from yet another hiding place in the frozen night. Her children
were sick. Her cloths frozen onto her skin, not having had time to let them dry after washing day.
With her “cloths…frozen Stiff,” and her belongings hastily thrown into a buggy, she and her
family slid down the muddy lane to find another safe house. During the entire tumultuous decade
of 1890s with the introduction of political parties, women like Juliaett Wood had to hide
themselves and were isolated from the political contests and controversies.356
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Figure 26 Charles Smith kept a copious journal in which he described his indictment for
cohabitation. Like many polygamists facing jail time, Smith viewed the political divisions of the
1890s as a frivolous distraction.

Juliaett and George Wood were not outliers in the post-manifesto period of maintaining
polygamist marriage in the midst of significant socio-political upheaval all around them in Utah
Territory. Pres. George Q. Cannon could easily have been talking about families like the Wood’s
when he said that Mormons “as a rule, have not studied the differences between the two
parties.”357 Many Mormons were too busy trying to keep from getting arrested to care about
politics. A similar apolitical-response to the political divisions was evident in the experience of
Charles Smith in Southern Utah. In his well-kept journal during the 1890s, Charles Smith
mentioned deaths in the family, sickness of children, evading U.S. marshals and the visits of
Apostles. Politics was easily either white noise or not a source of indignation to him. In August
1891, when Apostles Anthon Lund and Francis Lyman toured the stakes in southern Utah and
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told the Mormon settlers, “There are too many Democrats here. We were told to divide but here
in St George you have turned in a body from People’s party to Democracy.”358 Charles Smith
merely mentioned the conference where Francis Lyman spoke, but Lyman’s bald appeal for a
more equal political divide was sandwiched between Charles Smith’s journal entries about being
arrested for unlawful cohabitation by deputy marshals and about appearing the Court in Beaver
and pleading guilty to unlawful cohabitation.359 Not until months later did Smith remarked that
politics was “exciting” or provoking disruption among Mormons that were excessively affected
by the campaigns.360 Loose Party identification was fostered by Mormons’ political socialization
during these violent or divisive conflicts.361
Conclusion
The corporatist strategy of equalizing party balance in the Territory undermined
democratic institutions and reinforced church control of the political process. However much of
the Mormon population was either supportive of the corporatist strategy or ambivalent to the
political system as a whole, because the political divide de-emphasized religious cleavages and
secured protection from a powerful patron in the Republican party. This chapter presented
evidence of how the Mormon elite orchestrated the top-down division of the Mormon people
along party lines. The corporatist strategy of mediating different interests and political groups
was discussed. Finally the chapter ended with an extended discussion of the lack of democratic
consolidation among a substantial portion of the Mormon people. Many Mormons were largely
358
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ambivalent to political party politics since they were trying to survive in a harsh climate of
continued anti-polygamy raids.
The process of orchestrating this equal divide of political parties exposed how this
process undermined the legitimacy of the political party system that was being imposed on the
Mormon people. The corporatist strategy implemented by the Mormon elite did not confer
legitimacy on the local government because it largely curtailed the ability for opposing positions
to have equal voice in government. One answer to the question of why losers in an election are
more likely to accept an outcome as legitimate is whether they believe that the rules of
democratic procedure have been followed. Legitimacy depends on the perception that the
political process is fair.362 The Mormon elite viewed the system as unfair and illegitimate but
they implemented it to access patronage. Political losers in during the divide that were either
silenced or had the election outcomes distorted, viewed the system as unfair and illegitimate and
protested the results. But the large number of Mormon hard-liners viewed the national party
system as illegitimate because it was a corrupt system that undermined the religious kingdom
they sought to build.
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CHAPTER 7

“Howling maniacs of high priests:” Personalistic Politics, Social Erosion and Religious
Retrenchment in Utah Territory, 1891-1896

National politics in the Gilded Age was a period where the national parties were
deliberately vague on policy positions. This helped them to patch together coalitions under the
party umbrella across the country. Political campaigns were less about issues than rallying troops
of voters from different ethnic sectional and religious loyalties and ensuring turnout. The 1884
election devolved into a comic farce of personalistic war cries. Republican candidate James G.
Blaine was scorned during the campaign because of widespread charges of corruption.363
Meanwhile Grover Cleveland had admitted to fathering a child out of wedlock.364 Which led to
the Republican campaign chant: Ma, ma Where’s my pa?” How would these political norms
which were associated with U.S. national political campaigns, impact the subnational Mormon
society when introduced in Utah Territory? Unlike the national parties Mormons were
homogenous and did not need to cobble together loose coalitions connected by war cries. What
would their adoption of national politics look like? In sum, this chapter seeks to answer the
question, “how does the introduction of patronage based party systems impact subnational
illiberal regimes?”
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Figure 27 Federal politician in the Gilded Age doling out patronage to his clients

Thesis
Between 1891 and 1896, the Mormon religious elite in Utah Territory implemented a
policy to equally divide the Mormon people into national political parties. This division of the
Mormon people into national parties is often seen as the Mormon people assimilating national
political identity, but it actually served very different goals. In contrast to Utah’s image after
1945, the Mormon elite in 1891 orchestrated an equal division between political parties to gain
access to patronage from national parties. This church policy had several important
consequences for the democratic institutions in Utah. Arbitrary adoption of party identification
slowed the institutionalization of the party system. It increased the tendency towards
personalistic politics where elections turned into tests of the candidate’s personal piety. It
increased verbal attacks of Mormons against church leaders and fellow Mormons which
provoked an elite backlash against party politics. Mormons battled Mormons in local elections
that resulted in campaigns emphasizing the moral failings of their opponents instead
opportunities to discuss the differences of policy proposals. Instead, campaigns were “war-like,”
affairs. Local Mormons increased verbal attacks against church leaders and fellow Mormons.
These verbal attacks precipitated the reverse of the liberalizing trend and the retrenchment of
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Mormon corporatist control of Utah Territory. The consequences of this party division policy
underscore the critical importance of the sequence of liberalizing reforms in subnational regimes.

Figure 28 Fallout of the Contentious Process of National Political Party Adoption in Utah
Territory, 1891-1896

Literature Review
Research on elections and political representation in democratic countries have taken
political identity for granted and have supposed that politicians and the electorate are mostly
motivated by issue preferences.365 Many theories about why voters have strong loyalties to
parties focus on ideological or programmatic ties between voters and parties. According to these
theories voters choose a party because it represents their ideological or programmatic
preferences.366 Other approaches use a spatial voting model.367 These spatial voting researchers
advance the idea that individuals develop attachments to a party because they believe that the
party advances their interests.368 However, these theories do not adequately account for voting
and party competition in more patronage based party systems. The party programs and voting
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based on political ideology is weaker in systems undergoing political transitions than most
literature adequately accounts for.369
Scholarship on emerging democracies demonstrates that voting based on issue
preferences is many times the exception instead of the rule.370 In fact recent research has even
thrown into doubt the issue preference model for developed countries.371 These scholars argue
that social cleavages and political identity better explains party systems and voting patterns.372 In
developing countries, in addition to populist appeals to voters’ identity, patronage systems are
also common. As has been mentioned above, scholars sometimes compare nineteenth century
Western countries to present day developing countries (with varying degrees of success).But
there are some serious continuities that need to be interrogated with respect to patronage politics.
Patronage based linkages are also called clientelist linkages, are made when party officials attract
voters because of their capability to personally deliver resources, or leniency. A charismatic
linkage is when a politician creates a base of support based on their persona and by (often times)
appealing to the identity of the voters.373
In the presence of weak ideology ties between voters and their party, the voters are more
likely to float from one party to another. For example, in the case of party adoption in Utah
Territory, voters were explicitly directed in some cases to choose a party on the basis of
clientelist goods rather than ideological position. In this case a voter might cast a ballot for a
politician or party even though a rival party or candidate is ideologically nearer to her preferred
position. Under these conditions the bond is weak between the voter and the party.
369
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Personalistic Politics in Utah Territory

Figure 29 Prior to 1891, Mormon settlers combined politically in the face of federal intervention.
However, even durable regimes hold together interests and ambitions that in other circumstances
could be anticipated to be in rivalry.
We now turn to apply these ideas to the party system in Utah territory in the late
nineteenth century. The two political parties in Utah before 1891 were associated with different
religious traditions. The People’s Party was a confessional Mormon party and the Liberal Party
was an avowed anti-Mormon.374 Joseph F. Smith described that prior to 1891, “it was absolutely
necessary for the [Mormon] people to be united in order to repel the efforts of various political
parties that combined against us.” For decades the LDS church’s united political effort had
permeated down to the lowest levels of church organization. In the minutes of a local
congregation, Robert Dugdale, expressed his satisfaction for the unified and uplifting spirit of
politics among the Saints in Provo. Prior to the Saints adopting the national parties he felt
gratified in the way that the politics of the saints was handled compared to the rest of the world.
Dugdale viewed the “nations [as] hav[ing] gone astray.” However Dugdale “rejoiced in the Spirit
manifested in the political meeting held in the town yesterday. The instructions given there were
good.”375 Prior to the adoption of national political parties and norms, even political meetings
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were opportunities for the Mormon people to worship enjoy spiritual outpourings. Joseph F.
Smith likewise rejoiced in the community effort to politically overwhelm the Liberal party at the
ballot box in local elections. Before 1891 Smith was convinced that the Mormons unified
membership in the People’s Party was “a matter of self-protection.” Once non-Mormons in Utah
externalized these political conflicts and convinced national leaders to seek the “political
disfranchisement of all the Latter-day Saints,” Smith amended his position.376 Mormons were to
divide along national party lines but Smith did not think the division on national party lines was
not meant to undermine Mormon unity; it was meant to be a shift in strategy to ensure the selfprotection of the Mormon people. However there would be no more rejoicing in the spirit of God
manifested in political rallies now the church had permitted Saints to adopt national party
identifications. These parties came with norms and expectations that sewed discord.
Party politics in Gilded Age America was not generally organized around distinct policy
positions. Instead, the parties were organized around historical traditions and promises of
patronage. Neither Democrats nor Republicans were willing to take clear position on issues
important to the voters. James Bryce observed this lack of specificity on policy issues in the
Gilded Age. In his history he wrote, “Neither party has any clean-cut principles, any distinctive
tenets.” Instead of clear policy positions, parties had slogans and “war cries.” The parties had
organizations and interests with which they were aligned. But as Bryce noted, the interest
groups were focused on “getting or keeping the patronage of the government. All has been lost
except office or the hope of it.”377 The national parties were deliberately vague on policy
positions out of necessity. They saw this as the only viable way to patch together coalitions
under the party umbrella across the country.
Similarly, when national parties came to Utah, they were organized around getting and
keeping patronage and the local party positions were merely cosmetic window dressing. Since
the policy tenets of the national parties were so nebulous, and because so many Mormons in
Utah were politically ambivalent, it simplified Apostle John Henry Smith’s job of identifying
general authorities that leaned Republican. Smith spent a day visiting the Mormon elite, and
“button holing [them] to find out what their politics were if they had any.” Smith was able to
identify a handful of Republican-leaning church leaders, such as John Morgan, John Mickelson
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and Andrew Jenson, to enlist in the work of preaching and converting Mormons to
Republicanism.378
George Q. Cannon, saw the lack of politically informed Mormons as a boon to the project
of corralling Mormons into relatively equal political parties. On July 9 1891, Cannon explained
to the members of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles that, since the “great majority of the
[Mormon people] had no real [political preferences, that would allow] a greater chance of
division that would be nearly equal.”379 It also helped that, in addition to local political
ambivalence in Utah, the parties lacked clear policy distinctions which also made it easier to
divide the church equally along party lines.
Political campaigns in the nineteenth century Utah after the adoption of parties were
problematic because of the how difficult it was for voters to draw distinctions between the two
parties. The Mormon population in Utah was relatively homogenous. Their interests were
similar: All Mormons wanted the cessation of federal hostilities. However, many Mormons that
ventured into politics initially, pointed out that both national parties had branding problems.380
Neither parties had a good track record of protecting Mormons. Their official position towards
Utah was still opaque. At one political meeting in June of 1891, a Mr. Dusenberry compared
Republicans to a species of duck called a hell-diver that would dive for cover at the first
indication of being cornered.381 Dusenberry continued with his duck analogy: “you don’t know
where he’ll come up, you pin one down, and you can’t tell where he’ll sit.”382 While Republicans
may have been difficult to pin down on policy positions, this was equally true for the Democrats
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in Utah. In one political rally, a speaker noted, “Neither party can pose as the friend of the
Mormons for both have done all in their power to injure the people of Utah… every man’s hand
has been against them. No democrat will stand up and say he is grateful to the party for past
favors. They are well aware that no favors have been shown.”383 One St. George church leader
discouraged Mormons in his Sunday sermon from framing either party’s history as
demonstrating conviction in defending Mormon’s rights: “Do not think that either party has
anything to boast of in the past. The Lord will chastise [us] if we [do] not [remain]
united.”384The parties had historical legacies and abstract principles but specific policy positions
were very rare. Thus political rallies resorted to superficial pitches such as the one John T. Caine
used in one rally where he told a crowd that Democrats made better lovers: “young ladies, tell
your sweethearts that they [can] not come around again and see you unless they promise to
become good Democrats…Democrats make better husbands.”385 The implication was that
Republican politicians and voters lacked key characteristics of manhood; a harsh accusation, and
completely void of policy substance.
The lack of real political preferences among many Mormons was also noted by a Salt
Lake Tribune reporter who attended a Republican rally in Salt Lake City. The reporter instead
heard a mixture of statements that were so inconsistent to any party ideology that to him it was
laughable. The reporter described a school yard of the Fifteenth ward’s school house in Salt Lake
City on Sunday morning in July 1891. A platform with a dozen chairs with three or four young
men on the stand. After the Fifteenth Ward Drum and Fife band played, the speakers began a
“tepid meandering call for Republicanism.” They claimed to expound Republicanism but they
were all over the map in their assertions. At one point a speaker stated, “We are for State’s
Rights.” Another speaker spoke against monarchy and how he was against the liberals
“disfranchising a portion of this people.” Both of these talking points were common Democratic
rhetoric and would justifiably raise eyebrows in a Republican rally. The speakers only really
became animated when they were denouncing the anti-Mormon Liberal Party, a valence issue for
Mormons: “What are the Liberals? Have they principle? None! Except that founded on spleen
and the hatred of this people.” One speaker frankly admitted that “He had gone to dictionary to
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find the meaning of the words ‘Democracy’ and ‘Republicanism’ and didn’t find much
difference so he chose the latter.” This lack of clear programmatic political electioneering was
the result of the vague national party positions, but also because the result of neophyte politicians
and an uninformed electorate.386
In addition to the uninformed electorate and opaque party positions, the Mormon elite
attempted to erase any differences between party rhetoric to allow for an easier reach of partisan.
A consistent theme in church addresses either in sacrament meeting or regional conferences was
the lack of distinction between the two national parties. As George Q. Cannon recounted
privately to the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles that a Republican leader had told him that even
though this high ranking Republican Party member was himself a Republican, if he were living
in Utah in the situation of the Saints, he would adopt whatever party identification he needed, to
gain protection from federal intervention. Even if that meant setting aside some conscientious
political principles. 387 Cannon further explained that while establishing national linkages with
the Republican Party may have felt like the Mormon elite were crawling into bed with the
enemy, political necessity required it. Cannon attempted to assuage the elites by admitting that
while “Our political moves…do not always agree with our desires or ideas, I know God is
controlling and directing them.”388
In an effort to simultaneously equalize the parties and deemphasize the partisan cleavage,
Mormon leaders encouraged Mormons to vote for the person and not the party. One leader in
Beaver, Utah advised a Sunday audience in stake conference that “the man selected to any office
be the best man that can be found, for the better and purer the man the better the law.”389 This
was a common refrain from many quarters. A bishop in Salt Lake valley similarly counseled his
congregation emphasizing the righteousness of the men instead of their party label “the majority
of men nominated for office are unworthy men, and as the time for election [is] near; [my]
advice [is] that we should vote for good, honest men regardless of party.”390 Similarly, President
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George Q. Cannon said that “good government would come to the nation no matter which party
were in power provided good men were elected to office. It was the man and not the party that
would bring us good government.” Cannon thought that “all of us should have…the best
interests of Utah without regard to party.”391 Thus, the Mormon elite sought a more equal
partisan divide by undermining parties or candidates that sought to have clear programmatic
policy positions.
Voting for the person, instead of the party made more sense to many Mormon voters in
the 1890s. Both the national parties had been guilty of offenses against the Mormon people in
their minds. The lack of difference between the two parties became a consistent theme as
Republican Apostles visited the wards and stakes throughout the Territory. In a special church
meeting on the eve of another election, Francis Lyman told a Parowan congregation that “The
people wander [sic] why the Lord don’t reveal which [political party] is right or ‘why the
president or the twelve don’t let us know?’” Lyman’s answer was telling. The Lord “don’t reveal
which is right… because there is [no] right to politics,” Lyman exasperatingly explained. In a
stunning statement devaluing the need for sincere party identification, Lyman explained that
“Politics is not science [and] there is not a nickel difference between the two [parties].”392 Lyman
told his church audience that they merely needed to pick a side so the Mormon people could
benefit from patronage from either party. Lyman again reiterated the rationale for the
manufactured equal divisions. He explained that if the Mormon people could “hold the balance
of power,” then they would receive protection from federal intervention.393 In order to achieve a
more equal party division Lyman went to great rhetorical extremes to disparage the party
institutions.
The emphasis on the moral qualities of the candidate instead of the party became a
common talking point in Republican stump speeches in Utah. Hand-picked church leaders
heralded their party as the party of Abraham Lincoln. Church appointed stump speakers used
Lincoln’s legacy and other ornate rhetoric to persuade Mormons to become Republicans. Sadie
Staker Olson recorded hearing the Republican son of George Q. Cannon, “Geo. M. Cannon
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lecture on Abraham Lincoln,” during one election season.394 When Francis Lyman ordained
David F. Stout of Rockville a high priest in 1891, Lyman may have called Stout to become a
Republican political operative. According to Stout’s diary, shortly after that meeting with
Lyman, Stout adopted “the Republican Label.” Stout subsequently convened a rally in the small
Mormon village of Rockville and explained to his audience that all “in Rockville who adhered to
the principles of Abraham Lincoln but opposed the views of President Harrison,” could consider
themselves Republicans. According to Stout, Harrison was “an anti-Mormon bigot whose tactics
harassed and persecuted the Mormons in their quest for civil rights.” Stout continued to explain
that “Harrison was a disgrace to the great Lincoln: the Republican of the great Gettysburg
address.”395 Disdain for Harrison was often deflected for a love of Lincoln among the Mormons.
John Henry Smith explained in his political debut in the Salt Lake Theater in 189, that he
“believed in the Mission of Abraham Lincoln.”396 Joseph F. Smith wrote to a church leader in
Provo and explained, “While the Republican party may be rather unfortunate in some respects, in
its representative head [Benjamin Harrison], I trust we shall see that the party itself will rise to
the dignity of condoning the past, in our case as it did in the case of the conquered South, ‘with
malice toward none and charity towards all.’”397 In sum, Republican leaders framed their pitch to
converts Mormons to Republicanism conversion as a matter of adopting the just and holy
principles adhered to by the great men of the party and not any specific policy position or moral
failings of current Republicans leaders.
What the church elite failed to recognize was that this emphasis on electing people based
on character increased the likelihood of campaigns devolving to pointing out character flaws of
opponents and disparaging the individual. For example, when Republican candidates
campaigned in Rockville, the Republican candidates M. Allen and Frank J. Cannon told their
audience that “the Democrats were fools and dishonest.” In widely distributed campaign
literature, Joseph F. Smith accused Charles Penrose of “despicable cowardice” for claiming that
Republicans were more to blame than Democratic Party for Mormon persecutions. Joseph F.
Smith resorted to a sort of Mormon nativism in his attacks on the English-born Penrose. Smith
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implied that relative recent immigrants, like Penrose, had not suffered like the “old citizens
Utah.”398 At a Democratic rally in Provo, a Mr. Dusenberry recounted, “The Republicans have
been hunting up and pointing out the rascality of all … Democrats, but I pity the man who begins
that with the Republicans, for it would take a lifetime and make volumes.”399 Democratic
operatives engaged in similar smear campaigns. A Mormon from St. George, William
Seegmiller, a self-ascribed “rock-ribbed” Democrat, sent a courtesy letter to President George Q.
Cannon that he planned to derail the candidacy of George Q’s son. Seegmiller’s letter mentioned
Frank J. Cannon’s well documented alcoholism and his patronizing of brothels. Given Frank
Cannon’s moral turpitude, Seegmiller “intended to do all in his power to defeat Frank.”400
This focus on character flaws of opponents in the campaigns was more than just
nineteenth century dirty politics. It resulted from what political scientists refer to as ethnic
outbidding. Ethnic outbidding is a process through which political parties within the same
ethnonational bloc (such as Mormons) seek to portray themselves as the true defenders of the
group position while simultaneously undercutting the legitimacy of in-group rivals.401 For
example, Mormon Republicans used overtly religious and absolutist language in their
campaigning. They insinuated that Joseph Smith would be proud of the Mormon Republicans
and that Democrats had murdered, raped and killed the Mormon people in both Missouri and
Illinois. As James Henry Moyle put it, “More bitter and unyielding partisanship never developed
anywhere.” Moyle remembered “the Mormon tendency to treat politics on the same principle as
religion: truth vs. untruth; the one all right and the other all wrong.”402 Mormon Democrats
responded by further escalating the religiously charged rhetoric. Another Mormon Democrat
portrayed Democrats as the true defenders of religious liberty: “Always our friends have been
Democrats. They are today Democrats. Our driving’s, our persecutions, the confiscation of our
property have been through Republican laws.”403 The Mormon elite wanted to deemphasize the
differences between the parties to orchestrate the political divide. However, this manufactured
398

June 13 1891, Provo Dispatch
June 13 1891, Provo Dispatch
400
Oct 25, 1892. Lyman, Edward Leo. "Candid Insights of a Mormon Apostle: The Diaries of Abraham H. Cannon,
1889-1895." (2010).
401
Chandra, Kanchan. "Ethnic parties and democratic stability." Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 2 (2005): 235-252.
402
Sessions, Gene Allred, ed. Mormon Democrat: The Religious and Political Memoirs of James Henry Moyle.
Historical Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1975.
403
Utah Journal, July 27 1891. This ethnic outbidding and subsequent church involvement in politics contributed to
a new threat to Mormon control in Utah in the anti-Mormon American Party early in the 20th century. See
Mormonism in Transition.
399

170

in-group political rivals among a fairly homogenous Mormon people. The undesirable byproduct
of these in-group rivalries was that the Mormon elite exacerbated the tensions among both
Mormons and non-Mormons.404 Mormons exchanged claims and counterclaims about which
national party had done more damage to the Mormons. These claims and counterclaims resulted
in a version of ‘ethnic auction,’ where efforts of reconciliation between Mormons and nonMormons were significantly strained and made close to impossible.405
Discrediting and undercutting the moral and religious legitimacy of rival Mormons in
opposing parties caused significant societal disruption. Another example of ethnic outbidding
occurred when a young twenty year old bishop in the central Utah village of Deseret. Bishop
Milton Moody tried to undercut the legitimacy of a Mormon political rival by arguing that
polygamist in his town should be barred from the political process. Moody tried to stop a
Mormon of a different political party from voting at an election “because he was a polygamist
living with his wives.” Milton Moody accused Brother Western of adultery because Western
was still lived with both women. To Moody, their failure to comply with the laws of the land,
and what he understood to be the laws of the church, was an example of moral turpitude. When
local church members complained about Moody’s electoral interference, a Republican and a
Democrat Apostle came to arbitrate the tense political situation in the small Mormon village.
Apostles Francis Lyman and Heber Grant spoke in sacrament meeting in the congregation where
they attempted to discourage further intra-group rivalry on the basis of the religious standing of
voters. Lyman pleaded with the congregation to not “out” clandestine polygamists, because such
fodder would only fuel potential persecution from non-Mormons: “We must protect one
another,” Lyman argued, “Never betray a brother.”406
During the intense period of American scrutiny of Mormon polygamy many of the
Church elite advocated the informal adoption of what was called the Mormon’s Creed, Mind
Your Own Business. Church leaders wanted to convey to non-Mormons that prying into the
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personal lives of Mormons out of curiosity or because of some overzealous religious crusade to
“save” Mormons, was unwelcome and deeply offensive. During the 1890s, after new
polygamous marriages were discouraged and cohabitation was officially abandoned, a large
number Mormons still lived with and fathered children with plural wives. During this period of
political upheaval the so-called Mormon creed of “Mind Your Own Business,” was reinterpreted
by church leaders to mean that the polygamous status of voters and politicians should be off
limits to Mormons from the opposition political party. However, these in-group political attacks
of Mormon monogamists against polygamists continued throughout the 1890s.
With each election cycle after the division along party lines a familiar and alarming
problem arose for Mormon communities in the Mormon West: without policy programs to
organize election campaigns, the election season became a war like scramble to collect votes
through patronage and entertainment. As one exhausted and politically unaffiliated Mormon
polygamist quipped, “everything is politicks nowadays until the election… Democrats,
Republicans, & Liberals all down on each other … to gain office.”407 After the nationalizing of
parties, campaigns in Utah Territory began to mirror campaigns in the rest of the country.
Election campaigns took on a carnival style, with much sloganeering, booze, bands, girls, and
ready cash spread around liberally for willing voters. One Mormon settler, Moroni Spillsbury,
remembered the circus-style introduction of political parties with fondness. Spillsbury also
recalled the tensions that political competition created in frontier Mormon villages in southern
Utah: “We used to get so mad that we wouldn’t speak to a Republican if he came into the
crowd.” Refusing to speak to Republicans in small Mormon frontier villages was a significant
form of ostracism that strained communities and religious congregations. Mormon villages were
intimate and communitarian. Political divisions often exacerbated other preexisting frontier
Mormon tensions over water rights and land usage. Election Day in frontier towns often resulted
in fist fights and even violent brawls between Mormon settlers.408 Spillsbury further described,
“rousing mudslinging rallies” with “lots of drinking,” name calling, professional singers and
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“horse races.” At an outdoor Democratic rally, a group of women singers lead the crowd in
Toquerville, Utah in singing or chanting the nonsense slogan: “you wanta get fat,/you
Democrat/Eat a good old American Crow!”409 One Church leader, Brigham Young Jr.,
mournfully described one campaign season in Utah in the language of a painful jeremiad: “Good
honest men shout[ed] themselves hoarse with urging party cries.” The political divisions had
made “howling maniacs of high priests, seventies, elders and teachers.” Young continued his
lament over the night after night rallies and the drinking and debauchery that seemed to
accompany them. “In the name of God,” Young cried, “what spirit has taken possession of your
house that your howling rends the air and makes night hideous in Zion?” Young finished his
entry with a prayer to God to hasten the introduction of “pure politics of the kingdom of God,”
so that Mormons would not have to go “whoring after the degenerate spirit of the heathen.”410
The Apostle Moses Thatcher was swept up into this raucous escalating in-group attacks.
He often resorted to polemical hyperbole as well. At a Democratic convention in 1892 Thatcher
juxtaposed the official position of his colleagues in the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles and in
the First Presidency as favoring a centralization of state power instead of allowing for more
regional autonomy. Alienated in his own quorum Thatcher took to directly influencing Mormons
through the bully pulpit. Thatcher argued in this same speech that the corporatist methods of
coordinating interests within Utah Territory, ran counter to the church’s pronouncements of
sincere adoption of partisan identifications. What Thatcher said next in the speech must be
understood through the lens of Mormon society that viewed all things as spiritual in some way; a
society in which irrigation ditch digging was an act of religious devotion. With the introduction
to contentious national party politics and because of the veritable religious and cultural
homogeneity in Utah Territory, many partisan campaigners like Thatcher used religious
heuristics to simplify the vote choice for Utah citizens. However, Thatcher framed his political
speech in extreme dualistic religious rhetoric that lacked nuance: “I do not believe in the
centralization of government but the diffusion of power.” Thatcher continued: “It is simply the
question of man’s love for power against liberties of the people.” Then Thatcher’s polemic
409
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speech crescendos into the cosmic. Thatcher recounted a Mormon origin story set in heaven
before Adam and Eve were placed in the Garden. Thatcher described a cosmic war in heaven
between Satan and Michael the archangel. For Moses Thatcher, this pre-mortal war was fought
primarily over human agency and had serious continuities with the question of which political
party Mormon’s should adopt: “This fight began in heaven when the liberties of the people were
sought by Satan who said, ‘Give me thy power and I’ll force every man to be saved.’ If Satan
had his way we would all be Republicans. It’s slavery on one side, freedom on the other.”411 The
official backlash for Thatcher’s political speeches were swift and landed like a bombshell.
Almost all of the General authorities remarked in their journals about his “Satanic” speech and
the more firebrands took to the editorial pages of the newspapers in which they had influence to
denounce Thatcher’s characterizations.412

The Escalation of in-group tensions among politically divided Mormons

Figure 30 Member of the Seventy Andrew Jenson said he “felt sorry that after delivering [his]
political speeches, [he] usually left the people divided and contending with one another.”
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A handful of politically active Church leaders worried about the deleterious impact of
their overt political positions would have on Mormon communities in the early 1890s.
Republican church leader Andrew Jenson’s autobiography from the period is instructive in
articulating the conflicted conscience of one church elite in this period. Jenson gave political
speeches to church congregations all over Utah for years in the 1890s. He frequently recorded his
unease over the rancor and erosion of social cohesion that his speeches seemed to engender.
Jenson said he “felt sorry that after delivering [his] political speeches, [he] usually left the people
divided and contending with one another.”413 Barry Wride, who heard Jenson speak at an
especially contentious rally, wrote in his journal that the partisan animosity was “a queer and
serious crisis [in which] religion seemed to be forgotten.”414
The Apostle and Democrat Heber Grant similarly worried about getting caught up in
political campaigning. Grant self-identified as a Democrat and was upset about the statements of
many Republican church leaders untruthful slanders against Democrats, Grant worried that his
partisan positions would erode his ecclesiastical legitimacy. Grants journal contains a long
explanation why he tried (sometimes unsuccessfully) to extricate himself from politics. If Grant
were assigned to visit a Mormon village that happened to be overwhelmingly Republican and the
local Mormons were to pick up a newspaper and read that Heber Grant had publicly endorsed a
Democratic political candidate and encouraged others to do likewise, then perhaps these
Mormons that disagreed with Grant politically would be less inclined to follow his religious
counsel. As Grant put it in his journal, “I want to maintain the best possible feeling with all the
saints as I travel and speak with them. I feel that active campaigning for the Democratic Party
would make a feeling of resentment come into the minds of [Mormon] Republicans.”415
Resentment among Mormons indeed was the result of Andrew Jensen’s combined gospel and
political travels in Utah Territory in the 1890s. After delivering a campaign speech, Jenson
described “some good Democratic members of the church expressed regret that I should be on
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the wrong side of the political fence, as they had hitherto fore all confidence in me and my
activities.”416

Figure 31 Josiah F. Gibbs, vocal Mormon critic of church involvement in politics vividly
described a rally which flirted dangerously close to being a church meeting in the town of Wales,
Utah, to the right.

Similarly many Mormons found the activities of the extremely partisan Mormon Apostle
John Henry Smith especially disconcerting. Josiah Gibbs described this period in Utah in a later
book length expose after his split with Mormonism. His account fits with other contemporary
descriptions of such meetings. Gibbs recalls sitting in a political gathering which looked and felt
very similar to a church meeting in central Utah. Gibbs crammed into pews inside a frontier
church meeting house along with over a hundred Welsh Mormon immigrants in a small mining
village for a special meeting with John Henry Smith. As the meeting proceeded Gibbs
remembered the bald animosity towards Democrats that John Henry Smith used to drum up
support for the Republican Party. Gibbs recalled that “except as to the omission of singing
psalms, prayers and the administering of the sacrament, there was little difference between
Sabbath meetings held by Apostle John Henry Smith and political meetings held by [just] John
Henry Smith.” This lack of distinction between church and state seemed to Gibbs as an obvious
affront to political liberty. Gibbs sat in the church pew staring up at the local church leader
416
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bishop John Reese of Wales, Utah as he introduced the Apostle John Henry Smith. Bishop Reese
began in the following manner: “My beloved brethren and sisters: We have with us this evening
brother … John Henry Smith, who will talk to us on the doctrines of Republicanism.” According
to Gibbs, John Reese further primed his congregation before turning the remainder of the
meeting over to John Henry Smith with the comment, “my brothers and sisters, Democracy is
hypocrisy, and…Republicanism is Mormonism.”417 Gibbs and his family had been directed by
priesthood leaders for years on what to do and where to settle. Being told how to think about
political matters was a new and soul wrenching experience. Years later Gibbs wrote about his
eventual excommunication: “It served me right. I had been an apostate from the day, when in
1891, I first resented the domination of the Mormon priesthood in politics.”418
Gibbs described how political discussions after the adoption of the national parties began
to painfully erode the brotherhood and intense love that he had felt among his people in Fillmore:
“Notwithstanding the meagre knowledge of national parties possessed by the average Saint,
grave discussions of politics on street corners, on store platforms, in saloons and other
convenient places were frequent and often red-hot.” In the heat of those early political divisions
the barrage of confusing political activity left many casualties in its wake. Gibbs described that
“lifelong friendships were strained to the utmost and frequently severed.”419
In Gibbs’ account of lifelong friendships being severed over the fallout of the political
divisions, he was alluding to something incredibly important in nineteenth century Mormon
theology. Mormonism’s founding prophet, Joseph Smith, had taught his followers that “the same
sociality which exists among us here [on earth] will exist among us there [in the eternal
world].”420 Smith makes the point that heaven is fashioned out of a network of human
associations that spread out in all directions.421 In connection to this idea of heaven being about
this mesh of connectedness, Smith also argued, with arresting brevity that “Friendship is one of
the grand fundamental principles of Mormonism.”422 For many Mormons, this theological call
417
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for community cohesion made the political animosity which resulted from dividing towns and
congregations politically, feel like an unnecessary affront to the communitarian underpinnings of
Mormonism.

Figure 32 A Mormon Democrat, Fredrick Hathenbrook (seated) openly criticized church
involvement in the political divisions in the 1890s.

In 1891, the Democratic leaning and Mormon-run newspaper, the Provo Dispatch, also
denounced Republican campaign flyers that highlighted that Apostle John Henry Smith would
speak at a rally in Heber, Utah. The article argued that the use of John Henry’s religious title of
“Apostle” functioned as a heuristic. The use of the title “Apostle” in campaign literature sent a
cue to Mormon listeners and worked as an automatic problem solving strategy for “weakminded” and servile Mormons that kept the task of deciding for whom to vote within bounds.423
The word “Apostle” in the campaign flyers linked religious language to politics and cued many
Mormon’s religious identity. As the editorial in the Provo Dispatch explained, “The effect
423
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probably induced a wagon load of misguided, but by no means incorrigible citizens to go over
and listen to Republican principles expounded by ‘Apostle’ John Henry Smith…Those who are
in the habit of following guidance would easily and readily fall in line.” The editorial continued
to bemoan the apparent hypocrisy of “this mixing of oil and water, church position and state
affairs, as it is the very thing the head men of the Mormons have so emphatically declared
against.”424
These aspersions cast against “Apostle” John Henry Smith were inflammatory and
borderline sacrilegious for many Mormons that viewed their leaders as God’s mouth pieces.
Were these men speaking evil against one of God’s anointed leaders, or were they just
reasonably disagreeing with his politics? The article can easily be read as questioning not only
the prudence of John Henry’s politics but also the as disparaging him for abusing his office in the
Church. Mormons had been excommunicated for less. Church leaders ordered opposition
newspapers to be destroyed in earlier decades. Just a few years prior, a Mormon Democrat who
started his own political club was excommunicated for disagreeing with church political
positions. Yet, next to this article the summer of 1891, dozens of Mormon Democrats in Provo
had publically and vocally opposed the political campaigning of John Henry Smith, a church
Apostle.
With the advent of the national political parties in Utah, Mormons were testing new
boundaries. This liberalizing of politics was so new, that many Mormons were not sure what was
considered taboo. Initially there was much more outrage at the inclusion of party politics in
worship services. However, local church leaders’ opinions were divided over boundaries of
political propriety. When, where and by whom partisan speeches should be made? In May of
1891, Abraham Cannon thought that his uncle, the President of the Salt Lake Stake, Angus
Cannon “very unwisely talked about politics,” in a church meeting. Abraham Cannon was in the
audience and expressed embarrassment when his uncle blatantly collapsed what he saw as a
sacred venue with secular politics. According to Abraham’s account, his Uncle Angus “almost
announced himself a Republican, and urged young men to join that party.” Abraham Cannon
continued to describe his mortified reaction to his uncle’s partisan statements during Sunday
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church services: “I felt very much ashamed at his remarks which were entirely out of place.”425
Democrat and Apostle Heber Grant was also in the audience of this same church meeting and
similarly remarked in his journal that President Angus Cannon “made quite a political speech.”
Grant said that he “was surprised and annoyed at [Angus Cannon’s] remarks and felt ashamed to
have them made during our services.”426 Angus Cannon’s second in command in the stake
presidency, Charles Penrose, was a Democrat. He was also in attendance when Angus Cannon
pitched Republicanism. In subsequent sermons, Penrose indirectly criticized his superior in the
Salt Lake Stake presidency by frequently delivering tongue lashings to other priesthood officers
in meetings for using church buildings and church meetings for political recruitment. Penrose
stated a few days after President Cannon’s Republican pitch: “political meetings [should] not
[be] held in the houses where the Saints are wont to meet and worship the Lord, and that other
arrangements be made for political gatherings.” On another occasion he further urged a group of
priesthood leaders under his jurisdiction to “not drag such things into houses erected for the
worship of the Lord.” Many Mormons in Salt Lake including Angus Cannon did not heed
Penrose’s counsel. Many Republican meetings were held in church buildings after his
remarks.427 In yet another sermon, an exasperated Penrose exploded. Penrose berated the men of
his stake for not following the counsel to keep political meetings out of houses of worship: “yet a
great many have been held since then….Quite a number of these political gatherings have taken
place contrary to the counsel given. This should not be….There are other buildings in which
political meetings can be held without using the houses erected for the worship of the Lord.”428
Whereas President Angus Cannon, to not directly contradict Penrose’s counsel about political
rallies supplanting worship services, just urged bishops to shorten their sacrament meetings to
allow their congregants to attend a Republican rally held on a Sunday evening.
In addition to the worries over the venue for political electioneering, the blatantly partisan
nature of many talks meant to be religious were often easily interpreted as attacks on one
political party or another. Was this ok or was this off limits? No one really knew and the
425
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opinions differed. Moses Thatcher and Brigham Heber Roberts were fast becoming marginalized
among the Mormon elite and according to Roberts had become “marked men” for not deferring
to the expectations of participation as articulated by the other church hierarchs that advanced the
corporatist control of political parties. Roberts and Thatcher did not want the church to mediate
between the two political parties. As advocates of political pluralism they sought political office
without authorization from the other church hierarchs.429 Did they need to seek permission?
There was no precedent for this, but both men thought that the legitimacy of the party system
demanded competitive elections and unregulated unmediated political parties. Joseph F. Smith
disagreed. At a general priesthood meeting, in 1895 Joseph F. Smith berated the two Democratic
church leaders in his sermon.430 Smith broadcasted that one of the Twelve and one president of
the Seventy had not first consulted and obtained consent before accepting their party’s
nomination. According to fellow Apostle Francis Lyman, “Pres[ident] Smith’s [remarks] made
bad feelings.” After Joseph F.’s sermon, Lyman visited a number of men who were in the
congregation hearing Joseph F. Smith’s lightly veiled denunciation of Moses Thatcher’s and
Robert’s Democratic campaigning. Lyman recorded that the men were “all broke up in [their]
feelings over Pres[ident] Smith's talk.” It was clear to these men that Joseph F. Smith’s “attack
upon a member of the Twelve was [obviously] upon bro[ther] Moses Thatcher.” These faithful
lifelong Mormon pioneers were tortured by the fact that Smith would spew so much anger
towards “any prominent man who should endorse democracy and advocate it.” Lyman
ineffectually “poured in oil upon their troubled feelings and pacified them the best [he] could.”431
The blatant partisan nature of church meetings also annoyed Heber Bennion. Bennion was a
Mormon Democrat and member of a bishopric on the outskirts of Salt Lake City. He was
thoroughly disgusted with the impropriety of politicking in church meetings. He complained in
his journal that he “attended priesthood meeting [and] it was very much Republican.”432
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Soon after Joseph F. Smith’s public opposition to their political involvement in the
Democratic Party, the Democratic Party set up a political convention to reevaluate the
nominations of Thatcher and Roberts for political office. The Democratic convention, decided to
openly confront the LDS church hierarchs and reaffirm their earlier nominations of the two men.
The Utah Democratic Party adopted a great deal of points that were perceived by the church
hierarchs as attacking them and their position of strategically balancing the electorate. The
Democratic convention further intensified politics and escalated the level of religious outbidding.
In response to Smiths incendiary remarks, Orlando W. Powers said the fight has now been
started” He said the fight was over, “the question of human liberty, the question of the right of
the citizen to exercise his freedom”…from “covert” and “underhanded ways.”433 Mormon
Democrats, like the non-Mormon Powers, saw the church’s role in mediating interest groups and
political parties as contradicting the national norm of separation of church and state. The party
convention further said it refused to be intimidated by the church hierarchs and openly rejected
the corporatist policy that church had been advocating that would have required the parties to
consult with the church for leadership decisions and party nominations. Thus, the convention
concluded that no political party should be obligated to acquire the permission of the church
prior to choosing a nominee for the party.434 The Mormon Heber Bennion attended the
convention against the church involvement in politics. His journal described the protest as “the
great democratic convention protesting against church influence in politics.” He enthusiastically
described it as “a great meeting,” but he was less confident about the outcomes. “Whether for
good or for evil it remains to be seen,” Bennion mused.435 However, Joseph Dean was adamant
that the churches public denunciation of Democratic candidates and the subsequent protests
against church influence in politics was going to result in “lots of the democratic saints
[becoming] on the verge of apostasy.”436
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By 1896, Democrat, political firebrand and church Seventy Brigham H. Roberts had
started to cool off. He viewed both his and Thatcher’s political rhetoric as having been “extreme”
over the past six years. Roberts saw the effect of his heated mudslinging as having the “effect of
unfairly represent[ing] their brethren as conspiring against the liberties of the people and trifling
with their rights as American citizens.”437 Meanwhile, Thatcher remained adamant that the
corporatist coordination of interests in the Mormon community represented de facto autocracy.
In November 1896, Thatcher continued to dig in his heels in favor of the diffusion of political
power in Utah. Thatcher vowed to “fight the encroachments of the church and protect the youth
from its tyranny.” Upon hearing Thatcher’s continued private diatribes about ecclesiastical
overreach, Apostle Lund grew skeptical of Thatcher’s loyalty to the Mormon people. Lund wrote
that Thatcher had “professe[d] to believe in the divinity of the church and then pour[ed] into
doubting minds the suspicion that the prophets of god would be tyrants and abusers of power!”438
Recognizing the slippery slope that Thatcher’s highly divisive rhetoric would cause, the
church issued a Political Manifesto in 1896 which stated in part that every leading official of the
Church:
before accepting any position, political or otherwise, which would interfere with the
proper and complete discharge of his ecclesiastical duties . . . should apply to the proper
authorities and learn from them whether he can, consistently with the obligations already
entered into with the church upon assuming his office take upon himself the added duties
and labors and responsibilities of the new position.439
The result of this political manifesto from the church leaders gave church leaders power to pick
and choose who and from which party they would allow to run for political office since most
Mormons seeking political office were in positions of leadership. Church leaders allowed both
Democrats and Republicans to run but permission was granted for Republicans overwhelmingly
more than for Democrats.440
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Intensified Crackdown on Political Activism among Mormons
Smith’s full throated denunciation of the political candidacy of Thatcher, a prominent
Mormon Democrat in religious terms stirred up significant backlash that Joseph Dean was sure
would lead Mormon Democrats to apostasy. Three years before this divisive political protest
directed at Joseph F. Smith, Democrats in the Mormon elite privately expressed similar worries.
Mormon Democrats in the inner circle of church leadership deeply resented Smith’s couching
Democratic and Republican supporters in such religiously dualistic language. On a cold February
in 1892, in Salt Lake City the thirty three year old Abraham Cannon walked into the Church
President Wilford Woodruff’s office with its large wooden table and walls lined with books.
Cannon walked into a gaggle of senior ranking LDS church officials heatedly venting about the
latest political posturing from the strong-willed Joseph F. Smith. Smith’s “expressions…in favor
of Republicanism” deeply angered his Democratic colleagues within the Mormon elite. The
agitation on the church men’s faces, as they rehearsed Smith’s partisan railing, was not what the
Abraham Cannon was expecting to find upon entering the office. The indignation these
Democratic-leaning church men felt, when their “Democratic principles were assailed,” surprised
the politically ambivalent Cannon. Instead of joining in the outrage over the most recent partisan
swipe against the Democratic Party, Abraham Cannon noted his concern and fear in his journal
that the partisan bickering among the church hierarchy would spill out among the saints. He
worried that vibrant political competition would lead to a widespread “spirit of disregard and
disrespect for the Priesthood. Such a feeling is already beginning to make its appearance in some
places.” In a region of the West where most political candidates were also general or local
church officers in the Mormon priesthood, it was disconcerting for many Mormons to see their
revered priesthood leaders vituperatively denounced by their own people.441
At the inception of the political divisions many local church leaders in Salt Lake City
were aware of the dangers of party competition “pulling the people apart.”442 These church
leaders warned their priesthood brothers and ward teachers that were assigned to visit the homes
of each Mormon in their jurisdiction to “be very guarded in [their] speech.” On June 24, 1891
President Charles W. Penrose of the Salt Lake Stake Presidency “hoped that you will …be
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gentlemanly…if you are divided on politics.” On Election Day that same year, John T. Caine
advised a gathered congregation of priesthood holders in a Salt Lake religious service, “not to
indulge in remarks derogatory to one another because of politics. We must not forget that we are
brethren in the Church.” After the 1891 election, Stake President Angus Cannon told a similar
audience that political contestation should function “without …personal abuse and slander.”
Three years later on the eve of another election, Angus Cannon similarly counseled the brethren
to “not abuse each other as was the case at the last general election throughout the Territory but
to be respectful and kind to each other and treat one another as covenant brethren.”443
Threat of Politics Supplanting the Primacy of Religious Practice
The rancorous political rhetoric among the newly divided Mormon people was not unique
to Salt Lake valley where Angus Cannon had warned his listeners in one meeting, “There was
murder in the hearts of some of the people over political matters.”444 Throughout Utah Territory,
presiding officers in local church congregations that encompassed entire settlements also
denounced the personal attacks and bitter divisions that national party competition had
introduced. Bishops and other church officers’ denunciations of campaign “rascality” were more
overtly religious and stark as the years wore on. Gone were the soft peddled remarks of the early
days of the political division when church leaders merely requested gentlemanly and respectful
behavior. As the party competition “rampaged” and became more “boiling hot” and spilled over
into Mormon congregations, so did the religious rhetoric associating campaign mudslinging with
covenant breaking. Niels Mortensen of the Parowan ward “spoke about backbiting & speaking
evil of our brethren & sisters.” To counter this evil, Mortensen offered self-censorship as the
solution to political attacks: “If we cant speak well of them we should say nothing about
them.”445 Just after another local election in Santa Clara, Utah, Daniel Knight spoke in a
sacrament meeting of the “power of the evil spirits [that] were working among the …Saints.”
Knight exhorted all to be faithful and to “not to speak evil of the Lords anointed nor of each
other.” For Knight, the quagmire of partisan campaigning necessitated God extricating the saints
from the wicked political system. God’s deliverance was crucial and his judgment would be
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swift. Knight awaited the day when the millennial Messiah would melt away the sordid political
system that the saints had been forced to adopt “just as the snow melts before the sun.” Then
God “would come with all the riches and dwell with the residue here on Earth.”446Similarly,
another presiding church officer preached in Fillmore “to guard against the hard feelings arising
through politics.”447 Privately among his colleagues, Moses Thatcher also lamented the impact
that politics was having on the spiritual lives of the Saints. Mormon settlements were so divided
by politics that “one can scarcely tell Saints from sinners, and we are calling each other all the
vile names we can think of.”448
For village level Mormon leaders, “speaking evil” of the Lord’s anointed was more than
just apocalyptic rhetoric used to maintain community cohesion. “Speaking evil” was an overt
reference to covenants entered into by many faithful Mormons through sacred rituals in holy
temples. Especially with the before and after the dedication of the Salt Lake temple much of the
village level Mormon leaders’ political rhetoric was dripping with temple ethos.
In a Beaver conference on September 23, 1893 President Lyman in explained to stake
conference audience that while the Saints were expected to divide among the political parties,
there should not be a division of religious faith. An incensed Lyman was concerned that right
before an election the Saints were mistakenly dividing among their church councils and
quorums. The people were just supposed to divide along party lines. Lyman went on to down
play politics as not even being a part of their religion. Political parties were merely “the ideas or
men,” and they were not to be combined with church doctrine or scriptural teachings.449
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Figure 33 Miss Liberty and her attendants dressed in cloths that could double as temple dresses.
Photo is of a political parade in Ferron Utah. Contemporary to this photograph, a Mormon
patriarch in Ferron complained that “people thought more of politics than of their religion.”

Covenants of dedicating all your energies to building the literal kingdom was a common
theme of religious speeches on Sunday around election time when Saints became especially
consumed with political matters. Samuel Kendall Gifford’s diary recounts the words of one
speaker in a regional church conference in St. George that argued that neither “the Democrats
nor any other party would do much for us.” Thus, instead of diverting attention to politics and
away from kingdom building, the speaker reminded the Mormon settlers that “the Lord requires
all our time and talents.”450 Faced with what he interpreted as the blatant disregard for the temple
covenants, another priesthood leader in Ferron, Utah thundered to his audience, “the People
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thought More of Politics than of their Religion.”451 This village-level Mormon leader may have
been echoing the words of Apostle George Teasdale. Teasdale made a similar argument in a
church conference that same year: “Hear it, O Israel! And if you think that your political affairs
are more to you than your Priesthood and your Priesthood meetings, I am sorry for you.”452
Similarly, in a Stake Conference in Salt Lake City before Election Day in 1896, Apostle Heber J.
Grant said, “The Latter day Saints are so wrapped up in political affairs at this time that they
forget the gospel. Wherever you [go, you] hear the people discussing these matters, but you very
seldom hear them talking of the blessings which the Lord has bestowed upon them.”453 In sum,
many church leaders both local and general saw voter mobilization and campaigning, while
important for aggregating the interests of citizens in the democratic process, as a distraction from
the “weightier matters” of religious duty and as a potential violation of covenants.
When the Democrat Brigham H. Roberts ran for political office, brashly not cooperating
with church directives to balance the electorate he became a target of priesthood censure. The
religious hard-liner and church hierarch John W. Taylor, condemned Roberts for working against
to the First Presidency's corporatist policy. Taylor asserted that Roberts “had broken his
covenants and should be called to an accounting.”454 The lay member Abraham Holladay, of
Provo, argued in a Sunday meeting that any evil speaking or opposition to church policies should
be regarded as covenant breaking by Mormons. Holladay speculated about how this type of
“apostate” behavior would impact Mormon transgressors in the afterlife. He concluded that they
would be doomed to eternal punishment.455
Evil Speaking against the Lord’s Anointed
The denunciation of “evil speaking” was not exclusively the modus operandi of Mormon
elite hard-liners trying to recapture the glory days of community cohesion in Mormon villages.
Local political officials also used the language of temple ritual to discourage dissent from the
corporatist maneuverings of the Mormon elite. The Republican stake president of Provo called
on ‘Elder’ Holbrook, the Mayor of Provo in 1895, to address a Provo congregation and Holbrook
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remarked that “it [was the Saints’] duty to sustain [leaders], and not criticiz[e] them; he urged the
people to uphold those in authority in the church and stake as it is our duty to do so.”456 As
Church leaders continued to orchestrate a more viable Republican electorate, duty and obligation
to sustain church leaders became a common refrain from Republican church leaders to Mormons
that resented the overt partisan maneuverings of their local leaders.
Other Presiding officers in Mormon villages outside Salt Lake and further away from the
scrutinizing eye of anti-Mormon newspapers gave a shot across the bow and threatened
Mormons that engaged in “the evil slangeing or speaking evil of one another which prevail[ed].”
Bishop Knudsen of Provo, around election time in 1895, thundered in a Sunday sermon that “we
as Latter-Day Saints ought not to circulate falsehood about our brothers and sisters in the
church.” Knudsen gave the name of a church member that had been “slanged by members of his
ward, and warned them to cease to do so or that they would be tried for their fellowship in this
church.”457 Knudsen’s over-the-pulpit full throated attack on “evil speaking” in politics was not
an isolated incident. Knudsen may have been mirroring the behavior of higher ranking church
authorities. Similar to Knudsen’s threat to excommunicate evil speakers, George Q. Cannon also
threatened to excommunicate William Seegmiller if Seegmiller published a damning report
about the moral failings of Cannon’s son. William Seegmiller wrote a letter to Cannon detailing
his plans to publish stories about Cannon’s son, Frank. It was an open secret that Frank had
drinking problems. In addition to Frank’s drinking, he was also known to engage in salacious
sexual escapades worthy of a small town gossip column.458 There is no evidence that George Q.
actually tried to withdraw fellowship from Seegmiller but the threat from a presiding officer may
have had a chilling effect on Seegmiller’s campaign strategy. In short, when invoking religious
obligations failed to curb the unsavory campaign tactics of their Mormon congregants, Mormon
leaders sometimes threatened excommunication or ostracism to neutralize campaign competition.
For village level Mormon leaders, “speaking evil” of the Lord’s anointed was more than just
apocalyptic rhetoric used to maintain community cohesion. “Speaking evil” was an overt
reference to covenants entered into by many faithful Mormons through sacred rituals in holy
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temples. Especially with the before and after the dedication of the Salt Lake temple much of the
village level Mormon leaders’ political rhetoric was dripping with temple ethos.
Deference to Priesthood Authority is Superior to Political Authority
In the August of 1891, the Democratic and Republican Parties set up booths and podiums
on opposite ends of the lawn surrounding the Logan tabernacle and sought political converts. At
the Democratic lectern regaled in red white and blue, Apostle Moses Thatcher spoke briefly.
Thatcher said that he “had used no influence with men in [Cache Valley] to have them join either
party, as he desired them to be free.” Five bitter election cycles later, the orchestration of the
party divisions left Thatcher alienated from his colleagues in church leadership in threat of losing
his membership in the church.459

Figure 34 Joseph F. Smith asked a congregation of Mormons, “Who would you rather have rule
over you? The priesthood? or some scheming politician?”

Five years later, Thatcher’s superior in the church hierarchy, Joseph F. Smith spoke to the
many of the same local leaders in Logan. Smith emphasized not agency, but obedience to
prophetic counsel in speech inside the Logan tabernacle. Joseph F. Smith was responding to
accusations of the Church’s influencing of local elections. Smith did not deny church
involvement. Instead, he framed church involvement as a test for the faithful. Smith made clear
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that for him, the freedom to associate with a political party was drastically inferior to obedience
to church leadership: “We have to learn to do right in the face of being called subject to the
priesthood. Who would you rather have rule over you? The priesthood? or some scheming
politician and be a pocket piece to some petty fogging [conniving and nitpicky] lawyer or
wireworker [I.E. puppet master].” In other words, Smith argued while the Mormon people had to
render to Caesar his due, they did not have to sycophantically serve Caesar. In Smith’s mind,
being a cog in some political machine should have been less important to Mormons than being
subject to rulers in the kingdom of God. The Mormon elite began to more bluntly explain to
Mormon audiences that the equal party division was a mere strategy for relief from the
“wireworkers,” and the “petty fogging” lawyers that had used state power in a partisan manner to
strip Mormons of their rights of citizenship.460
In response to another case of alleged voter fraud in the Mt. Pleasant which we
mentioned earlier, In response to the Mt. Pleasant case of alleged electoral fraud, President
George Q. Cannon gave an extraordinary sermon to Mormons in Mt. Pleasant in which he called
the complaining members that lost the election to repent for stirring up controversy and casting
doubt on the legitimacy of the election results. Cannon invoked Mormons covenant obligation to
consecrate their “all.” Many Mormons had covenanted to establish Zion. Thus the proper
response to any perceived voter irregularities was to do whatever it was necessary to establish
Zion. Cannon explained, “God has established Zion. We must love it. [I am] sorry that many are
indifferent in the love of Zion. [They] care more for politics than religion. Many who have been
thoughtful and reliable men are getting careless in the gospel & the devils [working] upon them.”
Cannon reframed voting irregularities as not a question of voter fraud, but of proper priorities.
Politics was beginning to wrongly supersede religion in importance in the minds of many
Mormons. Cannon questioned his audience: “Are you elders going [to the polls] as men of God,
or are you going to give way to excitement & anger?” If the latter, then Cannon suggested that
they were not walking in the covenants they had made and they were in danger of coming under
the power of the devil.
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Figure 35 George Q. Cannon lamented in a sermon, “Party leaders are not desirous of asking
council of those who are placed in authority.”

George Q. Cannon continued in his Mt. Pleasant address and more forcefully associated
those who angrily disputed election results with demonic possession. The fear of evil spirits
possessing the bodies of saints was a common trope in apostolic addresses in the pioneer period
of Utah Territory when morality and a return to faithfulness was heavily stressed. Anxiety over
demonic possession persisted as recorded in various journals in the 1890s. There were still
scattered references and also extensive passages of worries about demonic possession and
witchcraft in frontier Utah. Alma Hale gave a supposedly possessed woman a priesthood
blessing in which the woman screamed “I am Satan,” but Hale noted that the spirit had
tormented her so long that she was dead in day.461 Priddy Meeks in southern Utah, spent pages of
his journal discussing how to identify and counter the power of evil spirits and witches.
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Similarly, young men in 1890 were convinced that their hermit neighbor in Lehi was a witch.462
Unexplained sickness was often accompanied by references to nefarious spirits, such as was
recounted by Hester Telle Richards. She wrote about an experience when a neighborhood child
howled in pain because of her feet. The mother of the child saw in vision that the feet were being
squeezed by a dark spirit at the foot of the bed. Another woman near St. George, Utah claimed
that she had seen an evil spirit run up and steal the eyesight of a child that had recently gone
blind in her Mormon community.463 In Springville, Utah, Margaret Birch would “make a
concoction sometimes to ward off evil spirits.”464
Thus, when Cannon spoke in Mt. Pleasant about returning to a passive deference to
priesthood leadership and to not dispute the results of elections, his audience was already primed
by anxiety with the devil’s ability to take possession of earthly tabernacles that permitted him.465
Cannon further tapped into an anxiety over evil spirits when explaining that political
participation without proper authorization had the ability contort and mangle the spirits of
otherwise good men: “Elders [should] be contented in the council of God [so] that evil spirits
may not take possession of you. Many evil spirits are going abroad to seek to destroy the people
of God...when man gives way to anger, the evil spirits possess his body & they become
transformed. In political campaigns men sometimes are led astray by evil spirits because they
give way to anger & extremes.”
Cannon combined a fear of covenant breaking with a fear of spiritual ruin through satanic
influence to encourage the return to the passive consent of deference to political rulers in the
Territory. He lamented that “Party leaders are not desirous of asking council of those who are
462
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placed in authority.” Party leaders did not see the President of the Church and his councilors as
legitimate arbiters and coordinators of political matters anymore: “Wilford Woodruff holds the
keys & his councel is the Councel of God.” Deference to his direction in political decisions was
good and right but “many men have neglected to ask counsel of him, no man can prosper who
treats him and his counsel lightly be they even his counselors or one of the twelve apostles.”
Cannon obliquely referenced political machines in the urban centers in the eastern United States.
Party leaders back east would consult the aged leaders in neighborhood or a precinct captain
before running for office. According to Cannon, this deference to a political boss was practiced
everywhere, “but in this country the young men think it below their dignity to ask council of a
good aged man. Men who will disrespect these men, will not prosper.” Cannon concluded his
remarks by predicting a full return of priesthood control of political governance in the region:
“[The] time will come when parties will have not so much power as they have now have…The
man that will not listen to such council will perish & [be] swept away. Do not be carried away by
any kind of political doctrine. God help you all. Amen.”466 Like Joseph F. Smith, Cannon saw
reverential deference in political matters as superior quality than some desire to foolishly
proceed in politics without consulting the rule of the wise and holy.
Both Smith and Cannon similarly argued that political pluralism free from priestly
guidance “tend[ed] to loosen the bonds which hold communities together and their natural
tendency [would be] anarchy.”467 Smith, like Cannon, rejected phrases like paternalism,
absolutism and monarchy “that seemed to convey the idea that the leaders of Isreal [sic] will take
away the agency or liberty from the people.” But men should take counsel from the only man
still living “who received his endowments under the hands of Joseph Smith.” Both men
essentially argued in favor of a strong state that could coordinate political religious and economic
interests in a corporatist manner and especially in which political leaders defer to the established
religious order for guidance and mediation in order to maintain order and peace and harmony.
Conclusion
The deliberate cultivation of the personal vote in Utah Territory was so detrimental to
local societal cohesion that the simple calculus of the elite was simple. To crack down, or not to
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crack down? That was the question. They assessed the costs of allowing the continuation of
unchecked political pluralism as a bridge too far. It outweighed the benefits. With the
abandonment of polygamy, the cessation of sealing to high ranking church leaders, the adoption
of capitalism, and the threat of secular educational ideas, they decided the church was
modernizing too fast. Societal change was outstripping the institutional pace and the church
could not keep up. It cracked down on politics but the tensions between church and state
continued.
While the American Civil War did not penetrate Utah Territory, one legacy of it did
impact how Utah Territory adopted national parties. In the nineteenth century, Utah along with
most of the nation, the national parties had no distinct institutional identity, but were instead
amalgamations of local and state party machines.468 Party politics in Utah, similar to other parts
of the country, adopted a series of military metaphors: political campaigns, party standard
bearers, and the rank and file and precinct captains.469 Political “war” was waged in Utah
Territory between the competing parties. A primary means of attack was to attack the character
of their political rivals. The deliberate de-emphasis of the differences between the national
political parties, incentivized local politicians in Utah to emphasize their own individual
personalities the moral failures of their opponents. Elections in Utah Territory after the adoption
of national parties turned on politicians’ individual qualities rather than on parties’ policy
positions or ideological stances. The adoption of national political parties and the orchestrated
equal division in the two parties forced politicians to compete with other candidates not only
from their own church but from their own congregation as well, thus making it absolutely
essential that they consolidate their electoral support based on the personal vote consistent with
Cannon’s prediction of a reversal in the amount of political pluralism in Utah, the Church
hierarchy in Utah continued to inject itself into political campaigns and debates in controversial
ways with pushback coming from all quarters. The corporatist norms and institutions were not
dismantled and the introduction of national party politics merely gave the church elite different
organizations to manage. Michael Mann wrote that “states will institutionalize present social
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conflicts, and that these institutionalized historic conflicts then exert considerable power over
new conflicts.”470
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

“More bitter and unyielding partisanship never developed anywhere:” Legacies and
Lessons of the Introduction of National Parties in the Mormon West

This dissertation has suggested that a central imperative of the nineteenth century U.S.
federal government was the desire to extend the authority of the state into spheres of society
hitherto dominated by non-Protestant religious elites in the American West. Political parties
organized themselves around acquiring clients and delivering patronage. They instituted a
protection racket to garner a predictable voting bloc in Utah Territory in exchange for relaxed
enforcement of anti-polygamy laws and amnesty for polygamists. The continuity of Utah’s
subnational regime after gaining the prize of statehood offers many lessons about regime change,
political parties, the American West and possibly the future role of the Mormon people in
American politics.
Framing Utah Territory as subnational illiberal authoritarian regime, this dissertation has
provided a new way of understanding the Mormon West. This concluding chapter pushes the
boundaries of this descriptive political analysis of the introduction of national parties in Utah
Territory. After briefly summarizing my findings, I further explore possible arguments that
empirical analysis may more fully corroborate in subsequent projects. I lay out a research agenda
on which I plan to focus for the foreseeable future. I will also extend the argument of this
dissertation farther into the future after Utah statehood to demonstrate and explore the utility of
analyzing subsequent periods of sociopolitical upheaval in the region.
This began as a study of how the Mormon elite divided their population along national
party lines and what was the Mormon response to this division. What this research revealed was
that, in addition to the Mormon elite deliberately deemphasizing the religious cleavages in the
territory, they also undermined the salience of party labels and sought to encourage elections
based on individual candidates. This personalistic political approach allowed religious
orthodoxy, personal piety, and commitment to building Utah to become more important than
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well-articulated party program.471 The Mormon elite’s strategy to deemphasize both party ID
and the religious cleavage, had a number of payoffs and consequences that will be summarized
below.
Extortion, Partisan Coordination and Ethnic Outbidding
In the 1890s patronage politics still dominated the organizing and mobilizing of voting
blocs for the major parties in the U.S. When the ruling elite in Utah Territory adopted the
Democratic and Republican parties, the parties did not come clear prepackaged policy positions.
They were non-programmatic and the national party structures were predatory organizations
attempting to implement protection rackets in Utah Territory. These national organizations
encouraged the continuity of subnational illiberal/ authoritarian regimes in exchange for votes.
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the federal state was largely controlled
by partisan majorities in Congress and in which political patronage, such as amnesty for
polygamists or non-enforcement of anti-polygamy laws to the Mormon elite and lay Mormons,
was exchanged for their political support.
Utah Territory maintained its unique synthesis of religious political power after adopting
national parties largely because national political parties primarily sought votes and did not
exclusively seek the liberalizing of the region. However, the 1890s constituted a critical juncture
for Utah’s party system. As a result, the Mormon elite had an expanded menu of options from
which to choose.472 Instead of Mormon elite orchestrating the political pendulum swinging
overwhelmingly to the Republican Party to access patronage, the Mormon elite chose to
coordinate an equal divide along party lines to leave open the strategy of accessing patronage
from whichever party dominated in the federal government.
Elite divisions among the Mormon leaders lead to inconsistent implementation of the
equal divide. After the LDS Church’s First Presidency decided to dissolve the political arm of
the church, the People’s Party, the Mormon elite divided into three competing factions. The
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hard-liners among the Mormon elite sought to maintain the status quo.473 These elites worried
that liberalizing by adopting parties would exacerbate anti-Mormon persecution. They sought to
maintain a policy of cultural and political isolation to uphold the religious integrity of how they
conceptualized “Zion” or “the Kingdom.” Whereas, the soft-liners were divided into two
competing factions over two major points. The soft-liners disagreed on whether they should seek
external linkages and patronage from the Republican Party. The soft-liners were further divided
over to what extent political pluralism should be curtailed.474 Democratic leaning soft-liners
feared that any attempt to orchestrate political decisions among the Mormon people would breed
distrust among non-Mormons and resentment among Mormons. Whereas the faction of
Republican soft-liners sought to encourage a political equilibrium to make patronage available
from the Republican Party operatives that had offered protection from federal intervention to
Mormons in exchange political loyalty.
The elite divisions contributed to varieties of responses to the adoption and coordination
of political parties. Some villages in Utah, that faced little resistance to priesthood control,
divided equally. Other areas within Utah Territory resisted elite coordination of politics and
organized party competition more naturally. Still other areas, which fell under the direct
supervision of Democratic soft-liners, were actively encouraged to explore and cultivate sincere
partisan competition and to disregard elite overtures for an artificially equal political divide. The
nature of the introduction of national party politics highlights the contingency and complexity of
how different factions’ leaders attempted to manage the liberalizing of politics in Utah Territory.
The artificial introduction of party competition, along with the elite’s de-emphasis on the
distinctions between the parties, exacerbated the personalized attacks during campaigns in Utah.
Like much of the rest of the nation, once party politics were introduced, elections in Utah began
to focus on personal politicians and not on clear policy agendas. The majority of settlers in Utah
were Mormon. When they chose parties, many religious elites downplayed any difference
between the parties to help establish a more equal partisan division. Ethnic outbidding among
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these religious communities became pronounced. Party operatives attempted to achieve the
endorsement of charismatic church leaders and frame their party as the true protector of the
Mormon people while painting the opposition candidate (who was also often a church officer) as
a foe to Mormonism. Ethnic outbidding, combined with personalistic politics, made campaigns
largely personality driven. Candidate’s character flaws and religious orthodoxy were scrutinized
and the more charismatic and virtuous the candidate the better the electoral outcome. Ad
hominem attacks against coreligionists were frequent even among candidates that were expected
to break bread together in worship services in small Mormon villages. This increased the social
unrest among coreligionists who had previously been committed to communitarian ideals. Thus,
in a communitarian society where social cohesion was cultivated by religious elite, personal
politics was especially corrosive.
Because of the social unrest that these contentious elections encouraged among the
Mormon people, the incentive for the Mormon religious elite to control political pluralism was
high. In other contexts, once a region started down a track of liberalizing the costs of reversal
would be high. But within a religiously constituted system that adhered to the belief that
revelatory utterances can legitimately reverse policy, a reversal of a liberalizing trend would be
less costly. Crackdowns on contentious elections would be less expensive for the regime.
Republican soft-liners among the Mormon elite formed a coalition with religious hardliners in to
counter the influence of Democratic softliners that had aligned themselves radicals in opposition
to the regime. The majority on the ruling elite used religious charged language to warn Mormons
that were aligning themselves with radical non-Mormons. The ruling elite made it clear that
Mormons that opposed church involvement in elections were flirting with excommunication and
demonic possession. George Q. Cannon explained that the continued church involvement in
politics “may come in contact with some of your ideas. [Mormons] may think [kingdom
building] will be done through party conventions [or] through politics or through political leaders
[but] it will never be done in that way. It will be done through the power of god and through the
revelations of Jesus Christ.”475 In the second half of the last decade of the century, the priesthood
reasserted control over politics and marginalizing pluralistic soft-liners because the majority of
Mormons still held the First Presidency as legitimate arbiters of politics in the Territory.
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The subnational elite’s crackdown on contentious political pluralism in Utah reached its
apogee when the Mormon elite (with the exception of Moses Thatcher) issued what has been
called the Political Manifesto in 1896. This document stated that Mormon ecclesiastical leaders
would be required to officially obtain the church’s permission from their ecclesiastical superiors
before running for church office. This official Church policy allowed church leaders to continue
the coordination of political candidates for office in Utah. This represented a period of
consolidation for the Mormon elite.476

In this dissertation, I used comparative politics concepts and applied them to the case of
the predominantly religiously organized Territory of Utah in the late nineteenth century. I
interpreted the 1891 adoption of national political parties in Utah as a critical juncture. The path
dependent nature of constraints were significantly relaxed and the menu of options for the
religious elite in Utah Territory expanded.477 This period of transition in a U.S. Territory is a
fruitful epoch to study because the decisions debated and the policies implemented significantly
limited the subsequent menu of options of the ruling elite for subsequent generations.
Implications for Regime Change
By framing Utah Territory as a case of subnational illiberalism or authoritarianism, it
allows us to put this case in conversation with other cases and draw comparisons and make
inferences. For example, Edward Gibson defines regime juxtaposition as a condition where two
layers of government with authority over the same slice of national territory operate under
dissonant regimes. Regimes can be described as norms, rules and practices that manage the
choice and the conduct of subnational elites. If subnational regimes are to stay in power for long
periods of time then subnational elites must stop the burdening interference of national actors
that seek to create ties with the local organized opposition to the subnational regime. Subnational
elites must further use representation in national institutions like legislatures to extend their
national influence and to look after their subnational interests. Finally, to ensure the perseverance
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of their rule, subnational elites must control many connections across their permeable boundaries
including money and communication flows, which connect the two tiers of government.478
External pressure for a subnational regime to liberalize, can result in short-lived reforms
that are also easily reversed depending on the incentives of the federal government.479 For
example, party competition at the U.S. national level was contingent upon national Republicans
selling protection in exchange for the maintenance of illiberal subnational regimes in Utah. The
Mormon elite could provide a Republican voting bloc with some regularity, and thus the initial
natural adoption of party affiliates were challenged by local leaders and reversal of the
liberalizing trend was implanted by disciplining and alienating prominent Mormon dissidents.480
Thus, the partisan-implementation of federal policies at the subnational level can and often does
create significant blowback and is harmful to the stated aims of the federal government for
intervening at the subnational level.
Another implication for regime change is the perceived biases of winners and losers of
the regime change. Schlozman Verba and Brady (SVB), in their book the Unheavenly Chorus,
highlight many normative reasons for championing the equality of influence of citizens in a
democracy. While discussing the imperative of citizens having an equal voice and the tensions
this creates in a democracy, SVB posit one important reason in favor of citizens having an equal
say in government: its power to confer legitimacy on the process. Democratic transitions are
often predisposed to democratic reversals or regime instability because of the perceived
illegitimacy of the new regime. One answer to the question of why losers in a conflict are more
likely to accept an outcome as legitimate is whether the losers believe that the rules of
democratic procedure have been followed. Legitimacy depends on the perception that the
political process is fair.481 For a generation, Mormons in Utah suffered under what they saw as
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an unfair system. They had been primed with the language of equality of influence. Thus in the
case of the Mormon elite’s continued involvement in the outcomes of elections and the selection
of candidates after statehood, Mormon Democrats and the non-Mormon minority saw the
interferences of the church in politics as delegitimizing the political process in in Utah because it
robbed them of an equal voice in government. Non-Mormons and Mormons aligned with them in
became less and less likely to accept election outcomes. While the scope of the conflict was
often small, non-Mormons in Utah continued to have incentives to nationalize the conflict to
increase the visibility of the conflict even after statehood. The larger American audience was
overwhelmingly opposed to the LDS church in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Americans perceived that the Mormon elite dictated in all aspects of the lives of the Mormon
people. Increasingly, church involvement in politics was met with greater resistance in the early
twentieth century. Accusations of illegitimacy by factions of non-Mormons and second echelon
reform minded Mormon leaders pressed the Mormon elite to withdraw further from involvement
in influencing electoral outcomes. In the early twentieth century, the church continued to
maintain that it was their right to coordinate the political affairs of the people. Even so, John
Henry Smith said in 1899, “grave questions arose in regard to how to use our influence
politically for the good of the people.”482
This norm eventually contributed to more liberal democratic outcomes in the Mormon
West. Since political parties had positions on many topics that had previously been the legitimate
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical leaders, open debates and criticisms of church positions began to
erupt. Mormons were left feeling like whenever their leaders did not confine themselves to
religious principles or spiritual matters they were “talking politics,” and were thus open to
criticism. Mormons felt their consciences and agency curbed by the heavy handed dictates of
their leaders. Many Mormons resented the continual involvement of the church in both political
and economic affairs and saw the adoption of the national political parties as a retreat into the
realm of the spirit for their church. They saw their church becoming more like a church and less
like a people or a nation. Almost imperceptibly, Mormons in Utah had incrementally adopted
democratic expectations of the equality of influence of citizens in their society.
A further implication of this case of regime change speaks to how subnational regimes
influence national regimes. The concern of how the subnational religiously motivated regime
482
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should influence their own people, raises the important question: How do subnational illiberal
regimes impact national level politics? Extending the concept of subnational boundary control
beyond the limited scope and depth of this dissertation, in 1903 the Mormon elite in Utah sought
to nationalize their influence by permitting a Mormon Apostle to become a U.S. Senator.
However, before Smoot’s seating his colleagues among the Mormon elite were unable to
successfully monopolize all national and subnational linkages. A group of Protestant church
leaders, lawyers, and mine owners from Utah drafted a petition protesting Reed Smoot’s
appointment to the U.S. Senate. They argued that since Smoot belonged to the upper echelons of
the Mormon elite, this should disqualify him from the U.S. Senate. According to the petition,
Smoot was a member of religious body “claim supreme authority, divinely sanctioned, to shape
the belief and control the conduct of those under them in all matters whatsoever, civil and
religious, temporal and spiritual.”483 This petition initiated what is possibly the longest and most
thorough investigation into a religious institution in the history of the United States. The seating
of a Mormon Apostle once again focused U.S. attention on the illiberal and religiously heterodox
norms that characterized Utah in the early twentieth century. Reed Smoot would later help clear
the path for further Mormon migration from European nations and was the facilitator of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff. When the LDS church attempted to nationalize their influence by
allowing a Mormon Apostle to become a Senator from the state of Utah the scope of conflict
expanded. No longer was this some regional dispute over Protestant and Catholic miners in Mt.
Pleasant Utah that complained that the local Mormon bishop had too much control of election
outcomes. Now, the conflict was over the integrity of the U.S. Senate. The scope of the conflict
expanded and the visibility of the conflict was high. An unsympathetic national audience once
again was forced to face the perceived heretical nature of Mormon society in Utah. As the scope
of the conflict expanded beyond the borders of Utah, minorities and majorities experience a role
reversal. Non-Mormon Minorities in Utah successfully nationalized the conflict and appealed to
a larger and more sympathetic audience of Protestant America through the press. By raising the
visibility and the intensity of the conflict the impact of the minority’s grievances were amplified
when brought to a national (largely Protestant) audience.484
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The heightened scrutiny that the Reed Smoot hearings brought on the LDS church,
significantly changed the churches position on polygamy and also to a lesser extent in regards to
politics. After testifying before the U.S. Senate, then church president, Joseph F. Smith returned
to Utah and released what has been called a “Second Manifesto.” This Second Manifesto echoed
points made in the first manifesto on polygamy from fourteen years prior. Smith further affirmed
that any church leader who officiated a plural marriage, as well as the couple that were married,
would be excommunicated from the church. He also made clear that the policy applied
worldwide; No more plural marriages performed in Mexico or Canada. In politics, after the
Smoot hearings, the LDS church continued to sometimes endorse candidates and the church
leaders actively campaigned for them but because of the very public denunciations of church
coordination in politics that were highlighted during the Smoot hearings and prior, the church
hierarchs were further constrained in these political activities. The pluralistic and contentious
nature of political factions in Utah that actively resisted church involvement slowly began to
limit the effectiveness of the Mormon elite’s political involvement.485
Does this Case Study Travel?
While admittedly this dissertation is a single case covering an obscure and under
researched topic in American political development, does it nonetheless speak to other cases?
The study of subnational regimes has long been a potential research field pregnant with
possibilities. In the past decade important scholarship has come out that reframes cases and
regions using the theoretical framework of subnational authoritarianism or similarly subnational
undemocratic regimes (SUR).486 Robert Mickey’s work applying comparative politics theories to
analyze and the southern United States as SURs was long overdue and a game changer.487 Using
concepts and literature developed in the subfield of comparative politics to analyze subnational
regimes in the U.S., has expanded the available cases for comparison and put unlikely cases in
conversation with one another. Below I highlight some potential cases that would, in subsequent
research projects, be useful in coming into conversation with the Utah Territory case.
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In his study of the struggle for New Mexico statehood, David V. Holtby suggests that a
mixture of white supremacy and partisan strategy obstructed New Mexico’s quest for statehood.
The New Mexico case makes for an interesting comparison with Utah Territory. Republican
Albert Beveridge’s derision towards Spanish culture in New Mexico, mirrored his derisive
comments about Mormonism. Beveridge believed that both cultures, with their hierarchical
religions and deference to authority, failed to prepare the citizens of these Western territories for
the responsibilities of self-government. But perhaps an even stronger motivation for the
Republican Party’s opposition to statehood in both Utah and New Mexico was political
partisanship and the fear that the addition of further Western states would enhance the position of
the Democratic Party. In Utah, the hierarchical religious culture with its strong deference to
authority was able to orchestrate the creation of a sizable Republican base. Furthermore, their
abandonment of polygamy permitted Mormons, in the minds of Congress, to achieve a level of
civilization and “whiteness” that allowed Utah’s inclusion in the Union. Whereas in New
Mexico, no such widespread coordination to manufacture Republican voters for statehood
occurred. Additionally the alleged the racially inferior status of Nuevo Mexicans was only to be
eradicated, in the minds of the U.S. Senate, by a consistent influx of Euro-Americans to the
region.488 Thus politics territorial governance is a ripe area for comparative analysis.
Another helpful analytical foil with territorial Utah is the Canadian province of Quebec.
In some ways Quebec provides a counterfactual case to what might have occurred in Utah had
there not been a predatory party-led crackdown on Utah Territory in the 1880s and 1890s. Like
Utah, Quebec was a full-orbed religiously hierarchical society. Whereas Quebec was Catholic
and French speaking, Utah was largely Mormon with a large Scandinavian population. Both
societies were grounded in the religious labors punctuated by sacrifice in the name of religion by
pioneers of their respective religious groups. Both Quebec and Utah went through a rekindling of
their faith as well a clear project of boundary maintenance through devotional and church
initiated revitalizing efforts in the mid-nineteenth century. Both regions were largely rural with
only isolated regions of intense urbanization well into the twentieth century. In Quebec, the socalled “revolution tranquille” or Quiet Revolution was largely the result of influential and
energetic intellectual insiders from the Catholic community in Quebec that enthusiastically

488

Van Holtby, David. Forty-Seventh Star: New Mexico's Struggle for Statehood. University of Oklahoma Press,
2012.

206

pushed for a reform in the province.489 In Utah the introduction national political parties was
largely externally imposed by partisan–led pressure from the central government. Some scholars
also point to the precipitous decline of Catholic influence in Francophone Canada as resulting
largely from the political soft-liners’ increased role the control provincial education. In the mid
twentieth century, the Catholic Church precipitously lost control of the province's education
system. In Quebec, when this secularizing of the school system happened, disparagements of
Catholic institutions that previously been infrequently made, now became routine. In Quebec
local Quebecois joining the priesthood and other religious orders also dropped during and after
the Quiet revolution. It seemed abrupt that, Quebec’s stable combination of Catholic, French,
rural, conservative, isolationist, and pre-capitalist values vanished.490 The LDS church, similar to
Catholic control of Francophone Canada also had provided the majority of education in Utah
Territory. The LDS Church’s control of the education system was relinquished a generation
earlier. In the 1880s and 1890s, the U.S. federal government with the cooperation of local nonMormon religious organizations and federal marshals confiscated land for the creation secular
educational institutions in Utah. This federally imposed secular education led to a lack of
Mormon trust in secular education and a massive push for local religious academies.491 The
connection between criticism of the LDS Church and secular education is another area in need of
further research. Prior to the 1891 political reforms in Utah Territory, Utah like French Canada
deferred to the rule of the “wise and holy.” Members of these societies were both resigned to
submit to religious laws dictating their public life. The societies were organized in a corporatist
fashion. They were collectivists and group-centered societies with an emphasis on burden
sharing.492 However, after the introduction of national parties in Utah in 1891, incrementally the
norms and political culture of the national party system accompanied the parties. The Utah
initially reacted in dismay to these trends but over time and especially after the Smoot hearings
they became more anti-statist, more individualistic and more populist. These new norms and
values were coupled with the persistent pre-reform characteristics of Utah such as its rural
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nature, its overall conservativism, and its isolationist tendencies. The synthesis of these values
and characteristics were slower to die after the political reforms of the 1890’s, largely because
life in most of rural Utah until 1950 looked very similar to life in Utah in 1890. Ranchers still
ranched. Farmers still farmed. Miners still mined. The lack of economic disruptions and the slow
generational change in educational expectations made only incremental changes possible in most
Mormon villages.493 In contrast to Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, Utah’s religiously organized
villages (even after the adoption of political reforms) were sustained deep into the twentieth
century by a dominant and still extraordinarily robust combination of widespread devotion to
their faith and priestly direction.494
Another useful comparison outside of North America also shows why the Utah case is
useful to expand our understanding of political behavior in non-democratic regimes. Utah
Territory, like many regimes where party politics is initially introduced, dealt with the social
reality that democratic governance was not perceived as the only game in town.495 Many
scholars have highlighted the need for societal conditions such as a vibrant civil society. Many
Mormon women and men in nineteenth century Utah emigrated from Scandinavia or the UK and
had little exposure to U.S. democratic governance once they settled in their insular frontier
Mormon villages. In addition to the behavior of Mormon elites that curtailed political pluralism,
attitudinally, many Mormon people did not even accept that democracy was the best form of
government. In this way the population of Utah’s political attitudes were similar to, for example,
many Germans during the German Empire and Weimar Republic that viewed political activity in
low esteem. Many Mormon essayists in the late nineteenth century, after the introduction of
political parties, articulated beliefs similar to German elites in that they drew a distinction
between serving the state, which was patriotic, and serving the interests of political parties.
Therefore, for many Mormons, similar to many Germans especially in the Weimar republic,
competitive political parties were a nasty degrading despicable affair. Whereas serving the state
was an act of patriotism.496
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Another comparison that is worth exploring is Mormon corporatism and how it is similar
or different to other corporatist states. The 1890s Republicans in the U.S. were in favor of strong
centralized democracy whereas Democrats were for more local autonomy and popular
sovereignty. LDS Church leaders were very already corporatist before the adoption of national
party labels. Mormon corporatist is worth comparing with German corporatists. The majority of
Mormon elites believed in coordination and cooperation between business, labor, church and
politics for cooperation. This would assure that more local control would rest in the hands of
local technocrats, party elite, businessmen and church officials. Church leaders discouraged what
they labeled as “anarchist” elements of labor unions and workers guilds. In contrast to Germany
that had a long history of guilds Mormons abandoned or privatized their co-ops in the late
nineteenth century. Church leaders support for women’s rights, especially suffrage, could also be
interpreted as expanding the amount of Mormon voters to ensure dominion of local control of
politics.
The strategies of the Mormon elite in the 1890s further travel to other cases as is evident
with their resettlement policies for poor Mormons. The Mormon elite had for decades sent
impoverished Mormons out of the cities to settle along the frontier.497 This policy was not
dissimilar to Chinese policies that have restricted mobility of Chinese citizens and the frequent
resettlement of citizens from the major city centers to rural areas as a measure to mitigate social
unrest and unsanctioned collective action.498 With the U.S. economic crisis in 1893, the policy of
calling Latter-day Saints to homestead in isolated Mormon villages was again reiterated by the
Mormon Elite. The motivation was clearly to discourage the increase of an open and
dynamic civil society in the more urban regions of the Territory.499 Above I have used Linz and
Stepan’s definition of “civil society” as being where self-shaping and fairly self-directed groups,
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social movements, and people endeavor to express values, to create social and political
connections with one another to further their wellbeing and happiness.500 The Mormon elite
coopted and coordinated social movements such as women’s suffrage movement, and
discouraged other aspects of civil society such as associations in trade unions, business groups,
and other unrestricted professional organizations. Also, similar to policies in modern China, the
Mormon elite encouraged the resettlement of the urban poor in rural frontier villages in Southern
Utah to further act as a release of the pressure valve for class-based political mobilization.501
Similar to Japanese party competition in postwar Japan, nineteenth century Mormons had
a high degree of sociocultural homogeneity in the mostly rural and isolated nineteenth century
Utah Territory. This made it difficult to organize a viable political opposition to the church’s
candidates. Brigham Young had explained a generation before that nineteenth century
Mormonism had the effect of homogenizing political preferences: “When [American society]
came to consider Joseph Smith and the Saints, they saw that they were one in [political ] faith,
and it scared them all, [because Mormonism] alters men’s politics; [it] change[s] them and
make[s] them all one.”502 The Mormons took seriously the injunction to be one in all things. For
example, an early church leader, Oliver Cowdery, denounced “the present Gentile world, with all
its parties.”503 Thus, when the Mormon elite divided the Mormon people into parties in 1891,
party competition became largely organized around the character of the candidate and their
skills, expertise and other valence issues which all Mormons desired such as statehood and relief
from persecutions; not on party programs and specific policies. Again, the legacy of Young’s
policies informed the lack of institutional party structure and the personalist politics, when he
explained that Mormons should “vote for the man who will sustain the principles of civil and
religious liberty, the man who knows the most and who has the best heart and brain for a
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statesman; and we do not care a farthing whether he is a whig, a democrat, a barnburner, a
republican, a new light, or anything else.”504
In Japan, in consequence of their party system, the major parties’ policy positions have
become more similar to each other. Voters also have increasingly cast ballots based on “valence”
(i.e., nonpolicy) evaluations such as economic growth and the character of the candidates.505
Similar to Utah Territory, this can result in dynastic politics with highly recognizable politicians
with important last names being more successful in elections. Also campaigns often turn on the
moral failings of candidates.506 In sum, sociocultural homogeneity in both Japan and in
nineteenth century Utah made party competition weak and it often hinged on non-policy
evaluations of candidates which increased the likelihood of emphasizing the personal failings or
successes of candidates.
Another way in which this case travels can be seen in the LDS church’s policy of
deliberately deemphasizing the legitimacy of religion as political identity. This also occurred in
India. After years of organizing party politics along ethnic lines, Nehru and other Indian leaders
in the post-independence period sought to deemphasize the Muslim Hindu cleavage so as to
mitigate the perpetuation of ethnic conflicts.507 The possibility of politics organized along
religious lines after independence in India vexed the political elite that feared that the territorial
integrity of the nation would be further cast into doubt with regions predominantly Muslim
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seeking either independence or incorporation into surrounding Muslim majority nations.508
Whereas, Mormons feared sectarian politics would exacerbate tensions between Mormons and
non-Mormons resulting in more severe external intervention from the U.S. federal state. A
possible comparison on the outcomes of the de-emphasis of religiously organized politics may
provide fruitful analysis in subsequent research.
Nineteenth century Utah, after the introduction of national political parties, also shares
some striking parallels with Post-Revolution Iran. In both Iran and Utah Territory, tensions
between religion and representative politics leaves compromises difficult to achieve. In Iran, as
well as in Utah Territory in 1891, an organizational chart of the governing institutions looks like
two complete systems, one democratic and another theocratic, mashed together. In both cases
there are elections with political actors and campaigning but the scope of these campaigns are
sharply limited by the religious councils which successfully block candidates that stray too far
from the council’s preferences.509 In the case of Iran, the marriage of the democratic and
theocratic system was formalized; in the case of Utah territory, the synthesis was not formally
constituted. In both systems, popular support for theocracy wains overtime. In both cases
external threats helped religious leaders consolidate power. In both cases greater external
linkages strengthened the positions of moderates and soft-liners. In Iran elite ideological groups
that lack the formal structure of political parties compete just as fiercely. They struggle to control
the country’s unelected institutions which is a fight often carried out in the shadows. In the case
of nineteenth century Utah, the elite divisions among elected religious leaders have been
extensively documented and made available to researchers and could possibly shed light on
ideological struggles in Iran’s religious institutions.510
Future Research
This dissertation analyzes and situates new and original data from the American West
within a broader comparative context. It does not make many overt comparisons with
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hierarchical religions in similar situations. In the future, I plan to research why the national
Republicans did not pursue a similar strategy of coopting the votes of Catholic voters.
Catholicism and Mormonism both suffered under Protestant-led discrimination and persecution
sanctioned by Republican federal officials. Yet the Republicans coerced Mormons into a
patronage relationship and not Catholics. Perhaps it has to do with their different religious
cultures or the difference in the geographic cohesion (or isolation) of Mormon communities
compared to the more diffuse Catholic presence in the U.S. Perhaps the variation in outcomes
arose from differences in the hierarchal connections. For example, Catholic leadership is
international, Mormon leadership is American and perhaps more easily leveraged than rulers in
Rome. Perhaps the Catholics were less vilified and less vulnerable to federal intervention.
Catholics in America had highly institutionalized and insulated political machine systems
operated by Democratic politicians in large urban centers that were more impervious to
Republican intervention. Another avenue of analysis could be to look for parallels in the party
capture literature in American politics.511 A final reason to explain the variation could be a
question of the political economy of the western United States in the late nineteenth century.
With the expansion of capitalist markets and resources perhaps Republican leaders desired
continued economic development by industrious and business-friendly Mormons and perhaps
this is why they were coopted.
Another missing piece in this dissertation that is worth analyzing in a subsequent projects
is the lack of women’s voices and women political figures represented in the politics of
subnational illiberal regimes. Other than a brief mention of the official policy of the LDS church
to encourage the inclusion of women’s suffrage in the new Utah Constitution there is little
discussion of how women responded to the political division policy. There is plenty of evidence
of women participating in canvassing and encouraging woman voters to go the polls or to
support specific political parties in Utah. In addition to their participation in party politics in the
late nineteenth century, women in Utah were also very active in grassroots suffrage meetings and
debating and advocating for equal rights for women. This merits investigation; the parallels
between women suffrage movements in Italy, and other European nations where conservative
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parties supported woman’s suffrage because they rightly believed that the religiously minded and
traditional gender roles of women would make the women natural allies of the conservative right
leaning parties. Leftist socialist parties blocked the suffrage movement’s success in Europe. This
striking similarity warrants further inquiry.512
A further line of inquiry that would be a fruitful research project would be to use this
same case of religious-led voter divisions to reinforce the reality that votes are socially
embedded and have less to do with a calculus of voting for future gains or punishing past
performance.513 In a related question, the Utah territory case would be interesting trace the
process of how identity-based voting evolves into normalized politics.
One aspect of this case study that was not explored sufficiently is a question that has
interested many scholars of the Mormon West: How have Mormons balanced tradition and
modernization in the Mormon west? Rural Utah in the late nineteenth century was full of women
speaking in tongues and potions concocted to ward off evil spirits and witches; folk magic and
religion was not easily demarcated. In the same town where these pre-modern practices are
prevalent there would be political debates that became “boiling hot” and where Darwin and
technological sophistication was debated in organized debate clubs. Local newspapers reported
national and international stories. The existence of independent magazines and competing
perspectives made a difference in the market place of ideas and created a robust exchange of
ideas even along the frontier. Much was changing in Mormonism in the late nineteenth century
and the LDS church leaders seemed to have deliberately engineered the lowering of societal
expectations for what politics should be in the Mormon village by fostering the continuation of
the religiously dominant identity to weather the cultural shifts. The paradoxes of modern and
pre-modern practices coexisting and the tensions they reveal in the late nineteenth century in
Utah is worthy of further investigation.
Conclusion
The national parties came to Utah with their own rules norms and institutions and the
Mormon elite could not control all of the outcomes of this introduction. The dominant party in
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Congress in the late nineteenth century was able to negotiate a linkage with the Mormon elite in
Utah that helped to deliver Republican Congressional seats. Republican patronage came at the
expense of sincere unrestricted political pluralism in Utah Territory. Patronage from the national
Republican Party fused with religious patrimonialism at the subnational level in Utah. This set
the stage for subsequent bitter contests to limit the control of the church over the state in Utah
that still reverberates in Utah politics.
Republican-dominated Federal intervention was socially disruptive to Utah. Federal raids
threatened to dismantle the church. Mormon leaders chose to buy protection from the threat of
the federal government’s intervention in the territory to gain relief from the unsettling federal
interferences into their way of life. However, in many ways this critical juncture in the evolution
of party politics in the West was tragic. In order to purchase protection from federal intervention,
party competition had to be manufactured. The Mormon project of constructing a literal
Kingdom of God, received its deathblow. Co-religionists began competing against each other
politically and using campaigns as barometers of the personal piety of their opponents. No longer
was it possible to expect all citizens of “the Kingdom” were of one heart and one mind to hasten
the coming of the Messiah. Instead, vitriolic ethnic outbidding, where Mormons sought to
demonstrate the moral failings of their fellow Mormons during elections, became common
among the Mormon people. With the engineered partisan divides, party competition that hinged
on non-policy evaluations of candidates increased the likelihood of emphasizing the personal
failings or successes of candidates. This became the modus operandi of political campaigns
every election cycle.
Mormon leaders went from facing down an external threat of complete eradication from
the extortive partisan administered police state, to facing the blowback from the artificially
manufactured political divisions in which their own people had “murder in their hearts” over
politics. After gaining initial promises of patronage from national elites, the Mormon elite
responded to dissenters in their own ranks. Mormons that dissented from the political polices of
the majority of the Mormon elite were alienated, silenced, excommunicated and often publicly
censured. This crackdown on proponents of greater political pluralism served to further
consolidate their local power, with tragic results for many Mormons.
The liberalizing of the political sphere in Utah Territory can be further considered tragic
because it forced ordinary Mormons to choose between competing goods: Social cohesion and
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political pluralism.514 As Hegel stated, “Genuine tragedies in the world are not conflicts between
right and wrong. They are conflicts between two rights.”515 Individual agency was in tension
with harmonious deference to priesthood leaders. Tensions between agency and obedience was
the doctrinal way that opposing leaders framed the tension. The price for social cohesion was
political deference to priesthood direction; but for many Mormons, the freedom to choose a
political identity came in direct tension with this disciplined obedience to priesthood direction
that pious Mormons were expected to give.516 These tensions set the stage for subsequent
attempts at maintaining the religiously constituted subnational regime in Utah.
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